The landing party chooses the supreme commander! Artillery of the RGC in the first period of the war Reserve of the main command.

Reserve of the Supreme High Command ) - Strategic reserve of the Red Army during the Second World War.

It included newly formed army formations (fronts, armies), formations, as well as units that were withdrawn to the reserve along the front line. Separate army units were also created, directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

1. History

In 1943, assault engineer-sapper brigades of the RVGK were formed.

In the pre-war period, the RGK artillery was supposed to have units of ground and anti-aircraft artillery. The creation of anti-tank units of the RGK was not envisaged. The formation of 10 anti-tank artillery brigades began in mid-May 1941 in the western border military districts. The deadline for final readiness for most of them was set on July 1 of the year, it was simply unrealistic: the units did not have enough guns and vehicles. Due to the lack of anti-tank guns, 76-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns began to be supplied to the armament of formations that were being formed. Before the war, the RGK artillery included 60 howitzer and 14 cannon artillery regiments, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and several separate divisions. The formation of new and modernization of existing divisions continued throughout the war. If in the initial period the RVGK artillery included 6% of the total number of artillery pieces, then at the end of the war it was already 20%. The Headquarters of the Supreme Command, widely maneuvering the artillery formations of the RVGK, at the right time reinforced the fronts and armies with artillery, which ensured a significant increase in the density of artillery in defensive and offensive operations.

According to the Soviet military science of the pre-war years, fire defeat of the enemy was to be carried out by delivering a simultaneous strike by the forces of all branches of the armed forces to the entire depth of the enemy defense. At the same time, the main role was assigned to artillery, which was organizationally divided into military artillery, which was part of subdivisions (starting from the battalion), units and formations, and artillery of the High Command Reserve (RGK). As part of the artillery of the RGC, it was supposed to have ground and anti-aircraft artillery units, which were intended for the qualitative, quantitative and special strengthening of the artillery of corps and divisions. Artillery units of the RGK were, as a rule, part of long-range corps and divisional artillery groups (DD), whose main task was to fight enemy artillery, or they were included in destruction artillery groups (AR), created if necessary to destroy heavily fortified enemy defensive lines . The creation of anti-tank units of the RGK was not envisaged. The second World War refuted this point of view, since large masses of tanks were used in the course of its operations and only effective anti-tank weapons could be opposed to them. However, the decision to form 10 anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK was made only at the end of April 1941.

Anti-tank artillery brigades, consisting of two regiments of six divisions, were powerful artillery formations. According to the state, the brigade had 120 anti-tank guns, 16 MZA anti-aircraft guns and 12 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns.

The formation of brigades began in mid-May 1941 directly in the frontier military districts. The deadline for final readiness for most of them was set on July 1, 1941. Such a short period of time was clearly not enough to properly equip, train and put together brigades as combat units. Due to the shortage of anti-tank guns, the Main Artillery Directorate began supplying 76-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns to the armament of the formations being formed. The situation with the provision of brigades with traction and vehicles was much worse. As of June 12, 1941, they had almost no tractors and received only 20% of the vehicles required by the state.

There were actually no funds for creating anti-aircraft artillery units of the RGC before the war. What was available was spent on staffing anti-aircraft air defense units designed to cover the objects of the country's territory. In the troops, not even all the corps and divisions had the separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the SZA and MZA assigned to them according to the state (As of June 1, 1941, there were 1382 guns in the military anti-aircraft artillery, and the states required 4900). Part of the GAU anti-aircraft guns was transferred to the formation of anti-tank artillery brigades.

In total, according to the wartime states in the Red Army, it was supposed to have 67335 guns and mortars, of which 4854 were in the RGK units. Before the war, the RGK artillery had 60 howitzer and 14 cannon artillery regiments, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and several separate divisions (battalions) and batteries, which accounted for 8% of all artillery. They were armed mainly with large-caliber guns: 122-210-mm cannons, 152-305-mm howitzers, 280-mm mortars (60%). Anti-tank guns and mortars were respectively 28 and 12%.

The distribution of artillery units of the RGK between the districts on the eve of the war was uneven. As can be seen from the table, the largest number of them were stationed in the southwestern strategic direction, where the High Command expected the enemy to deliver the main blow.

Change in the number of RGVK artillery units in the campaigns of the first period of the war

Data on	Types of artillery
	anti-tank					cannon				howitzer				mortars				reactive				anti-aircraft
	ptabr	ptap	paws	Total	HC*	dad, tpap	one OM, BM	Total	HC	gap, gap BM	one BM	Total	HC	minp	mind, minb	Total	HC	shelves	Drs.	Total	HC	shelves	Drs.	Total	HC
22.06.1941	10	-	-	20	18	14	2	15	14	60	13	64	58	-	11	11	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
01.12.1941	1	56	-	58	23	101	1	101	40	53	15	68	23	-	14	14	5	7	52	24	9	-	-	-	-
01.05.1942	1	120	-	122	21	176	4	177	30	145	13	149	26	63	-	63	11	56	47	72	12	-	-	-	-
20.11.1942	-	161	79	240	22	198	4	199	18	192	13	196	17	73	10	83	7	98	119	138	12	159	94	253	24

Compiled according to: History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T-34; Artillery in defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. - Prince. I; Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. - Prince. I; Fighter-anti-tank artillery in the Great Patriotic War.
* HC - specific gravity in percent.When counting the number of regiments, it is conditionally considered that three separate cannon (howitzer) divisions and three rocket artillery divisions are equivalent in terms of firepower to a regiment. One mortar battalion (battalion) is equated to a mortar regiment

Thus, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the RGK artillery consisted mainly of heavy cannon and howitzer artillery units, intended for the qualitative reinforcement of military artillery, anti-tank artillery formations, as well as individual mortar battalions. There were no anti-aircraft units.

The perfidious attack of fascist Germany put our troops in a difficult position. The rapid advance of the enemy inland led to the fact that the plans for rearmament and the formation of many artillery units and formations were actually thwarted. For the same reasons, the covering troops did not receive the personnel, means of transport and traction attached to them according to the mobilization plan. This had an extremely negative impact on the combat readiness of the artillery and its rear services.

The fight against enemy tanks throughout the Great Patriotic War was one of the most important tasks of Soviet artillery, both military and RGC. Therefore, already in the first months of the battles with the fascist hordes, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command paid great attention to the formation of new artillery units of the RVGK, especially anti-tank ones. In July-August alone, 45 artillery regiments were formed, of which 42 (over 90%) were anti-tank defense regiments (PTO).

During the border battles and subsequent fierce battles, the RVGK artillery suffered significant damage. There was a real threat of losing units of large and special power, which, as a rule, did not take part in battles, since they were not adapted to conduct highly maneuverable combat operations, but were in the reserve of fronts (armies). In this regard, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief allowed the redeployment from the fronts (except the Leningrad one) of some artillery units of the RGK, which were armed mainly with 305-mm howitzers and 280-mm mortars, to the internal military districts.

In a situation of declining resources of artillery weapons, the Headquarters of the RVGK took all measures to keep the artillery of the RVGK at the highest possible level and constantly strengthened it through the formation of new cannon, howitzer, mortar and anti-tank regiments, and also included in September 1941 in its composition all artillery regiments and anti-aircraft artillery battalions of rifle and mechanized corps in connection with the liquidation of the corps link. When forming new artillery regiments, emphasis was placed on increasing the number of highly maneuverable units, designed primarily to fight enemy tanks. For example, the formation of light artillery regiments (paws), anti-tank defense regiments, as well as rocket artillery - this new and effective remedy destruction of enemy manpower. Of the 4,252 guns and mortars used in 1941 for the formation of artillery units of the RVGK (without anti-aircraft and rocket artillery), 2,903 guns (69%) were for anti-tank artillery.

