Military pensioners for Russia and its armed forces. Prospects for the development of the armed forces of the Russian Federation The main provisions of the strategy for the social development of the armed forces

All about switches

The spring of this year has finally brought some intelligible hope for the fulfillment of the long-standing promises of the military-political leadership of Russia - to make the monetary allowance (DD) and the status of our military personnel in general such that it fully corresponds to the ideas of the army of a powerful, modern state.

Of course, the path to such a goal is not easy. We recall that an attempt to solve this problem, undertaken in 2002, was useful, but was reduced mainly to equalizing the military commanders' DD with the monetary allowance (DS) of the upper echelons of civil bureaucracy.

The junior officers were not really taken care of then. Therefore, many cadets of military schools and graduates, feeling deceived, began to quit - as best they could. And to the people of private and junior command staff (RMKS), even to those who served under the contract, the legislators reacted completely dismissively. Servicemen of the RMKS, bearing the bulk of the hardships and hardships military service, in status equated to referents ... of the lowest rank of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

To conclude a contract, they did not have before, and did not have any significant incentives.

Therefore, in 2003, when substantiating the federal target program (FTP) for the transfer of permanent readiness military units mainly to voluntary recruitment under the contract, it was decided to introduce a new “stimulating” allowance for the RMKS, and at the same time for junior and middle-level officers commanding them. However, senior officers, especially in the central apparatus (CA) of the Ministry of Defense, felt as if "offended." They turned to the then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov with a request-proposal to introduce another allowance - exclusively for them. The allowance is not simple, but long-term acting in their "favor". The results of such a policy are illustrated at the bottom of the page in a graph.

It shows that the size of the DD, expressed in current prices for the period 2002-2008, grew for all servicemen. But among the employees of the central apparatus, they "soared up." Each increase in salary by position (with indexation parrying inflation) led (due to allowances) to an increase in the DD of “apparatchiks” by an amount exceeding not only the increase in DD for soldiers and sergeants, but also the size of the entire DD of the RMKS military personnel. It all the years remained less than the average salary in the country. Time passed, the ruble depreciated, the cost of the federal target program grew when it was adjusted, but not a “stimulating” supplement.

A GOOD INTENTION TURNED INTO TROUBLE

It was precisely this situation with DD that was accepted from Sergei Ivanov by the new Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Serdyukov, who replaced him at the post. And no matter what ill-wishers say about his incompetence in military affairs, one cannot fail to note the noble initiative of the civilian manager: under him, the development of the "Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020" began. In April 2008, it was approved. At the same time, by order of the Minister of Defense No. 241 dated April 28, 2008, a commission was established to implement the strategy.

The plans were grandiose. Recall, in particular, the intention to introduce the Russian Armed Forces into the “five best armies in the world, including in terms of key socio-economic indicators”, and the military personnel serving under the contract into the “middle class of the country”. To do this, as expected, their AP should exceed the average wage (AW) in the country by 25%, and military pensions (MP) should rise to 80% of the AP. Another promise was also made: "For the first time, civil society will be able to take part in monitoring the implementation of activities and programs that ensure the implementation of the strategy." True, the next statement - that "the army is becoming truly open" did not harmonize with the factual behind-the-scenes work of the commission and the closed nature of drafting bills on changes in the army, even when they were discussed in the State Duma.

However, shortly after the strategy was approved, negative distracting developments occurred. This is the August 2008 war, during which the Russian Armed Forces defended their peacekeepers and civilians in South Ossetia. At the same time, an economic crisis broke out.

In the fall of 2008, the President of the Russian Federation, at the suggestion of military leaders, announced a transition to a “new look” for our army, we note, also behind the scenes, secretly from the majority of not only civilians, but also military personnel.

For a short time, the interests of contractors, who were previously forced to sign a “voluntary” contract, and military leaders, who allowed coercion instead of making the service attractive, coincided, including at the expense of a decent DD. The contractors began to scatter, and the generals escaped responsibility for the failure of the FTP by accusing the contractors of lack of patriotism.

