The landing party chooses the supreme commander in chief! Artillery of the RVGK in the first period of the war. Reserve of the main command.

Supreme High Command Reserve ) - Strategic reserve of the Red Army during the Second World War.

Included newly formed army formations (front, army), formations, as well as units that were withdrawn to reserve along the front line. Separate army units were also created, subordinate directly to the Supreme Command Headquarters.

1. History

In 1943, assault engineering and sapper brigades of the RVGK were formed.

In the pre-war period, the RGK artillery was supposed to have units of ground and anti-aircraft artillery. The creation of anti-tank units of the RGK was not envisaged. The formation of 10 anti-tank artillery brigades began in mid-May 1941 in the western border military districts. The deadline for final readiness for most of them was set at July 1 of the year; it was simply unrealistic: the units did not have enough guns and vehicles. Due to the lack of anti-tank guns, 76-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns began to be supplied to the formations that were being formed. Before the war, the RGK artillery included 60 howitzer and 14 cannon artillery regiments, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and several separate divisions. The formation of new and modernization of existing divisions continued throughout the war. If in the initial period the artillery of the RVGK included 6% of the total number of artillery pieces, then at the end of the war it was already 20%. The Supreme High Command Headquarters, widely maneuvering the artillery formations of the RVGK, at the right moment reinforced the fronts and armies with artillery, which ensured a significant increase in artillery density in defensive and offensive operations.

According to Soviet military science of the pre-war years, fire defeat of the enemy was to be carried out by delivering a simultaneous strike with the forces of all types of troops to the entire depth of the enemy defense. In this case, the main role was assigned to artillery, which was organizationally divided into military artillery, which was part of subunits (starting from a battalion), units and formations, and artillery of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK). The artillery of the RGK was supposed to have units of ground and anti-aircraft artillery, which were intended for qualitative, quantitative and special reinforcement of the artillery of corps and divisions. Artillery units of the RGK were, as a rule, part of corps and divisional long-range artillery groups (LD), whose main task was to fight enemy artillery, or were included in destruction artillery groups (AR), created if necessary to destroy the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive lines . The creation of anti-tank units of the RGK was not envisaged. Started second World War refuted this point of view, since during its operations large masses of tanks were used and only effective anti-tank weapons could be countered. However, the decision to form 10 anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK was made only at the end of April 1941.

Anti-tank artillery brigades, consisting of two regiments of six divisions, were powerful artillery formations. According to the staff, the brigade had 120 anti-tank guns, 16 MZA anti-aircraft guns and 12 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns.

The formation of brigades began in mid-May 1941 directly in the established border military districts. The deadline for final readiness for most of them was set at July 1, 1941. Such a short period of time was clearly not enough to properly staff, train and assemble the brigades as combat units. Due to the lack of anti-tank guns for the armament of the formed formations, the Main Artillery Directorate began supplying 76-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. The situation with the provision of traction and vehicles to the brigades was much worse. As of June 12, 1941, they had almost no tractors and received only 20% of the cars required by the state.

There were virtually no funds for creating anti-aircraft artillery units of the RGK before the war. What was available was spent on equipping anti-aircraft air defense units intended to cover the country's targets. In the troops, not even all corps and divisions had the separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions SZA and MZA assigned to them according to their state (As of June 1, 1941, there were 1,382 guns in the military anti-aircraft artillery, and the states required 4,900). The GAU transferred some of the anti-aircraft guns to the formation of anti-tank artillery brigades.

In total, according to wartime standards, the Red Army was supposed to have 67,335 guns and mortars, of which 4,854 were in the RGK units. Before the war, the RGK artillery had 60 howitzer and 14 cannon artillery regiments, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and several separate divisions (battalions) and batteries, which accounted for 8% of all artillery. They were armed primarily with large-caliber guns: 122-210 mm cannons, 152-305 mm howitzers, 280 mm mortars (60%). Anti-tank guns and mortars were 28 and 12%, respectively.

The distribution of artillery units of the RGK between the districts on the eve of the war was uneven. As can be seen from the table, the largest number of them were stationed in the southwestern strategic direction, where the High Command expected the enemy to deliver the main blow.

Change in the number of RGVK artillery units in the campaigns of the first period of the war

Data on	Types of artillery
	anti-tank					cannon				howitzer				mortars				reactive				anti-aircraft
	ptabr	ptap	paws	Total	UV*	dad, tpap	one OM, BM	Total	UV	gap, gap BM	one BM	Total	UV	minp	mind, minb	Total	UV	shelves	d-s	Total	UV	shelves	d-s	Total	UV
22.06.1941	10	-	-	20	18	14	2	15	14	60	13	64	58	-	11	11	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
01.12.1941	1	56	-	58	23	101	1	101	40	53	15	68	23	-	14	14	5	7	52	24	9	-	-	-	-
01.05.1942	1	120	-	122	21	176	4	177	30	145	13	149	26	63	-	63	11	56	47	72	12	-	-	-	-
20.11.1942	-	161	79	240	22	198	4	199	18	192	13	196	17	73	10	83	7	98	119	138	12	159	94	253	24

Compiled from data: History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T-34; Artillery in defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. - Book I; Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. - Book I; Destructive anti-tank artillery in the Great Patriotic War.
* HC - specific gravity in percent.When calculating the number of regiments, it is conventionally considered that three separate cannon (howitzer) divisions and three rocket artillery divisions are equivalent in firepower to a regiment. One mortar battalion (battalion) is equivalent to a mortar regiment

Thus, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the artillery of the RGK consisted mainly of heavy cannon and howitzer artillery units, intended to qualitatively strengthen military artillery, anti-tank artillery formations, as well as separate mortar battalions. There were no anti-aircraft units.

The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany put our troops in a difficult situation. The enemy's rapid advance into the interior of the country led to the fact that plans for the rearmament and formation of many artillery units and formations were actually thwarted. For the same reasons, the covering troops did not receive the personnel, vehicles and traction assigned to them according to the mobilization plan. This had an extremely negative impact on the combat readiness of the artillery and its logistics agencies.

The fight against enemy tanks throughout the Great Patriotic War was one of the most important tasks of Soviet artillery, both military and RGK. Therefore, already in the first months of battles with the fascist hordes, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command paid great attention to the formation of new artillery units of the RVGK, especially anti-tank ones. In July-August alone, 45 artillery regiments were formed, of which 42 (more than 90%) were anti-tank defense regiments (ATD).

During the border battles and subsequent fierce battles, the RVGK artillery suffered significant damage. There was a real threat of losing units of large and special power, which, as a rule, did not take part in battles, since they were not adapted to conduct highly maneuverable combat operations, but were in the reserve of fronts (armies). In this regard, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief allowed the redeployment from the fronts (except Leningrad) of some artillery units of the RGK, which were armed mainly with 305-mm howitzers and 280-mm mortars, to the internal military districts.

In an environment of declining artillery resources, the RVGK Headquarters took all measures to maintain the RVGK artillery at the highest possible level and constantly strengthened it through the formation of new cannon, howitzer, mortar and anti-tank regiments, and also included it in its composition in September 1941 all artillery regiments and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of rifle and mechanized corps due to the liquidation of the corps unit. When forming new artillery regiments, the emphasis was placed on increasing the number of highly maneuverable units designed primarily to combat enemy tanks. For example, the formation of light artillery regiments (paws), anti-tank defense regiments, as well as rocket artillery - this new and effective remedy defeating enemy personnel. Of the 4,252 guns and mortars deployed in 1941 to form artillery units of the RVGK (without anti-aircraft and rocket artillery), 2,903 guns (69%) were anti-tank artillery.

As the experience of the first months of the war showed, the anti-tank brigades of the RVGK and their regiments in the conditions of the transition of the Red Army to strategic defense turned out to be very cumbersome and difficult to control. During the fast-moving, maneuverable battles and battles, the need emerged to reinforce not only armies, but also rifle divisions and even regiments with anti-tank artillery weapons. For this purpose, at this stage of the war, it was more expedient to have in the artillery of the RVGK not large artillery formations, but a large number of small maneuverable anti-tank units. Taking this into account, in the fall of 1941, all anti-tank brigades of the RVGK, except for the 14th anti-tank artillery brigade formed during the war on the Leningrad Front, were disbanded. Using the materiel of these formations and newly allocated weapons, in the second half of 1941, 72 artillery regiments of the RVGK VET of various organizations were formed. Basically, these were light, maneuverable units, consisting of 4, 5 or 6 batteries of four guns.