As the experience of the first months of the war showed, the anti-tank brigades of the RVGK and their regiments in the conditions of the transition of the Red Army to strategic defense turned out to be very cumbersome and difficult to control. In the course of fast-moving, maneuverable battles and battles, it became necessary to reinforce not only armies, but also rifle divisions and even regiments with artillery anti-tank weapons. To do this, at this stage of the war, it was more expedient to have in the artillery of the RVGK not large artillery formations, but a large number of small maneuverable anti-tank units. With this in mind, in the fall of 1941, all anti-tank brigades of the RVGK, except for the 14th anti-tank artillery brigade formed during the war on the Leningrad Front, were disbanded. Due to the material part of these formations and the newly allocated weapons in the second half of 1941, 72 artillery regiments of anti-tank weapons of the RVGK of various organizations were formed. Basically, these were light, maneuverable units, which included 4, 5 or 6 batteries of a four-gun composition.

Due to the lack of anti-tank guns, 37-, 76- and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were used to form anti-tank regiments.

So, in July-October 1941, 49 divisions of medium-caliber and 49 batteries of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery were involved in staffing anti-tank defense regiments - a total of 770 guns.

Since March 1942, more and more new 76-mm guns of the 1942 model (ZIS-3) began to enter the army. They began to arm new anti-tank regiments, as well as to replace anti-aircraft guns in already formed units. With the release of anti-aircraft guns, the formation of anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the RVGK began. In addition, in early June 1942, 140 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions, 8 separate anti-aircraft batteries, 5 anti-aircraft armored trains and other units were transferred from the country's air defense to the subordination of the chief of artillery of the Red Army, which formed the backbone of the formed anti-aircraft artillery units of the RVGK.

Most of the organizational changes carried out in 1941 in the RVGK artillery were dictated by the difficult situation at the front and the lack of weapons. In particular, it was necessary to go to extreme measures related to the weakening of the firepower of artillery units in order to increase their number. So, in early September 1941, the cannon and howitzer regiments of the RVGK were disaggregated. Their batteries were transferred in the active army to a two-gun composition. Due to the released material part, new regiments were formed. 122-mm and 152-mm howitzer artillery units were transferred to the artillery of the RVGK, expelled from the states of rifle and tank divisions and reorganized into howitzer artillery regiments of the RVGK.

Separate mortar battalions of the RVGK turned out to be very bulky (48 107- and 120-mm mortars). Therefore, by order of the NPO in January 1942, they were disbanded, on their basis the creation of lighter mortar units, mainly five-battery mortar regiments (20 mortars each), began. By April 1942, there were 49, and by October, 70 RVGK mortar regiments in the active army.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, units of field rocket artillery were rapidly formed. The first combat vehicles of a new type of weapon were developed in our country immediately on the eve of the war. The simplicity of their manufacture by industry, the high efficiency of fire, especially when firing at manpower, the enormous morale impact on the enemy - all this predetermined the rapid growth of rocket artillery.

In July 1941, the formation of the first separate batteries, and then rocket artillery divisions, was completed. Highly appreciating the combat capabilities of the new type of artillery, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command takes decisive measures to develop it. On August 8, the formation of eight regiments of rocket artillery began, and then six more. Fighting vehicles (installations) of rocket artillery BM-8 and BM-13 were first mounted on the chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle, later on the chassis of the T-40, T-60 tanks and STZ-5 tractors. In January 1942, in accordance with the GKO decree, they began to form rocket artillery regiments of the new organization. The divisions of these units, having received their own material support bodies, were able to act independently.

For the period of operations, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command reinforced the fronts with units of rocket artillery, which received the name of the guards mortar (GMCH). They reported directly to the commanders of the fronts. For the direct management of combat activities and the supply of parts of the GMCh at the fronts, special control bodies were created - front-line operational groups of the GMCh.

Since the spring of 1942, the rear of the country began to supply the Armed Forces with more and more tanks, aircraft, guns, mortars, and rocket artillery combat vehicles. Most of the incoming artillery weapons went to the formation of parts of the RVGK. The number of guns and mortars in the RVGK artillery grew steadily. If by the beginning of the war there were 4854 of them, then by December 1, 1941 - 5704, by May 1, 1942 - 10080, and by the end of the first period of the war - already 18133. The change in the number of artillery units of the Reserve of the Supreme Command in the first period of the war is shown in the table.

In connection with the continuous growth in the number of artillery units of the RVGK, the armies began to receive 10 or more regiments for reinforcement both in defense and in the offensive. It became more and more difficult for the small artillery headquarters of the formations to manage such a large number of units, so the chiefs of artillery of the armies, as a rule, transferred units of the RVGK to reinforce divisions. However, this practice was contrary to the principle of massing artillery and its fire. In this regard, it became necessary to create large artillery formations of the RVGK. At the end of October 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the organization of artillery formations of the RVGK in ground and anti-aircraft artillery. On October 31, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order to create artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK (ad and zenad of the RVGK).

The first artillery divisions of the RVGK were formed by including eight artillery regiments of the RVGK (three gaps, two pap and three iptap) and a separate reconnaissance battalion. Part of the army air defense regiments and the already formed anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the RVGK were turned to the formation of anti-aircraft artillery divisions. There were four regiments of MZA (37-mm guns - 48 and 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns - 80) in the zenad in the state of October 22, 1942. By the end of the first period of the war, there were already 11 hells and 8 zenads of the RVGK in the active army.

Reinforcing the fronts, the Headquarters of the All-Russian High Command in the course of operations resolutely concentrated the artillery of the Russian High Command on the most important sectors of the Soviet-German front. So, in the summer and autumn of 1941, the main attention was paid to the Moscow strategic direction. By the end of the Smolensk battle, 50% of all artillery units of the RVGK were concentrated on the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts. Of the 49 anti-tank artillery regiments of the RVGK, 22 were transferred to these three fronts. Most of the armies of the Western Front received 4-5 artillery regiments of the RVGK for reinforcement.

In October, during the period of the autumn thaw, the main efforts of artillery were concentrated in the army zones covering the main highways along which enemy tank columns rushed towards Moscow. So, the 16th Army, blocking the Volokolamsk Highway, received six regiments for reinforcement, the 5th Army, which was defending in the Mozhaisk direction, eleven, and the 43rd Army, which held the defense in the Maloyaroslavets direction, eight regiments and a separate division of anti-tank artillery. The density of anti-tank artillery (PTA) in these areas was increased to 6-10 guns per 1 km of front. The remaining armies of the Western Front were reinforced by 1-2 regiments. Accordingly, the density of anti-tank guns in their lanes was low - 1-2 guns per 1 km of front.

The cannon, howitzer and mortar units of the army received from the front were transferred for reinforcement to the rifle divisions defending in the main directions. In divisions, they were usually included in the infantry support groups (PP), less often - long-range (DD). The firepower of the artillery of the ace divisions more often began to increase at the expense of rocket artillery, whose volley fire had a high effect, especially when firing at enemy manpower.

In the summer of 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters focused on the southwestern, and then Stalingrad directions. The bulk of the reserves, including artillery, went here. The number of artillery of the RVGK, which took part in the defensive battles near Stalingrad, was continuously increased due to the reinforcement of the fronts by the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. So, if on July 12, 1942, the artillery units of the RVGK had 4282 here, then on November 18 - 12078 guns and mortars, i.e. their number has tripled. During July - the first half of October 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent 105 artillery regiments and 16 divisions from its reserve (40 iptap, 16 dads, 14 zenap, 3 minp, 32 regiments and 16 divisions of rocket artillery) to the fronts operating in the Stalingrad direction.

The commanders of the fronts, as a rule, reassigned almost all the artillery units of the RVGK to the armies of the first echelon, which is explained by their acute shortage of their own artillery. The armies operating in the main directions received 10 or more artillery regiments of the RVGK for reinforcement. The 62nd Army (South-Eastern Front, on September 1) had, for example, 16 artillery units of the RVGK.

In connection with the large saturation of the troops with artillery of the RVGK in the battles near Stalingrad, artillery anti-tank reserves (APTR) began to be systematically allocated at all levels from the rifle division to the front: 1-2 iptap in the armies and from 1 to 5 iptap in the fronts. Cannon regiments were included in the army artillery groups DD.