Under these conditions, in order to save budget funds, it was decided to fill the bulk of the positions of the RMKS (700 thousand people) by conscription. The fact that it would not be possible to call up so many young men in the current demographic situation was neglected. And the fact that the combat effectiveness of persons undergoing military service for only one year is extremely low was also neglected. The generals convinced the deputies of the legitimacy to send military personnel into battle, who served only 3 months. And such an amendment was made to the law.

But everyone, it would seem, knows the impact on road safety of hastily trained young drivers of vehicles. Even if they do not drive in combat vehicles, but in comfortable foreign cars. The appearance of the term "teapot" in relation to them is not accidental. And so, in relation to our army, it turned out that it began to consist mainly of "dummies". A joking suggestion suggests itself: the leading commanders who justified such a transition to such a look of the RF Armed Forces should be renamed "bosses". But if it were only a matter of how we call them! And from the point of view of the country's defense capability, there is no time for jokes.

As for the size of the DD, then, having saved on military personnel of the lower level of the military hierarchy (after replacing contract soldiers with conscripts), some people wanted to transfer these funds to the more “needy”. Under plausible pretexts, a number of ministerial orders were developed to “bonuse money” for some military personnel according to criteria that were not entirely clear. The ill-fated orders still excite the military personnel and their families, and the main result of the undertaking was reduced to confusion and a split in the ranks of the “military brotherhood”.

BACKGROUND LEGISLATION IS CRAZY

Order No. 115 of March 28, 2009, deftly titled "On Additional Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Using Funds for the Monetary Allowance of Military Personnel and Remuneration of Civilian Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," became the apotheosis of the concern of the highest officials of the Ministry of Defense for themselves. Clause 7 of the “Procedure” attached to this order announced that the specific amounts of “incentives are determined within the limits of budgetary funds ... based on the results of the performance of official duties by military personnel and civilian personnel and are not limited to maximum sizes.”

It is impossible to show such an unlimited increase in DD after 2008 on the above graph, as well as to link it with any indicators of the combat capability of the troops and the country's defense capability. How the effectiveness of the use of DD funds increased remains a mystery. But the incomes of many military and civilian officials at the end of the budget year exceeded the incomes of not only regular troops, but also Supreme Commander! The bewildering meaning of this order was then corrected by the order of the Minister of Defense No. 1010 of 26.07. 2010.

Let us give an example of a completely different attitude of our authorities to the payment of funds to military personnel. This example applies to most military personnel. The Ministry of Finance, in its letter No. 03-04-08-01/9 dated January 27, 2009, signed by the director of the Department of Tax and Customs Tariff Policy, initiated the withholding of personal income tax (PIT) with one of the compensation payments to military personnel. We are talking about compensation provided for in Article 16 of the Federal Law of 1998 No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel”.

Unfortunately, this compensation does not have an official name. It is provided either “for”, or “for” sanatorium treatment, and if in meaning, then “besides” it. Without delving into the game of pretexts, the Ministry of Finance decided that personal income tax should be collected from this compensation. The calculation was that, firstly, the amounts of these compensations of 600 and 300 rubles per year (for a serviceman and family members, respectively) against the background of DD are insignificant, so the losses are not very noticeable, and secondly, the military are people accustomed to infringements . They grumble and calm down. There are enough other problems (both personal and official). Yes, and much larger problems in the system of monetary allowance continue to disturb the military ...

So it’s not the conjectures of critics, not the “subversive” activities of human rights activists, but life itself has shown and continues to show the fallacy of behind-the-scenes development of plans and the procedure for implementing them, especially in the systems of DD and army recruitment. Therefore, in February 2011, the parameters of the "new look" of the RF Armed Forces were again changed. It was also said about the necessary increase in the staffing of the RMKS under the contract, the approximate number was named, although there is no program for this yet.