Due to the lack of anti-tank guns, 37-, 76- and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were used to form anti-tank guns.

Thus, in July-October 1941, 49 divisions of medium-caliber and 49 batteries of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery were recruited to staff anti-tank defense regiments - a total of 770 guns.

Since March 1942, more and more new 76-mm guns of the 1942 model (ZIS-3) began to arrive in the active army. They began to arm new anti-tank regiments, as well as replace anti-aircraft guns in already formed units. With the release of anti-aircraft guns, the formation of anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the RVGK began. In addition, at the beginning of June 1942, 140 separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 8 separate anti-aircraft batteries, 5 anti-aircraft armored trains and other units, which formed the backbone of the formed anti-aircraft artillery units of the RVGK, were transferred to the subordination of the chief of artillery of the Red Army from the country's air defense.

Most of the organizational changes carried out in 1941 in the artillery of the RVGK were dictated by the difficult situation at the front and the lack of weapons. In particular, it was necessary to take extreme measures related to weakening the firepower of artillery units in order to increase their number. Thus, at the beginning of September 1941, the cannon and howitzer regiments of the RVGK were disaggregated. Their batteries were transferred in the active army to a two-gun composition. New regiments were formed using the released material. 122-mm and 152-mm howitzer artillery units were transferred to the artillery of the RVGK, excluded from the staff of the rifle and tank divisions and reorganized into howitzer artillery regiments of the RVGK.

Individual mortar battalions of the RVGK turned out to be very cumbersome (48 107- and 120-mm mortars). Therefore, by order of the NKO in January 1942, they were disbanded, and on their basis, the creation of lighter mortar units began, mainly five-battery mortar regiments (20 mortars each). By April 1942, there were 49 in the active army, and by October - 70 mortar regiments of the RVGK.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, field rocket artillery units were rapidly formed. The first combat vehicles of a new type of weapon were developed in our country just before the war. The ease of their production by industry, the high efficiency of fire, especially when shooting at manpower, the enormous moral impact on the enemy - all this predetermined the rapid growth of rocket artillery.

In July 1941, the formation of the first separate batteries, and then rocket artillery divisions, was completed. Highly appreciating the combat capabilities of the new type of artillery, the Supreme Command Headquarters is taking decisive measures to develop it. On August 8, the formation of eight rocket artillery regiments began, and then six more. The BM-8 and BM-13 rocket artillery combat vehicles (installations) were first mounted on the chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle, and later on the chassis of the T-40, T-60 tanks and STZ-5 tractors. In January 1942, in accordance with the decree of the State Defense Committee, rocket artillery regiments of the new organization began to be formed. The divisions of these units, having received their own material support bodies, were able to act independently.

During the period of operations, the Supreme Command headquarters reinforced the fronts with rocket artillery units, which received the name Guards Mortar Units (GMC). They reported directly to the front commanders. For direct management of combat activities and supply of GMCH units at the fronts, special control bodies were created - frontline operational groups of the GMCh.

Since the spring of 1942, the country's rear began to supply the Armed Forces with more and more tanks, aircraft, guns, mortars, and rocket artillery combat vehicles. Most of the incoming artillery weapons were used to form RVGK units. The number of guns and mortars in the artillery of the RVGK was constantly growing. If at the beginning of the war there were 4854 of them, then by December 1, 1941 - 5704, by May 1, 1942 - 10080, and by the end of the first period of the war - already 18133. The change in the number of artillery units of the Supreme High Command Reserve in the first period of the war is shown in the table.

Due to the continuous growth in the number of artillery units of the RVGK, the armies began to receive 10 or more regiments for reinforcement both in defense and in the offensive. It became increasingly difficult for the small artillery headquarters of the formations to control such a large number of units, so the artillery chiefs of the armies, as a rule, transferred the RVGK units to reinforce the divisions. However, this practice ran counter to the principle of massing artillery and its fire. In this regard, the need arose to create large artillery formations of the RVGK. At the end of October 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the organization of artillery formations of the RVGK in ground and anti-aircraft artillery. On October 31, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order to create artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK (ad and zenad RVGK).

The first artillery divisions of the RVGK were formed by including eight artillery regiments of the RVGK (three gaps, two pops and three iptaps) and a separate reconnaissance division. Some of the army air defense regiments and the already formed anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the RVGK were turned to the formation of anti-aircraft artillery divisions. In the Zenad on October 22, 1942, there were four MZA regiments (37 mm guns - 48 and 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns - 80). By the end of the first period of the war, there were already 11 ad and 8 zenads of the RVGK in the active army.

Strengthening the fronts, the Supreme High Command Headquarters during operations decisively concentrated the RVGK artillery on the most important directions of the Soviet-German front. Thus, in the summer and autumn of 1941, the main attention was paid to the Moscow strategic direction. By the end of the Battle of Smolensk, 50% of all artillery units of the RVGK were concentrated on the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts. Of the existing 49 anti-tank artillery regiments of the RVGK, 22 were transferred to these three fronts. Most of the armies of the Western Front received 4-5 RVGK artillery regiments for reinforcement.

In October, during the autumn thaw, the main artillery efforts were concentrated in the army zones covering the main highways along which enemy tank columns were rushing towards Moscow. Thus, the 16th Army, which blocked the Volokolamsk Highway, received six reinforcements, the 5th Army, defending in the Mozhaisk direction, received eleven, and the 43rd Army, which held the defense in the Maloyaroslavets direction, received eight regiments and a separate anti-tank artillery division. The density of anti-tank artillery (ATA) in these directions was increased to 6-10 guns per 1 km of front. The remaining armies of the Western Front were reinforced by 1-2 regiments. Accordingly, the density of anti-tank vehicles in their zones was low - 1-2 guns per 1 km of front.

The cannon, howitzer and mortar units of the army received from the front were transferred for reinforcement to the rifle divisions defending in the main directions. In divisions, they were usually included in infantry support groups (IR), less often - long-range (LD). The firepower of the artillery of the ACE divisions began to increase more often due to rocket artillery, the salvo fire of which had a high effect, especially when firing at enemy personnel.

In the summer of 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters focused on the southwestern and then Stalingrad directions. The bulk of the reserves, including artillery, went here. The number of artillery of the RVGK, which took part in the defensive battles near Stalingrad, was continuously increased due to the reinforcement of the fronts with reserves of the Supreme Command Headquarters. So, if on July 12, 1942, the artillery units of the RVGK had 4282 here, then on November 18 - 12078 guns and mortars, i.e. their number tripled. During July - the first half of October 1942, the Supreme High Command Headquarters sent 105 artillery regiments and 16 divisions from its reserve (40 iptap, 16 pop, 14 zenap, 3 minp, 32 regiments and 16 rocket artillery divisions) to the fronts operating in the Stalingrad direction.

The front commanders, as a rule, reassigned almost all the artillery units of the RVGK to the armies of the first echelon, which is explained by the acute lack of their own artillery. The armies operating in the main directions received 10 or more RVGK artillery regiments for reinforcement. The 62nd Army (South-Eastern Front, on September 1) had, for example, 16 artillery units of the RVGK.

Due to the large saturation of troops with RVGK artillery in the battles near Stalingrad, anti-tank artillery reserves (APTR) began to be systematically allocated at all levels from the rifle division to the front: 1-2 iptap in the armies and from 1 to 5 iptap in the fronts. Cannon regiments were included in the army artillery groups of the DD.

When conducting defensive battles directly in the city, by decision of the military council of the South-Eastern Front on September 14, a front artillery group (FAG) was created at the expense of the RVGK regiments previously assigned to the 62nd and 64th armies. It also included anti-aircraft artillery units of the RVGK and artillery of the Volga Military Flotilla. The group was headed by the Deputy Chief of Front Artillery, Major General of Artillery V.P. Dmitriev. The FAG included up to 250 guns and mortars. Due to the wide maneuver of trajectories and the massing of fire from the artillery of the army and the front artillery group, at certain moments of the most intense battles in Stalingrad in the defense sectors of the 62nd Army, it was possible to create an artillery density of up to 110 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. The wide maneuver of large masses of artillery fire ensured the tenacity and resilience of the troops in defensive battles both near Stalingrad and in the city itself.