When conducting defensive battles directly in the city, by the decision of the military council of the South-Eastern Front on September 14, a front-line artillery group (FAG) was created at the expense of the RVGK regiments previously attached to the 62nd and 64th armies. It also included parts of the anti-aircraft artillery of the RVGK and artillery of the Volga military flotilla. The group was headed by the deputy chief of artillery of the front, Major General of Artillery V.P. Dmitriev. The FAG included up to 250 guns and mortars. Due to the wide maneuvering of the trajectories and the massing of fire of the artillery of the army and the front-line artillery group, at certain moments of the most intense fighting in Stalingrad, in the defense sectors of the 62nd Army, it was possible to create an artillery density of up to 110 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. A wide maneuver with the fire of large masses of artillery ensured the stubbornness and steadfastness of the troops in defensive battles both near Stalingrad and in the city itself.

During the operations of the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the RVGK artillery underwent both quantitative and qualitative changes. It included parts of rocket and anti-aircraft artillery. The organizational structure and armament of the units have changed significantly.

The quantitative growth of the artillery of the RVGK (from 4854 to 18133 guns and mortars), the inclusion in its composition of units armed with various types of guns, mortars and rocket artillery installations, also changed its structure. Due to the artillery of the RVGK, military artillery is strengthened not only in quality, but also in quantity. The proportion of RVGK artillery in terms of staff strength increased in the artillery of the Soviet Army from 8 to 20%.

With the reorganization of the national economy on a war footing and the strengthening of the power of the artillery industry, the artillery of the RVGK began to grow rapidly. Anti-tank and rocket artillery units were formed especially intensively, and since the summer of 1942, anti-aircraft artillery units.

Another was the ratio of different types of artillery. If in the pre-war period more than half of all regiments (see table) accounted for howitzer artillery, then by the end of the first period of the war, anti-aircraft (24%) and anti-tank (22%) artillery were superior. The share of howitzer artillery decreased to 17%.

Rocket artillery, which only appeared at the beginning of the war, began to account for 12% of the total number of RVGK artillery.

The fronts defending in the most important operational areas were assigned 30-40 artillery regiments of the RVGK, the army - 8-10 or more. The need to centralize the management of a large number of individual artillery units of the RVGK raised the question of creating artillery divisions (artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK). The tendency to form large artillery formations of the RVGK was further developed in the second period of the Great Patriotic War.

The Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the command of the fronts, widely maneuvering the artillery formations of the RVGK, at the right time reinforced the fronts (armies) with artillery, due to which they achieved a significant increase in the density of artillery in defensive and offensive operations.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 2/1994, pp. 59-66

To the question of the creation and use of reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War

Colonel G.A.MOKHOROV,

candidate historical sciences, docent

In the fierce battles with the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military strategy withstood severe tests, the most important problem of which was the preparation and use of the strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command. In order to provide the active army with the necessary number of trained strategic reserves, a well-functioning system of organs, structures, and training centers was required, subordinated to the solution of this problem.

On the eve of the war, the country's leadership paid sufficient attention to the preparation of reserves for the Soviet Armed Forces. An important document determining the procedure for accumulating a reserve of those liable for military service was the Law on Universal Military Duty adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 1, 1939, which fixed the personnel principle of building, recruiting and training the Armed Forces.

Taking into account the growing threat of war from Nazi Germany, the top state and military leadership took a number of covert measures to increase the combat capability of the Armed Forces. By the middle of 1941, out of 320 divisions envisaged for deployment according to the mobplan, 303 were part of the ground forces, but 81 of them were in the process of formation. In addition, not a single formation in the internal and border military districts was completed according to the prescribed states. The mistake was that in the western direction there were no trained reserves of the troops of the High Command. Four armies and one corps were secretly relocated here from a number of military districts: the 22nd Army; from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luki region, the 21st Army from the PriVO to the Gomel region, the 19th Army from the North Caucasus Military District to the Belaya Tserkov region, the 16th Army from the ZabVO to the Shepetovka region and the 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District to the line of the Western Dvina. These troops were supposed to deploy before July 3, 1941 and form the reserve of the High Command.

The notion that the most dangerous strategic direction was not the western one - Belarus, but the southwestern one - Ukraine, was erroneous, which resulted in the wrong decision to concentrate reserve troops. In the very first days of the war, the 19th and 16th armies were transferred by forced march to the Smolensk-Moscow direction.

The biggest mistake turned out to be miscalculations in the timing, scale and nature of the first, main blow by the aggressor. This led to the fact that all plans for organizing a more effective repulse of the perfidious invasion of the Nazi army were thwarted.

The first task was to deploy and strengthening Armed Force, creation a sufficient number of heterogeneous reserves of troops for the successful conduct of defensive and offensive operations, formation parts and institutions rear for their comprehensive support during the war. On the second day of the war in fourteen military districts, intense and unprecedented in scale work was launched by military councils, local Soviet and party bodies, and military commissariats to implement military mobilization plans. In an atmosphere of general patriotic upsurge, 5.3 million people were drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces in the first eight days of the war. Their numbers have thus doubled. History has not known such a volume of military mobilization in a short time.

Having completed the first stage of mobilization, the State Defense Committee (GKO) began to form a large number of rifle, cavalry, tank, aviation and artillery units and formations. So, in the first days of July, the State Defense Committee adopted two resolutions on the additional formation of 75 rifle, 10 cavalry and 25 divisions of the people's militia, and later another 85 rifle divisions and 50 separate rifle brigades.

By the decision of the State Defense Committee of July 16, 1941 "On the training of reserves in the system of NCOs and the Navy," the direct management of their preparation was entrusted to a special group created under the NCOs of the USSR. In August 1941, to solve this problem, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of the Red Army was formed.

Particular attention was paid to the training of personnel for aviation, navy, armored, engineering troops, and signal troops. The initial training of the reserves was carried out in the system of general education and Osoaviakhim, and the final training in specialties, especially technical branches of the military, in the system of spare and training units created with the outbreak of war. Their capacity has been constantly increasing. For example, if as of August 12, 1941, crews for tanks and armored vehicles were trained in 18 reserve regiments, then in May 1945 there were 8 training brigades, 7 training tank regiments, 2 reserve tank regiments, 3 training regiments (for tanks of foreign brands ), 2 training repair and restoration battalions, about 10 training tank regiments of the fronts.

The educational and material base and the quality of the educational process were continuously improved. The duration of training varied depending on the complexity of the specialty from 1.5 to 6 months. The main principle, which was implemented in the activities of training and spare parts of all branches of the armed forces, was to teach what is necessary in the war.

An important problem in the preparation of reserve formations was the staffing of their command personnel. With the beginning of the war, the duration of training in all military educational institutions was reduced, their capacity increased, and the network of military educational institutions was expanded. Thus, only the number of military schools of the Ground Forces has increased from 138 to 164, and the number of cadets has increased by 67%. As a result of these and a number of other measures, the officer training system generally met the requirements of the front.

The first strategic success of the Soviet troops during the Battle of Smolensk was used to the maximum by the Soviet government to solve the complex tasks of restructuring the national economy on a war footing, establishing mass production of weapons and military equipment. On this basis, there was an accelerated creation and replenishment of the troops of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. After the second mass mobilization in August 1941, the conscription of those liable for military service in the army continued uninterrupted. By the end of 1941, more than 400 new divisions had been formed. At that time, the Stavka had 11 armies in its reserve. The number of reserve troops was 700 thousand people.

In total, in the first six months of the war, 221 newly formed and 8 restored divisions, 110 rifle and tank brigades, as well as a large number of artillery, aviation and engineering units, and air defense units were transferred to the fronts. 97 pre-war divisions were also sent from the Stavka reserve to the active army.

An analysis of archival documents shows that during the first year of the war, the strengthening of the fronts by units and formations took place mainly due to new formations, which during this period were the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Divisions that suffered significant losses in battle were not restored, but were sent to replenish other formations and units.