True, the president and prime minister regularly reminded officials of the need to adopt a law on a new DD for military personnel. For some time, a draft of such a law “hung” on the Internet, but then it disappeared. Perhaps this is due to the fact that high-ranking officials in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense are quite satisfied with the current procedure, since the high size and continuous growth of their DD guarantees it anyway. It seems that the implementation of the strategy mentioned above was stalled from the military department itself.

Many in the Russian Federation discussed the current situation, as well as the reasons for the slowdown in the strategy. This was done by military and civilian experts, in particular from the IEP.

Only after March 17 this year, when the preliminary consideration of the draft law on DD in the State Duma Committee on Defense took place, and the materials were partially published in the media, the discussion of the new system of DD was updated.

Most recently, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation submitted a draft law to the Russian government, and at its meeting on May 26, as it was announced, they were going to consider the document in order to then send it to the State Duma. But, we note, there is still little time left for the passage of the future law through all instances by the promised date of introduction - 01/01/2012. After all, by-laws will also be needed. At speeds, it's hard to fix anything. But the officials who developed the bills can report that they have carried out the president's order.

The following materials are now available for independent review:

1. Draft federal law "On monetary allowance and certain payments to military personnel" and the explanatory note and financial and economic justification accompanying this bill.

2. Information about the draft federal law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law “On Monetary Allowance and Certain Payments to Military Personnel” and the documents accompanying this bill.

3. A number of other documents accompanying the bills, but not included in them, as well as publications that are indirectly related to the problem. There are many retellings of the presented materials in the media, but there is little analytics.

What did the results of our independent study show?

ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABILITY AND PURPOSE OF BILLS

The appearance of the bills under consideration should certainly be considered a favorable event. They contain provisions that deserve support, but in general, as analysis has shown, support cannot be unconditional. It does not follow from the bills that they correspond to the main thing:

- the aspirations of the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation;

- the course announced by the President of the Russian Federation for the modernization of society, including the full involvement of young people in innovative activities, as well as the suppression of corruption;

- socially significant interests of military personnel, at least in the form as they were set out in the "Strategy for Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020."

Neither the explanatory notes to the bills, nor the certificates prepared for the meeting of the State Duma Committee on Defense, give an answer to the question of what caused the need for a radical change in the military personnel's DD. The explanatory notes are based on a purely bureaucratic approach - a listing of some instructions and instructions from the leadership, in pursuance of which the bills were developed. However, this list cannot be considered complete, much less accessible for analysis by independent experts.

At the same time, as shown in the table below, there are official documents in the state on the problem under consideration, which should have been completed long ago. And this is not counting the strategy mentioned above, which, as a departmental document, could not be mentioned by the drafters of laws due to the status sign. The table includes some current top-level documents that are related to the need to increase the attractiveness of military service. There are those that have not been implemented for many years, their text has been corrected, but not in the right direction. Perhaps someone has forgotten them. The time has come, in our opinion, to remember and fulfill.

No. Documents not mentioned by the developers, but also subject to execution Comments
1. Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 30, 1992 No. 918 on the beginning of the transition to voluntary recruitment The execution was interrupted in 1995, among other reasons, due to the lack of attractiveness of military service.
2. Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of May 16, 1996 No. 722 and of November 25, 1996 No. 1592 on the completion of the transition to exclusively voluntary manning of the RF Armed Forces and, to a limited extent, to other troops. Implementation has been deferred until “the creation of the necessary conditions”, which, first of all, depend on ensuring the attractiveness of military service. It's time to create them.
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on February 5, 2010 (subparagraph “g”, paragraph 30) The need for "training highly professional servicemen devoted to the Fatherland, increasing the prestige of military service" was noted. You can't do without the growth of DD.

In any case, it is incompetent to forget about the interests of military personnel of any category, as well as about the true reasons for the reform of the DD. The table below shows their indicative list, which is formed on the basis of publicly available information. And we should also add the requirement for the highest rates of recruitment military organization the state with highly professional military personnel and building up the combat capability of the troops.