During the operations of the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the artillery of the RVGK underwent both quantitative and qualitative changes. It included rocket and anti-aircraft artillery units. The organizational structure and armament of the units changed significantly.

The quantitative growth of the artillery of the RVGK (from 4854 to 18133 guns and mortars), the inclusion in its composition of units armed with various types of guns, mortars and rocket artillery installations, also changed its structure. Due to the artillery of the RVGK, military artillery is strengthened not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively. The share of RVGK artillery in terms of staff strength increased in the artillery of the Soviet Army from 8 to 20%.

With the restructuring of the national economy on a military basis and the strengthening of the power of the artillery industry, rapid growth of the artillery of the RVGK began. Anti-tank and rocket artillery units were formed especially intensively, and from the summer of 1942, anti-aircraft artillery units.

The ratio of different types of artillery also became different. If in the pre-war period more than half of all regiments (see table) accounted for howitzer artillery, then by the end of the first period of the war the primacy was already with anti-aircraft (24%) and anti-tank (22%) artillery. The share of howitzer artillery decreased to 17%.

Rocket artillery, which only appeared at the beginning of the war, began to account for 12% of the total number of RVGK artillery.

The fronts defending the most important operational directions were assigned 30-40 artillery regiments of the RVGK, the army - 8-10 or more. The need to centralize control of a large number of individual artillery units of the RVGK raised the question of creating artillery divisions (artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK). The trend of forming large artillery formations of the RVGK was further developed in the second period of the Great Patriotic War.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the front command, widely maneuvering the artillery formations of the RVGK, at the right time reinforced the fronts (armies) with artillery, thanks to which they achieved a significant increase in the density of artillery in defensive and offensive operations.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 2/1994, pp. 59-66

On the issue of the creation and use of reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War

Colonel G.A.MOKHOROV,

candidate historical sciences, assistant professor

In the fierce battles with the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military strategy, the most important problem of which was the preparation and use of the strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command, withstood severe tests. In order to provide the active army with the required number of trained strategic reserves, a well-functioning system of bodies, structures, and training centers was required, subordinate to the solution of this task.

On the eve of the war, the country's leadership paid sufficient attention to preparing reserves for the Soviet Armed Forces. An important document defining the procedure for accumulating a reserve of those liable for military service was the Law on General Military Duty adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 1, 1939, which enshrined the personnel principle of the construction, recruitment and training of the Armed Forces.

Given the increasing threat of war from Nazi Germany, the highest state and military leadership took a number of hidden measures to increase the combat capability of the Armed Forces. By mid-1941, of the 320 divisions envisaged for deployment under the mob plan, the ground forces included 303, but 81 of them were at the formation stage. In addition, not a single formation in the internal and border military districts was staffed according to the stipulated levels. The mistake was that there were no trained reserves of the High Command troops in the western direction. Four armies and one corps were secretly redeployed here from a number of military districts: the 22nd Army; from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luki region, the 21st Army from the PriVO to the Gomel region, the 19th - from the North Military District to the Belaya Tserkov region, the 16th - from the ZabVO to the Shepetovka region and the 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District to the Western border Dvina. These troops were supposed to deploy before July 3, 1941 and form the reserve of the High Command.

The idea that the most dangerous strategic direction was not the western - Belarus, but the southwestern - Ukraine was erroneous, which resulted in an incorrect decision to concentrate reserve troops. In the very first days of the war, the 19th and 16th armies were transferred by forced march to the Smolensk-Moscow direction.

The biggest mistake turned out to be miscalculations in the timing, scale and nature of the aggressor’s first, main blow. This led to the fact that all plans for organizing a more effective reflection of the treacherous invasion of the Nazi army were thwarted.

The first priority was to deploy And strengthening Armed Forces, creation a sufficient number of diverse troop reserves for successful conduct of defensive and offensive operations, formation parts And institutions rear for their comprehensive support during the war. On the second day of the war, intense and unprecedented in scale work of military councils, local Soviet and party bodies, and military commissariats unfolded in fourteen military districts to implement military mobilization plans. In an atmosphere of general patriotic upsurge, 5.3 million people were drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces in the first eight days of the war. Their numbers thus doubled. History has never seen such a volume of military mobilization in a short period of time.

Having completed the first stage of mobilization, the State Defense Committee (GKO) began to form a large number of rifle, cavalry, tank, aviation and artillery units and formations. Thus, in early July, the State Defense Committee adopted two resolutions on the additional formation of 75 rifle, 10 cavalry and 25 militia divisions, and later another 85 rifle divisions and 50 separate rifle brigades.

By the decision of the State Defense Committee of July 16, 1941 “On the preparation of reserves in the system of NCOs and the Navy,” the direct management of their training was entrusted to a special group created under the NCO of the USSR. In August 1941, to solve this problem, the Main Directorate for the formation and staffing of the Red Army was formed.

Particular attention was paid to the training of personnel for aviation, navy, armored forces, engineering troops, and signal troops. The initial training of reserves was carried out in the system of general education and Osoaviakhim, and the final training in specialties, especially technical branches of the military, in the system of reserve and training units created at the beginning of the war. Their capacity was constantly increasing. For example, if as of August 12, 1941, crews for tanks and armored vehicles were trained in 18 reserve regiments, then in May 1945 there were 8 training brigades, 7 training tank regiments, 2 reserve tank regiments, 3 training regiments (for tanks of foreign brands ), 2 training repair and restoration battalions, about 10 training tank regiments of the fronts.

The educational and material base and the quality of the educational process were continuously improved. The duration of training varied depending on the complexity of the specialty from 1.5 to 6 months. The basic principle that was implemented in the activities of training and reserve units of all branches of the military was to teach what is necessary in war.

An important problem in the preparation of reserve formations was staffing them with command personnel. With the beginning of the war, the duration of training in all military educational institutions was reduced, their capacity increased, and the network of military educational institutions was expanded. Thus, only the number of military schools of the Ground Forces increased from 138 to 164, and the number of cadets increased by 67%. As a result of these and a number of other events, the officer training system generally satisfied the requirements of the front.

The first strategic success of the Soviet troops during the Battle of Smolensk was used to the maximum by the Soviet government to solve complex problems of restructuring the national economy on a military footing and establishing mass production of weapons and military equipment. On this basis, the accelerated creation and replenishment of reserve troops of the Supreme Command Headquarters took place. After the second mass mobilization in August 1941, the conscription of those liable for military service into the army continued continuously. By the end of 1941, more than 400 new divisions were formed. At that time, the Headquarters had 11 armies in its reserve. The number of reserve troops was 700 thousand people.

In total, in the first six months of the war, 221 newly formed and 8 restored divisions, 110 rifle and tank brigades, as well as a large number of artillery, aviation, engineering and technical units, and air defense units were transferred to the fronts. 97 divisions of the pre-war formation were also sent from the General Headquarters reserve to the active army.

Analysis of archival documents shows that during the first year of the war, the reinforcement of the fronts with units and formations took place mainly due to new formations, which were the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters during this period. Divisions that suffered significant losses in battles were not restored, but were sent to replenish other formations and units.

Since July 1942, the Headquarters changed the procedure for creating its reserves. The main ways to replenish them were: the formation of new formations of military branches and branches of the Armed Forces and the withdrawal of formations and units from the fronts to the reserve for replenishment. The redeployment of rifle divisions to the subordination of their Supreme Command Headquarters for the period of replenishment and subsequent use was carried out according to plans developed by the General Staff and approved by Headquarters. They provided, as a rule, for the simultaneous reinforcement of 40-50 divisions, the average number of which was 3000-3500 people, up to 600 horses and up to 75 vehicles. To complete each division to the established level, 3500-4000 people, 250-300 horses, and 70-75 vehicles were required. Combat and political training of personnel in reserve formations was carried out according to special programs. The duration of training varied. Thus, the duration of stay in the reserve of 76% of divisions was less than 2 months.