From July 1942, the Stavka changed the procedure for creating its reserves. The main ways of replenishing them were: the formation of new formations of military branches and services of the Armed Forces and the withdrawal of formations and units from the fronts to the reserve for resupplying. The redeployment of rifle divisions under their command of the Supreme High Command for the period of replenishment and subsequent use was carried out according to plans developed by the General Staff and approved by the Headquarters. They envisaged, as a rule, the simultaneous replenishment of 40-50 divisions, the average number of which was 3000-3500 people, up to 600 horses and up to 75 vehicles. 3500-4000 people, 250-300 horses, 70-75 vehicles were required to complete each division to the established state. Combat and political training of personnel in the formations of the reserve was carried out according to special programs. The duration of training varied. Thus, the duration of stay in the reserve of 76% of divisions was less than 2 months.

In the third period, the reserves of the Headquarters were created mainly by resupplying the withdrawn formations and formations from the active fronts. The exception was the newly formed in January 1944, the 6th Panzer Army. Many divisions, corps and armies were withdrawn several times to the Stavka reserve. Four times, for example, the 21st, 28th and 61st combined-arms armies were in reserve; five times each - the 3rd and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The advantages of this method: the organizational and staffing foundations, traditions and continuity of the military glory of the unit, formation, the backbone of the personnel hardened in battles and front-line everyday life were preserved.

All during the war years, 527 divisions and 58 brigades were withdrawn from the fronts and understaffed.

The reserve of the Headquarters was also volunteer formations, which were created with the permission of the State Defense Committee on the initiative of local authorities. In the summer and autumn of 1941, when a critical situation developed in a number of areas, 60 divisions and 200 regiments of the people's militia were formed in large front-line cities. As independent formations, more than 40 volunteer divisions fought courageously near the walls of Moscow and Leningrad.

Highly combat-ready volunteer cadre divisions were also created in Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Bryansk, Omsk, Novosibirsk and other cities of the RSFSR. And in Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Perm, the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps was formed and provided with everything necessary from local resources, the combat path of which ended in Berlin and Prague. During the war years, the peoples of Russia gave the front over the GKO plan 55 rifle and cavalry divisions, 14 rifle brigades, 4 tank and 3 motorized rifle brigades.

In order to increase the strike force, improve command and control and use the troops of the reserve of the High Command in combat operations, their organizational structures were continuously improved. Thus, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, brigades and even divisions were formed to fight enemy tanks and aircraft. Guards mortar formations were especially actively created: at the beginning, divisions, then regiments and divisions. In the course of the rearmament of the Soviet troops that unfolded in the spring of 1942, the creation of tank and mechanized corps and tank armies, as well as reserve air armies, and then aviation corps, began.

In the summer and autumn of 1943, the preparation and use of strategic reserves reached perfection. The proportion of tank, aviation, artillery, mortar, and engineering troops has increased significantly in their composition. By this time, the transition of rifle troops to the corps system had basically been completed, qualitatively new formations had arisen - assault engineer-sapper brigades of the RGK. Of particular importance in solving strategic problems was the creation of five tank armies. The airborne troops, and especially the air defense troops of the country, received further development.

The results of the military mobilization activities of the central and local bodies of power and administration, the efforts of the entire Soviet people in strengthening their Armed Forces are truly enormous in terms of scale and effectiveness. During the war years, 80 combined arms armies, 6 tank, 17 air and 6 air defense armies were formed, and 40-50 of them, including 11 guards and 5 shock, were at the front.

Guards and shock armies, formed from the most combat-ready divisions, fought in the decisive areas of strategic operations.

One of the difficult moments in the activity of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the question of the distribution and direction of ready reserves to the fronts. The correct solution of this problem depended on the skillful determination of the main link in the existing strategic situation. The most important principle of the Supreme High Command in the distribution of fresh forces was, first of all, to send them to those areas where decisive battles were to unfold.

Anticipating the most acute events, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally asked the commanders of the troops of the fronts and representatives of the Headquarters under them - whether they had enough strength to completely defeat the enemy grouping. If necessary, the fronts always received additional reserves and marching reinforcements.

According to the data of the daily accounting of the number and readiness of reserves and marching replenishment conducted in the General Staff, the Supreme Commander had his own table of the availability of forces and means in the rear. By order of the Headquarters, they were sent to where they were in special need. Difficult situations also arose when the Headquarters could not satisfy the requests of the front commanders for the allocation of reserves. Such an example is typical. In June 1942, the Supreme Commander, in response to a similar request from the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, replied: “... the Headquarters does not have new divisions ready for battle ... besides your front, we also have other fronts ... We must fight not by numbers, but by skill. On another occasion, I.V. Stalin "explained" S.K. Timoshenko: "If divisions were sold on the market, I would buy 5-6 divisions for you, but, unfortunately, they are not being sold."

Comprehensively thought-out solutions were also required for issues related to the most rational concentration and efficient use of reserves. Rates. The success of not only individual strategic operations and campaigns, but the entire war as a whole depended on this. As experience has shown, these problems of military art were solved highly professionally and at the proper level.

At the time of the perfidious invasion of the USSR, the fascist German army, developing the offensive in three main directions, dealt the main blow in the central, Smolensk-Moscow. Correctly assessing the current situation, the High Command threw all the forces available in the reserve there in order to organize a strategic defense, the main task of which was to stop the enemy at all costs, to buy time to build up forces to go on the counteroffensive.

On the fourth day of the war, in order to restore the strategic defense front, the Stavka decided to use the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd (commanded by Generals I.S. Konev, P.A. Kurochkin, V.F. Gerasimenko and F.A. Ershakov) armies , put forward from the depths, in order to create a defense at the turn of the Western Dvina - the Dnieper. The command of the army group was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny. At the same time, the forces of the 24th and 28th armies (commanded by Generals S.A. Kalinin and D.I. Ryabyshev) launched defense preparations along the Selizharovo-Smolensk-Roslavl-Gomel line. The 16th Army under the command of General M.F. Lukin was concentrated in the Smolensk region.

During the battle of Smolensk, the Headquarters deployed in the rear of the Western Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko) a new echelon of reserve armies (29.30, 24.28, 31 and 32) led by General I.A. Bogdanov . Of the 20 rifle divisions of this echelon, five army groups were created (commander generals K.K. Rokossovsky, V.A. Khomenko, S.A. Kalinin, V.Ya. counterattacks against the fascist troops and unite with the troops of the Western Front, who fought in the encirclement in the Smolensk region.

In order to more reliably cover Moscow, on July 30, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed the Reserve Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov). He united the 34th, 31st, 24th, 43rd, 32nd and 33rd armies, which included 12 divisions of the capital's people's militia. The troops of the front occupied the Rzhev-Vyazma line of defense.

The strategic calculation of the Nazi command for a non-stop advance towards Moscow was thwarted. In October 1942, when the operational-strategic situation became even more aggravated, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent 18 personnel divisions from Central Asia, Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East to the Moscow direction, having information that "the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR" .

By the decision of the State Defense Committee on the outskirts of the capital, the Moscow Defense Zone was created under the leadership of the commander of the Moscow Military District, General P.A. Artemyev. It included parts of the capital's garrison, formations of the people's militia and divisions that arrived from other military districts. A significant contribution to strengthening the defense of Moscow and Leningrad was made by 12 divisions formed in the autumn 1941 years in the Siberian military district.

At the same time, five reserve armies were concentrated in the area of ​​Dmitrov, Lobnya, south of Orekho-Zuev, in Ryazan and Ryazhsk.

The State Defense Committee, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government did everything possible to stop the fascist hordes at the walls of Moscow. Most of the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - 150 rifle divisions (52%) and 44 rifle brigades (47%) - were given to the troops of the Moscow direction. And although numerical superiority over the enemy was not achieved, the Soviet troops in fierce defensive battles provided the conditions for going on a counteroffensive with decisive goals.

The defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Moscow radically changed the course of the war in favor of the Soviet Union. However, the situation remained tense. The front needed a huge amount of fresh forces and new reserves. In November-December 1941, they were preparing at an accelerated pace in the front line. In the areas of Krechetovo, Vologda, Gryazovets, Yaroslavl, Gorky, Alatyr, Saratov and Stalingrad, the training of 8 combined arms armies consisting of 52 rifle and 15 cavalry divisions was completed. However, during the general offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter 1941/42 year as a result of the "dispersal" of strategic reserves, no positive results were achieved. Due to the major mistakes of the Supreme High Command, all of them were completely used up. By June 1942 In the 1990s, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command did not actually have ready-made reserve formations.

At this time, their bulk (69 rifle divisions, 5 rifle brigades and 1 tank army) were intensively preparing and concentrated along two lines: the first - Vyshny Volochek, Moscow, Ryazan, Tambov, Borisoglebsk, Stalingrad; the second - Vologda, Yaroslavl, Gorky, Saratov, Kamyshin.

Serious miscalculations by the Headquarters in determining the direction of the main attack of the fascist German army in the summer of 1942 also led to an incorrect distribution of reserves. The bug has been fixed.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the principle of concentrating large reserves in the most important areas was maintained. Stalingrad turned out to be the main sector of the Soviet-German front. The Stavka transferred two-thirds of its reserves to the South-Western strategic direction. The 60th and 6th (commanded by Generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and F.M. Kharitonov) armies were advanced to the Voronezh sector from the reserve. In order to block the path to the Volga for the fascist troops, on July 12, 1942, the Stavka created a new, Stalingrad Front, the core of which was three reserve armies: 64.63 and 62 (commanded by Generals M.S. Shumilov, V.Ya. Kolpakchi, V. I. Kuznetsov, later A. Ilopatin and V. I. Chuikov). Troops of the 1st, 4th and 5th tank armies were concentrated in the area of ​​Kalach, Ilovlinskaya and Serafimovich (commanded by generals M.E. Katukov, V.D. Kryuchenkon, PL. Romanenko). At the end of August, the Stavka transferred the 24th, 1st Guards and 66th armies to the Stalingrad Front (commanded by Generals D.T. Kozlov, K.S. Moskalenko, R.Ya. Malinovsky).

The Headquarters and the General Staff paid special attention to the recruitment and cohesion of the newly created South-Western, as well as to strengthening the Don Front. In October, more than six divisions, understaffed across the Volga, were sent to Stalingrad to help the troops of the 62nd Army, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Before the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, in order to create a decisive superiority in the forces, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from its reserve transferred to the fronts only from November 20 to December 31, 1942 20 rifle divisions, 6 tank, 4 mechanized corps, 7 separate tank brigades, 25 artillery regiments and 2 aviation corps . The troops received the latest military equipment and weapons. Mechanized and tank formations had world-famous T-34 tanks, which allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to set more complex tasks for the troops. To build up the strength of the advancing troops, she created the 3rd Guards and 5th shock (commanded by Generals D.D. Lelyushenko, N.E. Berzarin) armies, which have high mobility and huge striking power.

The victory on the Volga further convinced that the final turning point in the war could not be achieved without strong and diverse reserves. Therefore, when developing the plan for the summer campaign of 1943, the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command assigned a special place to the deployment of powerful strategic reserves, taking into account the military-political tasks of the upcoming campaign, the availability of human, military-technical resources and vehicles. In a short time, huge forces of various types of troops and branches of the Armed Forces were accumulated on the territory of the Moscow and Volga military districts. They concentrated on the Smolensk direction, in the region of Kaluga, Voronezh and Voroshilovgrad. They consisted of 15 armies (including 2 tank armies), uniting 94 rifle divisions, 13 tank, 3 mechanized and 5 cavalry corps. The total number of personnel of the Stavka reserves exceeded 1 million people.

The highest degree of concentration of reserve formations of the Headquarters of the High Command was in the Voronezh direction. In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts at the line of Livny - Stary Oskol, a reserve front was formed - the Steppe Military District (since July 9, the Steppe Front under the command of Marshal I.S. Konev). It included the 2nd reserve, 27th, 53rd, 4th and 5th guards, 47th combined arms (commanded by generals V.I. Morozov, S.T. Trofimenko, I.M. Managarov, G.I. Kulik, A.S. Zhadov, A.I. Ryzhov) and the 5th tank (under the command of General P.A. Rotmistrov) armies. In July, the front received two more armies. Thus, 50% of all reserve troops of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were united as part of the Steppe Front. It was the most powerful front-line grouping, most of whose divisions underwent combat training, having received high field training.

The Steppe Front was faced with the task of preventing a deep breakthrough of the advancing enemy, and when our troops went on the counteroffensive, to increase the power of their strike from the depths on the Kursk ledge. The goal of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the formation of such an organizationally completed strategic link, capable of entering the battle in any direction, was achieved.

The heavy defeat of the fascist army in the Battle of Kursk allowed the Supreme Command Headquarters to further change the balance of forces on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Red Army. The continuous increase in the combat power of the army in the field created the conditions for reducing the number of trained reserves. Therefore, in the summer of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had at its disposal only six armies (of which 2 were tank armies), consisting of 36 rifle divisions and 4 tank corps.

At the final stage of the war, the Headquarters reserve (on January 1, 1945) included the Field Directorate of the former 3rd Baltic Front, the Karelian Front, consisting of three armies, as well as the 5th Guards Tank and 9th Guards Armies; On May 1, 1945, the Headquarters had at its disposal the Reserve Front Directorate, the Zemland Group of Forces, consisting of four armies (the former 1st Baltic Front). In preparing the final operations of the Great Patriotic War - the Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and especially Berlin - the Headquarters accumulated such forces as to create a double, triple and greater superiority over the fascist troops in the direction of the main attacks. Owing to the increased level of military skill of the commanders and the fighting skill of the soldiers, these operations were distinguished by their special scope, decisiveness and high efficiency in the destruction of large strategic enemy groupings.

The undoubted merit of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff is the skillful and creative combat use of strategic reserves. In the first period of the war, they were and acted on the defensive and solved various, but equally complex tasks: the restoration of the repeatedly broken Soviet strategic defense front, including twice in the main, central direction; creation of the greatest depth of defense in the direction of the main attacks of the enemy; reinforcement of active fronts by forming large strike groupings in order to deliver powerful counterattacks and go on the offensive with the main forces of the fronts in a given direction, etc.

In the second and third periods of the war, the most characteristic feature of the use of strategic reserves was sudden, massive actions with decisive goals up to the complete defeat of enemy troops in offensive operations; achieving superiority over the fascist troops in forces and means and building up strikes by the main groupings of the advancing troops. The actions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in the use of the strategic reserve troops were distinguished by: the absence of a template, taking into account the accumulated experience, recognition of the mistakes and miscalculations made, understanding them and preventing them in the future, genuine collective creativity in resolving issues of concentration and timely massive use of forces.

The basis for success in solving the complex complex problem of troop reserves during the war years was the competent, highly qualified leadership of this most important area of ​​military organizational activity of the central bodies of the Soviet state and the Armed Forces to achieve victory over fascist Germany. It was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff on the basis of the relevant resolutions State Committee Defense. All fundamental issues related to the order of formation and combat training, concentration, determination of specific goals and tasks for their use, redeployment, transfer to the active fronts and withdrawal at the disposal of the Headquarters, were resolved at the highest level.

Direct operational work was entrusted to the Department of Reserves, created in August 1941 in the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. After its disbandment (April 1942), planning, development of directives for the withdrawal of formations and units from the fronts to the reserve of the Headquarters, daily accounting, deployment and control over the progress of the staffing of strategic reserves began to be dealt with by the Department in the structure of the General Staff Organizational Directorate. In April 1943, it was reorganized and strengthened.