No. Reasons for the need for legislative reform DD Comments
1. The impossibility of solving (within the framework of the previous order and sizes of DD) the problem of voluntary recruitment of regular troops of the RF Armed Forces by such citizens who would be interested and able to solve all military tasks in peacetime and wartime This is evidenced by the failure of the first stage of recruiting the Armed Forces after 1992, then the failure of the FTP of 2004-2007, the observed early dismissal of young officers and cadets from the Armed Forces
2. The corruption of conscription and the preservation in it, as in the rudiment of the Russian serf past, of the inequality of citizens of the Russian Federation and the transfer of this inequality to DD This is evidenced by the materials of the military prosecutor's office and the data of the committees of soldiers' mothers.
3. The impossibility of Russia's entry into the group (five) of states with the best modern armies, declared in 2008 in the Social Development Strategy of the RF Armed Forces, including in terms of socio-economic indicators Russia from this year will remain in the G8 G8 the only state that retains the conscription
4. Unmotivated violation of the constitutional principles of equality of citizens, including civil servants (civil / military; under contract / conscription; serving in various federal executive authorities, etc.) There are regular facts that the DD of military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lags behind DD in some other troops, as well as from the monetary content of civil civil servants
5. Lack of legislative linkage of military personnel’s DD with the average wage (SWP) in the country The sizes of DD and SZP, their growth rates are not linked, which leads to the loss of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the competitive labor market
6. Incorrect from a socio-economic point of view, the proportions of the ratios of the maximum and minimum DD within the existing order (up to 10 times when taking into account all allowances), which leads to an increase in social discontent and is fraught with negative consequences. The bills are contrary to the National Security Council-2020, in which such ratios (maximum income to minimum) are elevated to the number of the most important indicators of socio-economic security
7. A general decline in the prestige of military service, contrary to the inclusion of contract servicemen in the category of the “middle class of the country”, stated in the Strategy, which is designed to solve the problem of staffing the country's defense capability Simultaneously with the decrease in DD and VP, other incentives have fallen, which in other countries make military service attractive, and the social status of a serviceman is high.

There is another group of reasons that make it necessary to reform not only the system of DD for military personnel, but also the provision of pensions for military pensioners, but this requires a separate analysis, and not a passing mention. Although it is probably worth noting that the government is still trying to establish an unacceptable procedure for calculating pensions for the vast majority of retired military men.

In a press release for the meeting on May 26, it was stated as follows: “The procedure for calculating the pensions of citizens who have served in the military is being changed in such a way that, by reducing the amount of monetary allowance accepted for calculating pensions, in order to ensure an increase in the pensions themselves, on average, by at least 1.5 times." This is much less than what military pensioners expect, and directly contradicts what was stated in Serdyukov's strategy.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION OF BILLS

The considered bills are an attempt to implement the instructions of the top military-political leadership of the Russian Federation on the introduction of new, significantly increased sizes of military personnel's allowances from 2012. Such an attempt deserves support in principle. Undoubtedly positive in the bill is, for example, the establishment of lump-sum benefits in the amount of 3 and 2 million rubles. and further descending by 500 thousand rubles. - solid, although it is not clear from what considerations the developers proceeded.

At the same time, the bills do not solve many problems that are among the most relevant for citizens and society, as well as for the state:

1. According to the main parameters of DD and EP, the bills do not contain direct action laws - instead of them, references are made to future by-laws. The published tables of the future sizes of DD and VP, given as supposedly illustrating the submitted bills, in fact, do not have a law direct relation- the mentioned dimensions are not fixed by law. This means that the DD parameters actually promised to citizens after the adoption of laws will not receive guaranteed grounds. And by-laws, due to established traditions, will be drawn up without proper public (and even parliamentary) control. And whether the parameters they introduced will meet today's promises is a big question.

2. The general impression of future laws, if we abandon solid promises, is that in terms of their content and semantic load, these are not independent new laws, but modified versions of Articles 12 and 13 of the 1998 Law No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel” and a number of changes in other articles of the said and other laws.