In the third period, GHQ reserves were created mainly by replenishing the withdrawn formations and formations from the active fronts. The exception was the 6th Tank Army, newly formed in January 1944. Many divisions, corps and armies were withdrawn to the General Headquarters reserve several times. For example, the 21st, 28th and 61st combined arms armies were in reserve four times each; five times each - the 3rd and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The advantages of this method: the organizational and staffing foundations, traditions and continuity of the military glory of the unit, formation, and the backbone of battle-hardened and front-line personnel were preserved.

During the war years, 527 divisions and 58 brigades were withdrawn from the fronts and completed.

The reserve of the Headquarters also included volunteer formations, which were created with the permission of the State Defense Committee on the initiative of local authorities. In the summer and autumn of 1941, when the situation was critical in a number of directions, 60 divisions and 200 militia regiments were formed in large front-line cities. As independent formations, more than 40 volunteer divisions fought courageously near the walls of Moscow and Leningrad.

Highly combat-ready volunteer personnel divisions were also created in Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Bryansk, Omsk, Novosibirsk and other cities of the RSFSR. And in Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Perm, the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps was formed and provided with everything necessary from local resources, the combat path of which ended in Berlin and Prague. During the war years, the peoples of Russia gave the front more than the GKO plan 55 rifle and cavalry divisions, 14 rifle brigades, 4 tank and 3 motorized rifle brigades.

In order to increase striking force, improve command and control and use the reserve forces of the High Command in combat operations, their organizational structures were continuously improved. Thus, to combat enemy tanks and aircraft, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, brigades and even divisions were formed. Guards mortar formations were especially actively created: first divisions, then regiments and divisions. During the rearmament of the Soviet troops that unfolded in the spring of 1942, the creation of tank and mechanized corps and tank armies began, as well as reserve air armies, then aviation corps.

In the summer and autumn of 1943, the preparation and use of strategic reserves reached perfection. In their composition, the proportion of tank, aviation, artillery, mortar and engineering troops has increased significantly. By this time, the transition of rifle troops to the corps system had basically been completed, and qualitatively new formations had arisen - assault engineer brigades of the RGK. The creation of five tank armies was of particular importance in solving strategic problems. The airborne troops and especially the country's air defense forces received further development.

Truly enormous in scale and effectiveness are the results of the military mobilization activities of central and local authorities and administration, the efforts of the entire Soviet people in strengthening their Armed Forces. During the war years, 80 combined arms armies, 6 tank, 17 air and 6 air defense armies were formed, and 40-50 of them, including 11 guards and 5 shock troops, were at the front.

Guards and shock armies, formed from the most combat-ready divisions, fought in decisive sectors of strategic operations.

One of the difficult moments in the activities of the Supreme Command Headquarters was the question of the distribution and dispatch of ready reserves to the fronts. The correct solution to this problem depended on the skillful determination of the main link in the current strategic situation. The most important principle of the Supreme High Command in the distribution of fresh forces was, first of all, to direct them to those areas where the decisive battles were to unfold.

Anticipating the most acute events, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally asked the front commanders and Headquarters representatives with them whether they had enough forces to completely defeat the enemy group. If necessary, the fronts always received additional reserves and marching reinforcements.

According to the daily records of the number and readiness of reserves and march replenishment kept by the General Staff, the Supreme Commander had his own table of the availability of forces and means in the rear. By orders of Headquarters, they were sent to where they were particularly needed. Difficult situations also arose when the Headquarters could not satisfy the requests of front commanders for the allocation of reserves. This example is typical. In June 1942, the Supreme Commander, in response to a similar request from the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, replied: “... Headquarters does not have new divisions ready for battle... besides your front, we also have other fronts... You have to fight not with numbers, but with skill.” Another time, J.V. Stalin “explained” to S.K. Timoshenko: “If divisions were sold on the market, I would buy 5-6 divisions for you, but, unfortunately, they are not sold.”

Issues related to the most rational concentration and effective use of reserves also required comprehensively thought-out decisions. Rates. The success of not only individual strategic operations and campaigns, but also the entire war as a whole depended on this. As experience has shown, these problems of military art were solved highly professionally and at the proper level.

At the time of the treacherous invasion of the USSR, the fascist German army, developing an offensive in three main directions, delivered the main blow in the central, Smolensk-Moscow. Correctly assessing the current situation, the Supreme Command threw in all the forces available in reserve to organize a strategic defense, the main task of which was to stop the enemy at all costs, to gain time to accumulate forces to launch a counter-offensive.

On the fourth day of the war, to restore the strategic defense front, the Headquarters decided to use the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd (commanding generals I.S. Konev, P.A. Kurochkin, V.F. Gerasimenko and F.A. Ershakov) armies , advanced from the depths in order to create a defense at the Western Dvina - Dnieper line. Command of the army group was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny. At the same time, the forces of the 24th and 28th armies (commanded by generals S.A. Kalinin and D.I. Ryabyshev) began preparations for defense along the Selizharovo-Smolensk-Roslavl-Gomel line. The 16th Army was concentrated in the Smolensk area under the command of General M.F. Lukin.

During the Battle of Smolensk, the Supreme High Command Headquarters deployed in the rear of the Western Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko) a new echelon of reserve armies (29.30, 24.28, 31st and 32nd) led by General I.A. Bogdanov . Of the 20 rifle divisions of this echelon, five army groups were created (commanded by generals K.K. Rokossovsky, V.A. Khomenko, S.A. Kalinin, V.Ya. Kachalov, I.I. Maslennikov), which received the task of striking fascist troops counterattack and unite with the troops of the Western Front, who were fighting surrounded in the Smolensk region.

In order to more reliably cover Moscow, the Supreme Command Headquarters formed the Reserve Front on July 30 (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov). He united the 34th, 31st, 24th, 43rd, 32nd and 33rd armies, which included 12 divisions of the capital's people's militia. Front troops occupied the Rzhev-Vyazma defense line.

The strategic plan of the Nazi command for a non-stop advance towards Moscow was thwarted. In October 1942, when the operational-strategic situation worsened even more, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent 18 personnel divisions from Central Asia, Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East to the Moscow direction, having information that “the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR” .

By the decision of the State Defense Committee, a Moscow defense zone was created on the approaches to the capital under the leadership of the commander of the Moscow Military District, General P.A. Artemyev. It included parts of the capital's garrison, militia formations and divisions arriving from other military districts. A significant contribution to strengthening the defense of Moscow and Leningrad was made by 12 divisions formed in the fall 1941 years in the Siberian Military District.

At the same time, five reserve armies were concentrated in the area of ​​​​Dmitrov, Lobnya, south of Orekho-Zuev, in Ryazan and Ryazhsk.

The State Defense Committee, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government did everything possible to stop the fascist hordes at the walls of Moscow. Most of the reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters - 150 rifle divisions (52%) and 44 rifle brigades (47%) - were given to troops in the Moscow direction. And although numerical superiority over the enemy was not achieved, Soviet troops in fierce defensive battles provided the conditions for launching a counteroffensive with decisive goals.

The defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Moscow radically changed the course of the war in favor of the Soviet Union. However, the situation remained tense. The front needed a huge amount of fresh forces and new reserves. In November-December 1941, they prepared at an accelerated pace in the front line. In the areas of Krechetovo, Vologda, Gryazovets, Yaroslavl, Gorky, Alatyr, Saratov and Stalingrad, the preparation of 8 combined arms armies consisting of 52 rifle and 15 cavalry divisions was completed. However, during the general offensive of Soviet troops in winter 1941/42 year, as a result of the “dispersion” of strategic reserves, no positive results were achieved. Due to major mistakes of the Supreme High Command, they were all completely spent. By June 1942 The Supreme Command Headquarters actually did not have ready-made reserve formations.

At this time, the bulk of them (69 rifle divisions, 5 rifle brigades and 1 tank army) were intensively preparing and were concentrated along two lines: the first - Vyshny Volochek, Moscow, Ryazan, Tambov, Borisoglebsk, Stalingrad; the second - Vologda, Yaroslavl, Gorky, Saratov, Kamyshin.