The issue of the state of the reserves (among other paramount ones) was reported daily by the Chief of the General Staff to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The corresponding directives were also approved here. All the changes that had taken place were put on the map of the location of the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which was also available to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Thus, the strictest daily operational control was achieved over the course of formation and resupply, as well as the redeployment of divisions and armies that were at the disposal of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The facts summarized above allow us to conclude that the reserves of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army were the main means of restoring and building up the combat potential of the Armed Forces, strengthening the existing fronts in the main directions and the most dangerous sectors of the decisive battles of the Great Patriotic War. They were the most important condition for the victory of the Armed Forces of the USSR over the army of Nazi Germany.

The creative, skillful, comprehensively thought-out approach of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff to the creation and use of strategic reserves clearly showed the superiority of the Soviet military strategy over the strategy of the fascist leadership.

The war of the Soviet Union with Germany and its satellites convincingly proved that it is impossible to fight without reserves. Therefore, the lessons and experience of solving this problem cannot be forgotten. Its relevance is determined not only by external, but also by internal factors. In conditions when there is no Warsaw Pact, NATO's power is maintained and strategy is being improved, new types of weapons and military equipment appear, close attention is required to assessing the balance of power between the forces of peace and war.

50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR. - M.: Military Publishing, 1968. - S.235.

F at to about in G.K. Memories and reflections. - M.: APN Publishing House, 1971. - S.218.

50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR. - P.257.

Military history magazine. - 1972. -№12. - P.46.

TsAMORF, f.15, op.2245, d.85, ll.123, 146.

Ibid., op.113, d.1, sheet 160.

Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war. Book one. -M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.- P.65.

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DEPARTMENTS OF THE 68TH ARMY AND TWO RIFLE DIVISIONS

TROOPS OF THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONT ON THE WITHDRAWAL

1. Send from the North-Western Front to the reserve Headquarters of the Supreme
of the High Command, the field administration of the 68th Army with units of the combat
support, service agencies and army rear services, 253rd and
254th page of the division.

2. Send by railway 1 in the following order:

a) administration, army units and institutions of the 68th army. Loading at st.
Mura from 18.00 5.5.1943, pace - 1 and at st. Lychkovo from 18.00 8.5.1943,
pace - 3.

b) 253rd division. Loading at st. Beglovo, Lychkovo from 18.00
May 5, 1943, pace - 3;

c) 254th division. Loading at st. Knivetsy, Lychkovo from 18.00
May 5, 1943, pace - 3.

3. Send the army command and rifle divisions in full, with
personnel, weapons, vehicles and property not allowed
kaya no withdrawals before shipping.

4. Provide divisions and management before sending: ammunition - 1 combat
set, fuel - 1 refueling, food forage - 10 days on the route
and, in addition, a five-day unloading stock. May 3 to report to the General Staff
the combat and numerical strength of divisions and a complete list of units and institutions,
sent with the control of the 68th Army.

5. Receipt directive to confirm. Report the progress of the shipment daily
to the General Staff 2 .

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 87, 88. Original.

1 Directive No. 46143 ordered the administration of the army and division to send marching orders
com: control - to the Bologoye area, the 253rd rifle division - to the Kuzhenkino area and 254th rifle division - to
Edrovo district (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 89)?.

a) to the commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front on the withdrawal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the reserve
management of the 4th Army and the 294th Rifle Division (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 84, 85).
Directive No. 46144 of May 3, 1943, the commander of the front forces was ordered to withdraw into re-
only the 294th division was reserved (Ibid. L. 90);

b) to the commander of the troops of the Kalinin Front on the withdrawal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the reserve
of the 373rd Rifle Division (Ibid., sheet 86). Directive No. 46145 dated May 3 to the commander of the
it was written to send another division (Ibid. L. 91).

RATE DIRECTIVE No. 30116

MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT

ON THE BATTLE MISSIONS OF THE 1st AIR ARMY

Copy: Commander of the Red Army Air Force

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered, in the period from May 6 to May 16, inclusive, the forces of the 1st Air Army carry out the following tasks:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Du-
Khovshchina, Demidov, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mstislavl, Bryansk, Zhizdra.

2. Disrupt the enemy's railway transportation in Smolensk and Bryansk
which directions, preventing the movement of trains east of the Vitebsk line,
Mstislavl, Pochep.

3. Disorganize car traffic on the roads east of the line
Smolensk, Roslavl, Bryansk.

The first strike against enemy airfields should be delivered between 0430 and 0500 hours on 6 May. Keep enemy aircraft under combat influence for three days, then take a two-day break and again proceed to mass operations at airfields, which are also carried out for three days.

Actions on railways and motor traffic on dirt and highways must be systematic throughout all ten days, and first of all, to disable steam locomotives, tanks, tankers, cars and staff vehicles with machine-gun fire.

Detailed instructions on the fulfillment of tasks to the commander of the air army were given by the commander of the Red Army Air Force.

Up to 220 sorties of assault, fighter and short-range bomber aviation, as well as up to 600 sorties of night bomber aviation, are allowed to be spent on the operation.

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 93, 94. Original.

1 On the same day, similar directives were issued to:

1. Disrupt the enemy's railway transportation on the lines Sebezh - Novosokolniki, Po-
Lotsk - Nevel, Vitebsk - Nevel.

2. Disorganize traffic on the roads east of the Pustoshka, Nevel, Gorodok line.

Operations are allowed to spend up to 300 sorties of attack aircraft and fighters (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 92);

b) to the Military Council of the Bryansk Front on the combat missions of the 15th Air Army and the 1st Guards. exterminate-
body aviation corps:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the area of ​​Volkhov, Karachev, Navlya,
Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky, Orel.

2. Disrupt the enemy's railway transportation from Bryansk to Orel and further to the front line;

3. Disorganize traffic on the roads east of the line Karachev, Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky.
It is allowed to spend up to 450 sorties on ground attack and use for the operation.
demanding aviation and up to 200 night bombing sorties (Ibid. L. 95, 96);

c) to the Military Council of the Central Front on the combat missions of the 16th Air Army, the 3rd Bomber
leveling aviation corps and the 229th assault aviation division:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky area,
Trubchevsk, Shostka, Konotop, Divination.

2. Disrupt the enemy's railway traffic, preventing the movement of trains from Unecha to
Hut [or] Mikhailovsky and from Konotop to Vorozhba.

3. Disorganize traffic on the roads east of the Trubchevsk-Konotop line.

The operation is allowed to spend up to 750 sorties of ground attack, fighter and bomber aircraft and up to 300 sorties of night bombers (Ibid. L. 97, 98);

d) the Military Council of the Voronezh Front on the combat missions of the 2nd Air Army, 4th Fighter
body, 1st assault and 1st bomber aviation corps:

STAFF DIRECTIVE No. 46151 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT, THE 52nd ARMY ON SENDING THE ARMY DEPARTMENT TO THE RESERVE OF THE SUPREME HIGH HIGH COMMITTEE

Copy: to the Chief of the Main Organizational Directorate of the General Staff

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered:

1. Send a field pack to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
management of the 52nd Army with combat support units, service institutions
vaniya and army rears.

2. Send by rail. Start of loading - 8 May. G.
in the area of ​​st. sacrums.

3. Send units and institutions of the army in full force, with all available
we eat people, horses, weapons, transport and property, without taking anything
before sending.

4. Units and institutions of the army must be provided with one refueling before dispatch
fuel, food forage - on the route 6 days and unloading stock
for 4 days.

5. On May 8, submit to the General Staff a list of units and institutions included in
the composition of the field administration of the army and army rear units and institutions.

Execution to convey 2 .

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command A. VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 106. Original.

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Belopolye, Romny, Pol-
tava, New [th] Vodolaga, Merefa.

2. Disrupt the enemy's railway transportation from Poltava to Kharkov.

3. Disorganize car traffic on the roads east of the line Belopolye, Akhtyrka,
New [th] Vodolaga.

It is allowed to spend up to 1,500 sorties of attack aircraft, fighters and short-range bombers and up to 400 sorties of night bombers on the operation (Ibid. L. 99, 100);

e) to the Military Council of the Southwestern Front on the combat missions of the 17th Air Army and the 3rd
shanny aviation corps:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Zmiev, Krasnograd, Dnep-
Ropetrovsk, Chaplino, Krasnoarmeiskoye, Slavyansk.