Serious miscalculations by the Headquarters in determining the direction of the main attack of the Nazi army in the summer of 1942 also resulted in an incorrect distribution of reserves. The error has been fixed.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the principle of concentrating large reserves in the most important areas was maintained. Stalingrad turned out to be the main sector of the Soviet-German front. The Headquarters transferred two-thirds of its reserves to the South-Western strategic direction. The 60th and 6th armies (commanded by generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and F.M. Kharitonov) were moved from the reserve to the Voronezh sector. In order to block the fascist troops’ path to the Volga, on July 12, 1942, the Headquarters created a new, Stalingrad Front, the core of which was three reserve armies: the 64th, 63rd and 62nd (commanded by generals M.S. Shumilov, V.Ya. Kolpakchi, V. I.Kuznetsov, later A.ILopatin and V.I.Chuikov). In the area of ​​Kalach, Ilovlinskaya and Serafimovich, troops of the 1st, 4th and 5th tank armies were concentrated (commanded by generals M.E. Katukov, V.D. Kryuchenkin, PL. Romanenko). At the end of August, the Headquarters transferred the 24th, 1st Guards and 66th armies to the Stalingrad Front (commanded by generals D.T. Kozlov, K.S. Moskalenko, R.Ya. Malinovsky).

The Headquarters and the General Staff paid special attention to recruiting and putting together the newly created South-Western Front, as well as strengthening the Don Front. In October, more than six divisions, completed beyond the Volga, were transported to Stalingrad to help the troops of the 62nd Army, by decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

Before the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, in order to create a decisive superiority in forces, the Supreme High Command Headquarters from its reserve transferred to the fronts only from November 20 to December 31, 1942, 20 rifle divisions, 6 tank, 4 mechanized corps, 7 separate tank brigades, 25 artillery regiments and 2 aviation corps . The troops received the latest military equipment and weapons. Mechanized and tank formations had world-famous T-34 tanks, which allowed the Supreme High Command Headquarters to assign more complex tasks to the troops. To increase the strength of the attacking troops, she created the 3rd Guards and 5th Shock (commanded by Generals D.D. Lelyushenko, N.E. Berzarin) armies, which had high mobility and enormous striking power.

The victory on the Volga further convinced that the final turning point in the war could not be achieved without strong and diverse reserves. Therefore, when developing the plan for the 1943 summer campaign, the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Headquarters gave special attention to the deployment of powerful strategic reserves, taking into account the military-political tasks of the upcoming campaign, the availability of human, military-technical resources and vehicles. In a short period of time, enormous forces of various types of troops and branches of the Armed Forces were accumulated on the territory of the Moscow and Volga military districts. They concentrated in the Smolensk direction, in the area of ​​Kaluga, Voronezh and Voroshilovgrad. They consisted of 15 armies (of which 2 were tank), uniting 94 rifle divisions, 13 tank, 3 mechanized and 5 cavalry corps. The total number of personnel in the General Headquarters reserves exceeded 1 million people.

The highest degree of concentration of reserve formations of the Supreme Command Headquarters was in the Voronezh direction. In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, at the line Livny - Stary Oskol, a reserve front was formed - the Steppe Military District (from July 9, the Steppe Front under the command of Marshal I.S. Konev). It included the 2nd Reserve, 27th, 53rd, 4th and 5th Guards, 47th Combined Arms (commanding generals V.I. Morozov, S.T. Trofimenko, I.M. Managarov, G.I. Kulik, A.S. Zhadov, A.I. Ryzhov) and the 5th Tank Army (under the command of General P.A. Rotmistrov). In July, the front received two more armies. Thus, 50% of all reserve troops of the Supreme Command Headquarters were united as part of the Steppe Front. It was the most powerful front-line grouping, most of whose divisions underwent combat training and received high field training.

The Steppe Front was faced with the task of preventing a deep breakthrough by the advancing enemy, and when our troops launched a counteroffensive, to increase the power of their strike from the depths on the Kursk ledge. The goal of the Supreme Command Headquarters in forming such an organizationally complete strategic unit capable of entering battle in any direction was achieved.

The heavy defeat of the fascist army in the Battle of Kursk allowed the Supreme High Command Headquarters to further change the balance of forces on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Red Army. The continuous increase in the combat power of the active army created conditions for a reduction in the number of trained reserves. Therefore, in the summer of 1944, the Supreme High Command Headquarters had at its disposal only six armies (of which 2 tank) consisting of 36 rifle divisions and 4 tank corps.

At the final stage of the war, the reserve of Headquarters (as of January 1, 1945) included the Field Directorate of the former 3rd Baltic Front, the Karelian Front consisting of three armies, as well as the 5th Guards Tank and 9th Guards armies; on May 1, 1945, the Headquarters had at its disposal the Reserve Front Command and the Zemland Group of Forces consisting of four armies (formerly the 1st Baltic Front). In preparation for the final operations of the Great Patriotic War - the Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and especially Berlin - the Headquarters accumulated such forces as to create double, triple and greater superiority over the fascist troops in the direction of the main attacks. Thanks to the increased level of military art of the command staff and the combat skill of the soldiers, these operations were distinguished by their special scope, decisiveness and high effectiveness in destroying large strategic enemy groups.

The undoubted merit of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff is the skillful and creative combat use of strategic reserves. In the first period of the war, they were and acted on the defensive and solved various, but equally complex tasks: restoring the repeatedly broken Soviet strategic defense front, including twice in the main, central direction; creating the greatest depth of defense in the direction of the enemy’s main attacks; strengthening existing fronts by forming large strike groups in order to deliver powerful counterattacks and go on the offensive with the main forces of the fronts in a given direction, etc.

In the second and third periods of the war, the most characteristic feature of the use of strategic reserves was sudden, massive actions with decisive goals until the complete defeat of enemy troops in offensive operations; achieving superiority over the fascist troops in forces and means and increasing the attacks of the main groupings of the advancing troops. The actions of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff in the use of strategic reserve troops were distinguished by: the absence of a template, taking into account the accumulated experience, recognizing the mistakes and miscalculations made, comprehending them and preventing them in the future, genuine collective creativity in solving issues of concentration and timely massive use of forces.

The basis for success in solving the complex complex problem of troop reserves during the war was the competent, highly qualified leadership of this most important area of ​​military-organizational activity of the central bodies of the Soviet state and the Armed Forces to achieve victory over Nazi Germany. It was carried out by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff on the basis of relevant resolutions State Committee Defense. All fundamental issues related to the order of formation and combat training, concentration, determination of specific goals and tasks for their use, redeployment, transfer to active fronts and withdrawal to the disposal of Headquarters were resolved at the highest level.

Direct operational work was entrusted to the Reserves Department, created in August 1941 in the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. After its disbandment (April 1942), issues of planning, development of directives for the withdrawal of formations and units from the fronts to the reserve of the Headquarters, day-to-day accounting, deployment and control over the progress of staffing strategic reserves began to be dealt with by the Department within the structure of the General Staff Organizational Directorate. In April 1943 it was reorganized and strengthened.

The issue of the state of the reserves (among other priorities) was reported daily by the Chief of the General Staff to the Supreme Command Headquarters. The relevant directives were also approved here. All changes that occurred were plotted on a map of the location of the reserves of the Supreme Command Headquarters, which was also available to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Thus, the strictest day-to-day operational control was achieved over the progress of the formation and replenishment, as well as the redeployment of divisions and armies at the disposal of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

The facts summarized above allow us to conclude that the reserves of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army were the main means of restoring and increasing the combat potential of the Armed Forces, strengthening the active fronts in the main directions and the most dangerous sectors of the decisive battles of the Great Patriotic War. They were the most important condition for the victory of the USSR Armed Forces over the army of Nazi Germany.

The creative, skillful, comprehensively thought-out approach of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff to the creation and use of strategic reserves clearly demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet military strategy over the strategy of the fascist leadership.

The war of the Soviet Union with Germany and its satellites convincingly proved that it is impossible to fight without reserves. Therefore, the lessons and experience of solving this problem cannot be forgotten. Its relevance is determined not only by external, but also by internal factors. In conditions when the Warsaw Pact does not exist, NATO's strength is maintained and its strategy is improved, new types of weapons and military equipment appear, close attention is required to assess the balance of power between the forces of peace and war.