2. Disrupt rail traffic on the lines Novo-Moskovsk - Merefa, Krasnograd - Sla-
Vyansk, Pavlograd - Merefa.

3. Disorganize car traffic on the roads east of the line Krasnograd, Krasnoar-
Meyskoye.

It is allowed to spend up to 1700 sorties of attack aircraft and up to 600 sorties of night bombers on the operation (Ibid. L. 101, 102);

f) to the Military Council of the Southern Front on the combat missions of the 8th Air Army:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the area (claim) Slavyansk, (claim)
Krasnoarmeyskoe, Mariupol, Taganrog.

2. Disrupt the enemy's railway transportation on the lines Chaplino - Krasnoarmeyskoye, Gor-
agility - Debaltseve, on all railways to the north of the Gorlovka, Debaltseve lines; Mariupol,
Stalino and Gorlovka, Taganrog.

3. Disorganize vehicular traffic on the roads east of the Krasnoarmeiskoye, Ma-
riupol.

The operation is allowed to spend up to 1200 sorties of attack aircraft, fighters and short-range bombers and up to 400 sorties of night bombers (Ibid. L. 103, 104).

2 On the same day, similar directives were sent to:

a) Commander of the Volkhov Front:

1. Send two rifle brigades to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

2. Send by rail. The beginning of loading - from May 10 with. city ​​(TsAMO. F. 48a.
Op. 3409. D. 8. L. PO);

b) Commander of the troops of the Kalinin Front:

HQ DIRECTIVE No. 46149 TO THE COMMANDER

TROOPS OF THE VOLGA MILITARY DISTRICT

AND THE HEAD OF THE MAIN DEPARTMENT FORMATION

AND MANNING OF THE TROOPS ON THE RELOCATION OF THE RIFLE BRIGADS

Copy: to the Chief of the Main Organizational Directorate of the General Staff

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered:

1. Send the 25th Saratov, 120th Chapaev to a new deployment point
and the 163rd Penza Rifle Brigades.

25th brigade - loading at the station. Atkarsk;

120th page brigade - loading st. Chapaevsk;

163rd page brigade - loading at the station. Penza.
The dispatch rate is 6 echelons per day.

3. Send the brigades in full force, with all the presence of people, horses,
weapons, transport and property, without removing anything before shipment.

On May 6, submit to the General Staff a report on the combat and strength of the sent brigades.

4. Before sending, provide each brigade with: ammunition - 1.5 ammunition
bundles, fuel - two gas stations, food forage - on the route
10 days and unloading stock for 5 days.

Deliver execution."

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command A. VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48 a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 112. Original.

1. Send from the Kalinin Front to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
three rifle brigades.

2. Sending to make by rail or hike to the area of ​​Staritsa, Rzhev, Kalinin. On-
start of loading - from May 10 of this year. (Ibid. L. 108);

c) Commander of the North-Western Front:

1. Send by rail from the North-Western Front to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command 11, 21 and 23 anti-aircraft divisions of the RGK. Sending will start from May 8 this year. (Ibid. L. 105);

d) Commander of the 3rd Reserve Army, MVO troops:

From May 5, 1943, the 3rd Reserve Army should be directly subordinated to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Ibid. L. 115);

e) Commander of the 68th Army;

1. By May 15, 1943, redeploy the 68th Army to the Bologoye area to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme
High Command.

2. Include in the 68th Army:

a) field administration of the army with combat support units, service institutions and ar-
May rears;

b) the 253rd and 254th divisions, arriving from the North-Western Front; 294th page division,
arriving from the Volkhov Front; 373rd and 93rd division divisions arriving from Kalininsky
front.

Subordinate the army directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Ibid. L. 116);

f) Commander of the North-Western Front:

1. Send from the North-Western Front to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command-
two rifle brigades.

2. Send by rail. Start of loading - from May 11 of this year. (Ibid. L. 109).
1 On the same day, similar directives were sent to:

a) Commander of the Ural Military District:

1. Send the 82nd Marine Rifle Brigade to a new deployment point.

2. Send by rail from May 8 of this year. Loading - at Vereshchagino station.
The rate of dispatch is 3 echelons per day (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 111);

b) Commander of the Western Front:

1. Send five rifle brigades from the Western Front.

DIRECTIVE RATES VGK№ 46162 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 52nd ARMY,

TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE ON THE RELOCATION OF THE ARMY DEPARTMENT

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered:

1. By May 16, 1943, relocate the administration of the 52nd Army to the Ka-
linin to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command 1 .

2. Include in the 52nd Army:

a) the field administration of the 52nd army with combat support units, established
service lines and army rears;

b) seven rifle divisions, forming them on the basis of those withdrawn from the fronts
and arriving from the districts of rifle brigades:

138th line division - in the area of ​​​​Vysokoye on the basis of the 20th brigade of the North-West -
the front and arriving for its resupply of 64 brigades from SAVO;

153rd division division - in the Staritsa area on the basis of the 136th brigade of Kalininsky
front and arriving for its resupply of 109 brigades from SAVO;

154th line division - in the Rzhev area on the basis of the 130th brigade of Kalininsky
front and arriving for its resupply of 120 brigades from the PriVO;

156th division division - in the Kalinin area on the basis of the 26th brigade of Kalininsky
front and arriving for its resupply of 163 brigades from the PriVO;

157th line division - in the Likhoslavl area on the basis of the 6th marine brigade
Volkhov Front and arriving at its resupply 134th brigade from Yuzh. -
UrVO;

159th line division - in the Torzhok area on the basis of the 140th brigade of Volkhovsky
front and arriving for its resupply of 132 brigade from Yuzh.-UrVO;

173rd division division - in the Klin area on the basis of the 150th brigade of the Western Front
and arriving for its resupply of 135 brigades from the Moscow Military District.

To subordinate the army directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

3. Heads of the main departments of NPOs to complete the formed
divisions with personnel, weapons, transport and other types of property
stva, bringing the number of each division to 8000 people by the next
kam:

2. Send three str. brigades by rail to points as directed by the General Staff and two str. brigades - by marching to the Vyazma region, to the 10th Guards. army. Start of loading and march - from May 9 this year. (Ibid. L. 107);

c) Commander of the Central Asian Military District:

1. Send the 64th, 109th and 118th rifle brigades to a new deployment point.

64th page brigade - loading st. Mary;

109th page brigade - loading st. Stalinabad;

118th page brigade - loading st. Geok-Tepe.
The rate of dispatch is 3 echelons per day (Ibid. L. 114);

d) Commander of the South Ural Military District:

1. Send the 122nd, 132nd and 134th rifle brigades to a new deployment point.

122nd page brigade - loading st. Novo-Sergievskaya;

132nd page brigade - loading st. Sorochinskaya;

134th page brigade - loading st. Kandra.

The rate of dispatch is 4 echelons per day (Ibid. L. 113);

e) Commander of the Moscow Military District:

1. 135th rifle brigade by May 15 of this year. relocate in full force on a campaign to the Klin area (Ibid. L. 250). "See Document No. 210.

4. The leadership of the reorganization of rifle brigades into divisions and their additional staffing shall be entrusted to the chief of the Main Department of the Red Army. Deliver execution.

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command A. VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 120. Original.

At the end of 1941, one of those miracles happened, which never ceases to amaze the world. The defeated, bloodless, almost completely destroyed Red Army seemed to rise from the dead, first throwing the Wehrmacht away from Moscow, then defeating the Paulus army at Stalingrad and finally seizing the strategic initiative in the Battle of Kursk, which predetermined the outcome of the war.

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Note 1: Due to the low quality of the original scan, the tables are left as pictures.

Artillery Reserve Headquarters (RGK / RVGK)

This process of reorganization of the NPO continued into early 1942, seeking to save manpower and make the RVGK artillery regiments better suited to the needs of the field troops. Beginning April 19, he again reorganized the cannon artillery regiments. Now they had two or three divisions each, consisting of three two-gun batteries, with a regiment of twelve to eighteen 107-mm or 122-mm guns or 152-mm howitzer guns. At the same time, howitzer artillery regiments were reduced from three battalions, consisting of three batteries with four guns each, to two battalions armed with twenty-four 152-mm or 122-mm howitzers. In addition, a smaller version of such a regiment was created, which had one battery less - that is, only twenty 122-mm or 152-mm howitzers. Finally, on April 2, the NPO reduced high-capacity artillery regiments from four to two battalions, and battalions to twelve 203-mm howitzers, while increasing the number of high-capacity artillery regiments.

As a result, by July 1, 1942, the number of RVGK artillery increased to 323 artillery regiments and separate artillery battalions of various types, and by February 1, 1943, it amounted to 301 artillery regiments and 23 separate artillery battalions.

At the end of 1942, armaments production increased dramatically, allowing the formation of more artillery regiments and divisions of the RVGK. At the same time, the NPO was faced with the need to create new structures that would enable combined arms commanders to more effectively control their artillery - especially in those large-scale offensive operations that the Stavka planned to conduct in November 1942. As a result, by order of October 31, part of the individual artillery regiments of the RVGK was reduced to 18 new artillery divisions: in addition, 18 anti-aircraft artillery divisions were formed.

Initially, such a division consisted of 8 artillery regiments, including three howitzer artillery regiments from three divisions - twelve 122-mm howitzers in each regiment, two cannon artillery regiments from two divisions - eighteen 152-mm guns each, three anti-tank regiments artillery from three divisions - twenty-four 76-mm guns in each. Instead of anti-tank artillery regiments, there could be two anti-aircraft artillery regiments with twenty-four 85-mm guns each. In addition, the division included a separate artillery reconnaissance battalion. The total strength of the division was 7,054 men and 168 guns in the anti-tank version or 144 guns in the anti-aircraft version.

However, during the initial stages of the winter offensive, it became clear that these eight regiments were difficult to manage from a single center. Therefore, from December 14, the NPO began to form new artillery divisions with four brigades instead of eight regiments. Such a division consisted of a three-regiment light (anti-tank) artillery brigade with seventy-two 76-mm guns per brigade, a three-regiment howitzer artillery brigade with six dozen 122-mm or 152-mm howitzers, a two-regiment heavy gun brigade with thirty-six 122-mm guns or 152-mm howitzer-guns, a mortar brigade of four regiments with eight dozen 120-mm mortars, as well as an artillery reconnaissance battalion, an air squadron and rear services. The total strength of the division was 9124 men, 168 guns and howitzers and 80 mortars. In addition, the NPO formed one heavy artillery brigade (19th), which consisted of five cannon regiments, one high-power howitzer regiment, and one special-power gun battalion.

Throughout 1943, the Headquarters and the NPOs continued to reinforce divisions, brigades and artillery regiments of the RVGK to provide support for the Red Army both in defense and in the offensive, and also began to create full artillery corps. By building this artillery under the control of the Headquarters, putting together its formations in accordance with the needs of the situation of a specific offensive or defense, and timely allocating forces from it to the active fronts and armies, the Soviet command provided the Red Army with more flexible fire support, which, in turn, ensured unprecedented artillery superiority Soviet troops over the Wehrmacht in almost every major offensive of the Red Army.

At the beginning of 1943, the largest field artillery formations in the RVGK were the artillery divisions formed in October and modified in December 1942 with artillery brigades subordinate to them. In addition, the RVGK artillery included several independent artillery brigades (for example, armed with 152-mm guns), they had two regiments each, fire control and communications battalions, and a transport unit for supplying ammunition.

At the beginning of 1943, the most common artillery units in the Red Army were artillery regiments of combined arms armies, rifle corps and divisions, as well as artillery regiments of the RVGK. There were five variants of artillery regiments:

Cannon-artillery of three divisions with three two-gun batteries in each - a total of 1120 personnel with nineteen 107-mm or 122-mm guns or 152-mm howitzer-guns and 35 tractors;

Cannon-artillery of two divisions with three two-gun batteries in each, with a total number of 758 personnel, twelve 107-mm or 122-mm guns and 24 tractors;

Howitzer artillery of two divisions with three four-gun batteries in each - a total of 947 personnel, twenty-four 122-mm or 152-mm howitzers and 36 tractors;

Howitzer-artillery, which had one division with three four-gun batteries and one division with two four-gun batteries, with a total regiment strength of 864 people, twenty 122-mm or 152-mm howitzers and 30 tractors;

Corps artillery regiments of one or two battalions with three to six 122 mm guns and one battalion with twelve 153 mm howitzers.

The heaviest artillery in the RVGK at the beginning of 1943 were regiments and divisions severe artillery, artillery pain shoy power and special power. Regiments and divisions of heavy artillery were equipped with 152 mm Br-2 guns, high power - 203 mm B-4 howitzers, and special power - guns of 210 mm or even larger caliber or howitzers of 280 mm or more caliber. The artillery regiment of high power consisted of two firing divisions, had 904 people, 12 B-4 howitzers, 26 tractors and 36 trucks. A separate heavy artillery battalion had eight 152-mm howitzers, a separate high-power artillery battalion had six 203-mm howitzers, and a separate special-power artillery battalion had six heavy guns or howitzers.

The last stage of artillery reinforcement began on April 13, 1943, when the order was given to form five breakthrough artillery corps and breakthrough artillery divisions - either separate or subordinate to the breakthrough artillery corps. The breakthrough artillery corps consisted of two breakthrough artillery divisions, one division of reactive guards mortars and an artillery reconnaissance battalion with a total strength of 712 guns and mortars with a caliber from 76 to 203 mm, as well as 864 barrels of M-31 launchers. The breakthrough artillery division consisted of six artillery brigades: a light artillery brigade, consisting of three cannon artillery regiments with twenty-four 76-mm cannons each; a howitzer-artillery brigade with three howitzer artillery regiments, twenty-eight 122-mm cannons each; a heavy cannon-artillery brigade with two cannon regiments of eighteen 152-mm cannons each; a heavy howitzer-artillery brigade with four howitzer battalions of eight 152-mm howitzers each; a high-capacity howitzer-artillery brigade with four howitzer battalions of six 203-mm howitzers each; a mortar brigade with three mortar regiments of thirty-six 120-mm mortars each; artillery reconnaissance battalion. The strength of the breakthrough artillery division was 10,869 fighters and 356 guns, howitzers and mortars, including seventy-two 76-mm guns, eighty-four 122-mm howitzers, thirty-two 152-mm howitzers, thirty-six 152-mm guns, twenty-four 203-mm howitzers and one hundred and eight 120-mm mortars.

In addition, in June 1943, the NPO began to create experimental heavy cannon artillery divisions for counter-battery artillery fire. These divisions consisted of four brigades of three divisions of four batteries each, the battery had four howitzer guns, the brigade had 48 howitzer guns, and the division had 144 howitzer guns with a caliber of 152 mm. Two divisions of this type were formed (4th and 6th guards), and in October 1943, the third (8th guards) cannon artillery division, similar to a heavy one, but including a division with four batteries of four 76- mm guns instead of one division of 152 mm guns in each brigade.

By July 1, 1943, the NPO had formed 5 breakthrough artillery corps, 12 breakthrough artillery divisions, and 13 standard artillery divisions, comprising either three or four artillery brigades. By December 31, there were 5 breakthrough artillery corps and 26 artillery divisions, including 17 breakthrough artillery divisions, six artillery divisions founded in December 1942, and three counter-battery artillery divisions.

As the successful offensives of the Red Army in mid- and late 1943 showed, the sharp increase in the number and power of the artillery of the RVGK had a noticeable effect on the ability of the Red Army to break through the tactical defenses of the Germans. From October 1942 to the end of 1943, the severity of artillery fire during the planned offensive operations of the Red Army increased fourfold and reached crushing proportions.