50 years of the USSR Armed Forces. - M.: Voenizdat, 1968. - P. 235.

Zh u k about in G.K. Memories and reflections. - M.: Publishing house APN, 1971. - P.218.

50 years of the USSR Armed Forces. - P.257.

Military-historical magazine. - 1972. -No. 12. - P.46.

TSAMORF, f.15, op.2245, d.85, sheet 123, 146.

Ibid., op. 113, d. 1, l. 160.

Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war. Book one. -M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.- P.65.

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DIRECTORATES OF THE 68TH ARMY AND TWO RIFLE DIVISIONS

TROOPS OF THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONT ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL

1. Send from the North-Western Front to the reserve of the Supreme Headquarters
of the High Command, field control of the 68th Army with combat units
support, service institutions and army logistics, 253rd and
254th Infantry Division.

2. Send by railway 1 in the following order:

a) administration, army units and institutions of the 68th Army. Loading at the station
Mura from 18.00 on May 5, 1943, tempo - 1 and at station. Lychkovo from 18.00 on May 8, 1943,
tempo - 3.

b) 253rd Infantry Division. Loading at the station Beglovo, Lychkovo from 18.00
5/5/1943, rate - 3;

c) 254th Infantry Division. Loading at the station Knivetsy, Lychkovo from 18.00
5.5.1943, rate - 3.

3. Send the army administration and rifle divisions completely, with
personnel, weapons, transport and property not permitted
No withdrawals before shipping.

4. Before departure, divisions and management should be supplied with: ammunition - 1 combat
set, fuel - 1 filling, food - 10 days for the route
and, in addition, a five-day unloading stock. May 3 report to the General Staff
combat and numerical composition of divisions and a complete list of units and institutions,
sent with the control of the 68th Army.

5. Confirm receipt of the directive. Report shipment progress daily
to the General Staff 2.

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 87, 88. Original.

1 Directive No. 46143 ordered the administration of the army and divisions to send marching order
com: control - to the Bologoye area, 253rd Infantry Division - to the Kuzhenkino area and 254th Infantry Division - to
Edrovo district (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 89)?.

a) to the commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front on the withdrawal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the reserve
control of the 4th Army and the 294th Infantry Division (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 84, 85).
Directive No. 46144 of May 3, 1943 ordered the commander of the front troops to withdraw
the reserve of the Supreme High Command is only the 294th division (Ibid. L. 90);

b) to the commander of the troops of the Kalinin Front on the withdrawal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the reserve
of the 373rd Infantry Division (Ibid. p. 86). Directive No. 46145 of May 3, the commander
it was written to send another division (Ibid. L. 91).

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 30116

TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT

ABOUT COMBAT TASKS OF THE 1ST AIR ARMY

Copy: Commander of the Red Army Air Force

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the forces of the 1st Air Army to carry out the following tasks during the period from May 6 to May 16 inclusive:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Du-
Khovshchina, Demidov, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mstislavl, Bryansk, Zhizdra.

2. Disrupt enemy railway transportation in Smolensk and Bryansk
com directions, preventing the movement of trains east of the Vitebsk line,
Mstislavl, Pochep.

3. Disorganize traffic on roads east of the line
Smolensk, Roslavl, Bryansk.

Deliver the first strike on enemy airfields between 04:30 and 05:00 on May 6. Keep enemy aircraft under combat influence for three days, then take a two-day break and again proceed to mass operations at airfields, which also continue for three days.

Actions on railways and automobile traffic on dirt and highways must be systematic throughout all ten days, and first of all, disable steam locomotives, tanks, tank trucks, cars and staff vehicles with machine-gun and cannon fire.

Detailed instructions on the performance of tasks to the commander of the air army were given to the commanders of the Red Army Air Force.

To carry out the operation, it is allowed to expend up to 220 sorties of attack, fighter and short-range bomber aircraft, as well as up to 600 sorties of night bomber aircraft."

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 93, 94. Original.

1 On the same day, similar directives were issued:

1. Disrupt enemy railway transportation on the Sebezh - Novosokolniki, Po-
Lotsk - Nevel, Vitebsk - Nevel.

2. Disorganize traffic on the roads east of the Pustoshka, Nevel, Gorodok line.

It is allowed to spend up to 300 sorties of attack aircraft and fighters to carry out operations (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 92);

b) To the Military Council of the Bryansk Front on the combat missions of the 15th Air Army and the 1st Guards. exterminate
body aviation corps:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Volkhov, Karachev, Navlya area,
Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky, Orel.

2. Disrupt enemy rail transportation from Bryansk to Orel and further to the front line;

3. Disorganize traffic on the roads east of the Karachev, Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky line.
It is allowed to spend up to 450 sorties of attack and use aircraft to carry out the operation.
high-demand aviation and up to 200 night bomber sorties (Ibid. L. 95, 96);

c) to the Military Council of the Central Front on the combat missions of the 16th Air Army, 3rd Bombardment
fortification aviation corps and the 229th assault aviation division:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky area,
Trubchevsk, Shostka, Konotop, Vorozhba.

2. Disrupt the enemy’s railway transportation, preventing the movement of trains from Unecha to
Khut[or] Mikhailovsky and from Konotop to Vorozhba.

3. Disorganize traffic on the roads east of the Trubchevsk, Konotop line.

It is allowed to spend up to 750 sorties of attack, fighter and bomber aircraft and up to 300 sorties of night bombers to carry out the operation (Ibid. L. 97, 98);

d) To the Military Council of the Voronezh Front on the combat missions of the 2nd Air Army, 4th Fighter
body, 1st assault and 1st bomber aviation corps:

DIRECTIVE of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 46151 BY THE COMMANDER OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT TROOPS, 52ND ARMY ON SENDING ARMY CONTROL TO THE RESERVE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

Copy: Head of the Main Organizational Directorate of the General Staff

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered:

1. Send the field management to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
management of the 52nd Army with combat support units, service institutions
vaniya and army rear.

2. Dispatch is carried out by rail. Start of loading - May 8 this year. G.
in the area of ​​the station Sacrums.

3. Send army units and institutions in full force, with all available equipment.
I eat people, horses, weapons, vehicles and property without confiscating anything
before sending.

4. Provide army units and institutions with one refueling before departure
fuel, food fodder - 6 days for the route and unloading stock
for 4 days.

5. On May 8, submit to the General Staff a list of units and institutions included in
composition of the field command of the army and army rear units and institutions.

Execution convey 2.

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command A. VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 106. Original.

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the Belopole, Romny, Pol-
tava, New [aya] Vodolaga, Merefa.

2. Disrupt enemy rail transportation from Poltava to Kharkov.

3. Disorganize traffic on the roads east of the Belopole, Akhtyrka,
New Vodolaga.

It is allowed to spend up to 1,500 sorties of attack aircraft, fighters and short-range bombers and up to 400 sorties of night bombers to carry out the operation (Ibid. L. 99, 100);

e) Military Council of the Southwestern Front on the combat missions of the 17th Air Army and the 3rd Regiment
Shan aviation corps:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the area of ​​​​Zmiev, Krasnograd, Dnep-
ropetrovsk, Chaplino, Krasnoarmeyskoye, Slavyansk.

2. Disrupt railway transportation on the lines Novo-Moskovsk - Merefa, Krasnograd - Sla-
Vyansk, Pavlograd - Merefa.

3. Disorganize automobile traffic on the roads east of the Krasnograd-Krasnoar-
Meyskoe.

It is allowed to spend up to 1,700 attack aircraft sorties and up to 600 night bomber sorties to carry out the operation (Ibid. L. 101, 102);

f) To the Military Council of the Southern Front on the combat missions of the 8th Air Army:

1. Destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air in the area (claim) Slavyansk, (claim)
Krasnoarmeyskoye, Mariupol, Taganrog.

2. Disrupt enemy railway transportation on the Chaplino-Krasnoarmeyskoye, Gor-
lovka - Debaltsevo, on all railways north of the Gorlovka, Debaltsevo lines; Mariupol,
Stalino and Gorlovka, Taganrog.

3. Disorganize automobile traffic on the roads east of the Krasnoarmeyskoye, Ma-
Riupol.

It is allowed to spend up to 1,200 sorties of attack aircraft, fighters and short-range bombers and up to 400 sorties of night bombers to carry out the operation (Ibid. L. 103, 104).

2 On the same day, similar directives were sent to:

a) To the commander of the Volkhov Front troops:

1. Send two rifle brigades to the reserve of the Supreme High Command.

2. Dispatch is carried out by rail. Loading starts from May 10 this year. (TsAMO. F. 48a.
Op. 3409. D. 8. L. PO);

b) To the commander of the Kalinin Front troops:

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 46149 TO THE COMMANDER

TROOPS OF THE VOLGA MILITARY DISTRICT

AND TO THE HEAD OF THE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE FORMATION

AND STAFFING OF TROOPS ON THE RELOCATION OF RIFLE BRIGADES

Copy: Head of the Main Organizational Directorate of the General Staff

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered:

1. Send 25th Saratovskaya, 120th Chapaev to a new deployment point
skaya and 163rd Penza rifle brigades.

25th page brigade - loading at the station. Atkarsk;

120th page brigade - loading st. Chapaevsk;

163rd page brigade - loading at the station. Penza.
The dispatch rate is 6 trains per day.

3. Send the brigades in full force, with all the people, horses,
weapons, transport and property, without confiscating anything before shipment.

On May 6, submit a report to the General Staff on the combat and numerical composition of the dispatched brigades.

4. Before departure, each brigade is provided with: ammunition - 1.5 ammunition -
packs, fuel - two filling stations, food supplies - on the route
10 days and unloading stock for 5 days.

Deliver the execution."

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command A. VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48 a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 112. Original.

1. Send from the Kalinin Front to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
three rifle brigades.

2. Dispatch by rail or by hike to the areas of Staritsa, Rzhev, Kalinin. On-
Loading starts from May 10 this year. (Ibid. L. 108);

c) To the Commander of the North-Western Front:

1. Send the 11th, 21st and 23rd anti-aircraft divisions of the RGK from the North-Western Front to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command by rail. Dispatch will begin on May 8 this year. (Ibid. L. 105);

d) Commander of the 3rd Reserve Army, Moscow Military District troops:

From May 5, 1943, the 3rd Reserve Army was subordinated directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Ibid. L. 115);

e) Commander of the 68th Army;

1. By May 15, 1943, redeploy the 68th Army to the Bologoe region to the reserve of the Supreme Headquarters
High Command.

2. Include in the 68th Army:

a) field command of the army with combat support units, service institutions and artillery
May rear;

b) 253rd and 254th infantry divisions arriving from the North-Western Front; 294th Infantry Division,
arriving from the Volkhov Front; 373rd and 93rd infantry divisions arriving from Kalinin
front.

Subordinate the army directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Ibid. L. 116);

f) To the Commander of the North-Western Front:

1. Send from the North-Western Front to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command-
there are two rifle brigades.

2. Dispatch is carried out by rail. Loading begins on May 11 this year. (Ibid. L. 109).
1 On the same day, similar directives were sent to:

a) To the commander of the troops of the Ural Military District:

1. Send the 82nd Naval Rifle Brigade to a new deployment point.

2. Dispatch by rail from May 8 this year. Loading - at Vereshchagino station.
Dispatch rate - 3 trains per day (TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 111);

b) To the commander of the Western Front:

1. Send five rifle brigades from the Western Front.

DIRECTIVE RATES VGK№ 46162 COMMANDER OF THE 52nd ARMY,

TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE ABOUT THE RELOCATION OF THE ARMY DIRECTORATE

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered:

1. By May 16, 1943, relocate the control of the 52nd Army to the Ka-
Linina to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command 1.

2. Include in the 52nd Army:

a) field control of the 52nd Army with combat support units, establishing
service areas and army logistics;

b) seven rifle divisions, forming them on the basis of those withdrawn from the fronts
and rifle brigades arriving from the districts:

138th Infantry Division - in the Vysokoye area at the base of the 20th brigade North-West
of the front and the 64th brigade arriving from SAVO to supplement it;

153rd Infantry Division - in the Staritsa area at the base of the 136th Kalininsky Brigade
front and the 109th brigade arriving from SAVO to replenish it;

154th Infantry Division - in the Rzhev area at the base of the 130th Kalininsky Brigade
front and 120 brigade brigade arriving from PriVO to complement it;

156th Infantry Division - in the Kalinin area at the base of the 26th Kalinin Brigade
front and the 163rd brigade arriving from PriVO to complement it;

157th Infantry Division - in the Likhoslavd area at the base of the 6th Naval Brigade
Volkhov Front and the 134th brigade arriving from South to complete it. -
Urvo;

159th Infantry Division - in the Torzhok area at the base of the 140th Volkhovsky Brigade
front and the 132nd brigade arriving from the South-Ural Military District to complete it;

173rd Infantry Division - in the Klin area at the base of the 150th Brigade of the Western Front
and the 135th brigade from the Moscow Military District arriving to complete it.

Subordinate the army directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

3. The heads of the main departments of non-profit organizations must staff the newly formed
divisions with personnel, weapons, transport and other types of property
by bringing the strength of each division to 8,000 men by the next date.
kam:

2. Send three brigades by rail to points as directed by the General Staff and two brigades by marching to the Vyazma region, as part of the 10th Guards. army. The start of loading and marching is from May 9 this year. (Ibid. L. 107);

c) To the commander of the troops of the Central Asian Military District:

1. Send the 64th, 109th and 118th rifle brigades to a new deployment point.

64th page brigade - loading station. Mary;

109th page brigade - loading st. Stalinabad;

118th page brigade - loading st. Geok-Tepe.
The dispatch rate is 3 trains per day (Ibid. L. 114);

d) To the Commander of the South Ural Military District:

1. Send the 122nd, 132nd and 134th rifle brigades to a new deployment point.

122nd page brigade - loading st. Novo-Sergievskaya;

132nd page brigade - loading station. Sorochinskaya;

134th page brigade - loading station. Kandra.

The dispatch rate is 4 trains per day (Ibid. L. 113);

e) To the Commander of the Moscow Military District:

1. 135th Infantry Brigade by May 15 of this year. redeploy in full force to the Klin area (Ibid. L. 250). " See Document No. 210.

4. The leadership of the reorganization of rifle brigades into divisions and their replenishment should be entrusted to the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army. Deliver the execution.

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command A. VASILEVSKY

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 120. Original.

At the end of 1941, one of those miracles that never ceases to amaze the world happened. Defeated, bloodless, almost completely destroyed, the Red Army seemed to rise from the dead, first pushing the Wehrmacht back from Moscow, then defeating Paulus’s army at Stalingrad and finally seizing the strategic initiative in the Battle of Kursk, which predetermined the outcome of the war.

A new book by an authoritative military historian dedicated to these events is not an ordinary chronicle of military operations, more than an ordinary description of the battles of 1941 - 1943. In his outstanding study, the leading American specialist did something that none of his colleagues had dared to do before - he conducted a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet military machine and its work in the first years of the war, revealing the mechanics of the “Russian military miracle.”

Encyclopedic in its coverage of material, unprecedented in its accuracy and depth of analysis, this work has already been recognized as a classic.

Having studied a huge volume of archival documents, assessing the combat capabilities and tactics of both sides, the balance of forces on the Soviet-German front and the style of warfare, David Glantz examines in detail the process of accumulation of combat experience by the Red Army, which allowed it to first catch up with the enemy, and then surpass that which was considered invincible Wehrmacht.

This fundamental work debunks many myths existing in both German and American historiography. Glantz irrefutably proves that the decisive victory over Germany was won precisely on the Eastern Front and was by no means accidental, that the outcome of the war was decided not by “generals Mud and Frost”, not by the stupidity and incompetence of Hitler (who was in fact an outstanding strategist), but by the increased the skill of the Soviet command and the courage, dedication and steadfastness of the Russian soldier.

Note 1: Due to the low quality of the original scan, the tables are left with pictures.

Artillery Reserve Headquarters (RGK/RVGK)

This process of reorganization of the NKO continued at the beginning of 1942, trying to save manpower and make the artillery regiments of the RVGK better suited to the needs of the field forces. Starting on April 19, he again reorganized the cannon artillery regiments. Now they had two or three divisions, consisting of three two-gun batteries with a regiment strength of twelve to eighteen 107 mm or 122 mm guns or 152 mm howitzer guns. At the same time, the strength of the howitzer artillery regiments was reduced from three divisions, consisting of three batteries with four guns each, to two divisions, armed with twenty-four 152 mm or 122 mm howitzers. In addition, a smaller version of such a regiment was created, which had one less battery - that is, only twenty 122 mm or 152 mm howitzers. Finally, on April 2, the NKO reduced the heavy artillery regiments from four to two divisions, and the divisions to twelve 203 mm howitzers, while simultaneously increasing the number of high power artillery regiments.

As a result, by July 1, 1942, the number of RVGK artillery increased in total to 323 artillery regiments and separate artillery divisions of various types, and by February 1, 1943 it amounted to 301 artillery regiments and 23 separate artillery divisions.

At the end of 1942, arms production increased sharply, allowing the formation of more artillery regiments and divisions of the RVGK. At the same time, the NKO was faced with the need to create new structures that would enable combined arms commanders to more effectively manage their artillery - especially in those large-scale offensive operations that the Headquarters planned to conduct in November 1942. As a result, by order of October 31, part of the individual artillery regiments of the RVGK was consolidated into 18 new artillery divisions: in addition, 18 anti-aircraft artillery divisions were formed.

Initially, such a division consisted of 8 artillery regiments, including three howitzer artillery regiments from three divisions - twelve 122-mm howitzers in each regiment, two cannon artillery regiments from two divisions - eighteen 152-mm guns in each, three anti-tank regiments artillery from three divisions - twenty-four 76-mm guns in each. Instead of anti-tank artillery regiments, there could be two anti-aircraft artillery regiments with twenty-four 85 mm guns each. In addition, the division included a separate artillery reconnaissance battalion. The total strength of the division was 7,054 men and 168 guns in the anti-tank version or 144 guns in the anti-aircraft version.

However, during the initial stages of the winter offensive it became clear that these eight regiments were difficult to control from a single center. Therefore, from December 14, the NKO began to form new artillery divisions with four brigades instead of eight regiments. Such a division consisted of a three-regiment light (anti-tank) artillery brigade with seventy-two 76-mm guns per brigade, a three-regiment howitzer artillery brigade with six dozen 122-mm or 152-mm howitzers, a two-regiment heavy gun brigade with thirty-six 122-mm guns or 152-mm howitzer guns, a four-regimental mortar brigade with eight dozen 120-mm mortars, as well as an artillery reconnaissance battalion, an air squadron and logistics services. The total strength of the division was 9,124 men, 168 guns and howitzers and 80 mortars. In addition, the NKO formed one heavy artillery brigade (19th), which consisted of five cannon regiments, one regiment of high-power howitzers and one battalion of high-power guns.

Throughout 1943, the Headquarters and the NPO, in order to provide support for the Red Army both in defense and in the offensive, continued to strengthen the divisions, brigades and artillery regiments of the RVGK, and also began to create full artillery corps. By building this artillery under the control of the Headquarters, putting together its formations in accordance with the needs of the situation of a particular offensive or defense, timely allocating forces from it to the active fronts and armies, the Soviet command provided the Red Army with more flexible fire support, which, in turn, ensured unprecedented artillery superiority Soviet troops over the Wehrmacht in almost every major offensive of the Red Army.

At the beginning of 1943, the largest field artillery formations in the RVGK were the artillery divisions formed in October and modified in December 1942 with their subordinate artillery brigades. In addition, the artillery of the RVGK included several separate artillery brigades (for example, armed with 152 mm guns), they had two regiments, fire control and communications battalions, as well as a transport unit for supplying ammunition.

At the beginning of 1943, the most common artillery units in the Red Army were artillery regiments of combined arms armies, rifle corps and divisions, as well as artillery regiments of the RVGK. There were five variants of artillery regiments:

Cannon and artillery of three divisions with three two-gun batteries in each - a total number of 1120 personnel with nineteen 107 mm or 122 mm guns or 152 mm howitzer guns and 35 tractors;

Cannon and artillery of two divisions with three two-gun batteries in each - a total of 758 personnel, twelve 107 mm or 122 mm guns and 24 tractors;

Howitzer-artillery of two divisions with three four-gun batteries in each - a total of 947 personnel, twenty-four 122-mm or 152-mm howitzers and 36 tractors;

Howitzer-artillery, which had one division with three four-gun batteries and one division with two four-gun batteries with a total regiment strength of 864 people, twenty 122-mm or 152-mm howitzers and 30 tractors;

Corps artillery regiments of one or two battalions with three to six 122 mm guns and one battalion with twelve 153 mm howitzers.

The heaviest artillery in the RVGK at the beginning of 1943 were regiments and divisions severe artillery, artillery pain shoy power And special power. Heavy artillery regiments and divisions were equipped with 152 mm Br-2 guns, high power - 203 mm B-4 howitzers, and special power - guns of 210 mm or even greater caliber or howitzers of 280 mm or more caliber. The high-power artillery regiment consisted of two fire battalions, had 904 men, 12 B-4 howitzers, 26 tractors and 36 trucks. A separate heavy artillery battalion had eight 152 mm howitzers, a separate high power artillery battalion had six 203 mm howitzers, and a separate high power artillery battalion had six heavy guns or howitzers.

The final stage of artillery reinforcement began on April 13, 1943, when orders were given for the formation of five breakthrough artillery corps and breakthrough artillery divisions, either separate or subordinate to the breakthrough artillery corps. The breakthrough artillery corps consisted of two breakthrough artillery divisions, one guards rocket mortar division and an artillery reconnaissance battalion with a total strength of 712 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 to 203 mm, as well as 864 M-31 launchers. The breakthrough artillery division consisted of six artillery brigades: a light artillery brigade, consisting of three cannon artillery regiments with twenty-four 76 mm cannons each; a howitzer-artillery brigade with three howitzer artillery regiments of twenty-eight 122 mm guns each; a heavy cannon-artillery brigade with two cannon regiments of eighteen 152 mm cannons each; a heavy howitzer-artillery brigade with four howitzer battalions of eight 152 mm howitzers each; a high-power howitzer-artillery brigade with four howitzer battalions of six 203 mm howitzers each; a mortar brigade with three mortar regiments of thirty-six 120 mm mortars each; artillery reconnaissance battalion. The strength of the breakthrough artillery division was 10,869 soldiers and 356 guns, howitzers and mortars, including seventy-two 76 mm guns, eighty-four 122 mm howitzers, thirty-two 152 mm howitzers, thirty-six 152 mm guns, twenty-four 203 mm howitzers and one hundred and eight 120 mm mortars.

In addition, in June 1943, the NKO began creating experimental heavy cannon artillery divisions to conduct counter-battery artillery fire. These divisions consisted of four brigades of three divisions of four batteries each, a battery had four howitzer guns, a brigade had 48 howitzer guns, and a division had 144 howitzer guns of 152 mm caliber. Two divisions of this type were formed (4th and 6th Guards), and in October 1943, a third (8th Guards) cannon artillery division, similar to the heavy one, but included a division with four batteries of four 76- mm guns instead of one battalion of 152 mm guns in each brigade.

By July 1, 1943, the NKO had formed 5 breakthrough artillery corps, 12 breakthrough artillery divisions, and 13 standard artillery divisions, comprising either three or four artillery brigades. By 31 December there were 5 breakthrough artillery corps and 26 artillery divisions, including 17 breakthrough artillery divisions, six artillery divisions founded in December 1942, and three counter-battery artillery divisions.

As the successful offensives of the Red Army in the middle and end of 1943 showed, the sharp increase in the number and power of the RVGK artillery had a noticeable impact on the Red Army’s ability to break through the tactical defenses of the Germans. From October 1942 to the end of 1943, the severity of artillery fire during the planned offensive operations of the Red Army increased fourfold and reached devastating proportions.