3. Separate legal provisions are not productive, not precise or even clearly erroneous, they contain provisions that look like they contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 (paragraph 2 of article 19 and paragraph 2 of article 55), and therefore need justification, which not in the explanatory note. There are also discrepancies with a number of existing laws, while their provisions are not proposed to be canceled in connection with the entry into force of new laws.

4. Prerequisites are being laid for the destruction of the unity of the civil service system in the Russian Federation, provided for by the Federal Law of 2003 No. 58-FZ “On the System of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation” (clause 1, article 3), in particular, due to deepening discrepancies between the system of DD for military personnel and the DS system for civil servants. The previously formulated requirements of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 2002 No. 249 "On measures to improve the system of monetary allowances for military personnel" are called into question. This even applies to such a provision as the status of an official who establishes the size of the DD of military personnel and DS of state civil servants. Now they are different. Article 12 of the Federal Law No. 76 of 1998 “On the Status of Military Personnel” (clause 2, part 3) states: “Salaries for standard military positions of military personnel, salaries for those undergoing military service under a contract, and additional payments are determined by the Government of the Russian Federation upon submission Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (another federal executive body in which military service is provided for by federal law) in compliance with the condition of unity of the basic norms of the monetary allowance of military personnel. And in Article 50 of the Federal Law No. 58 of 2003 "On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation" it is written that "the size of official salaries and salaries for the class rank of federal civil servants are established by decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation."

The preservation of this distinction proposed in the bill actually lowers the status of servicemen.

In the same way, the proposed division of military personnel into "grades" corresponding to their departmental affiliation is a violation.

Most of all, the rights of low-paid categories of military personnel to a decent DD are ignored, which undermines the plans for the accelerated transfer of regular Russian troops to voluntary military service under a contract by recruiting the necessary specialists on a competitive basis; Ultimately, the achievement of the goal set in the Address of the President of the Russian Federation is not ensured.

5. Some legal norms regulated by other laws are abolished; changes in a number of existing norms are not stipulated; there are still opportunities for sub-legislative expansion of the supposedly “final” list of payments and the finite number of categories of citizens to whom the bill applies, in particular, this applies to the “equal persons” mentioned in the bill.

WHAT CAN YOU OFFER IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

The authors of this publication attempted two possible answers to the question posed. The first is the development of a new alternative project and proposals for its wide open discussion. The second is the formulation of conceptual (fundamental) provisions, which the introduced laws must comply with when they are finalized. Materials on both attempts were handed over to a number of officials involved in solving this problem, in due course.

For implementation, the second answer seems more realistic. His wording, proposed by us, about the size of DD is as follows.

The size of the DD for military personnel is annually (during the development of the federal budget) established (adjusted) by the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation with the participation of all federal executive bodies in which military service is provided for by law, based on the following values ​​achieved:

a) the size of the SZP in the country - this size is most important for citizens concluding the first contract for service in the regular forces (with a coefficient exceeding DD over SZP of 1.25, which can be specified when preparing the draft federal budget);

b) the size of the DS of civil servants - these sizes are important for all (especially for high-ranking) contracted military personnel who are reassigned to new positions and (or) renegotiate contracts, in accordance with the updated scale of correspondence between the positions of military and civil servants.

The specified data is used to adjust the grid of tariff categories and, accordingly, salaries.

Citizens called to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland and perform military service on conscription are assigned the following DD:

- during the period of study in training military units (centers) to prepare for further service in the regular troops or for staying in a military-trained reserve (reserve) - corresponding to standard state student scholarships;

- during the period of further conscription service in the positions of soldiers, sailors and sergeants in the regular troops - the corresponding DD of military personnel undergoing the same service under the contract.

All servicemen doing military service in the Russian Federation receive DD in accordance with the same scales of official salaries, salaries by military rank and all allowances, except for an allowance for special conditions of military service. It may be different for various authorities in which military service is provided for by federal law.

And, of course, we cannot ignore the problem of anti-corruption expertise of the submitted bills. Indeed, the methodology for conducting anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts, which was approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 2010 No. 96 “On anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts”, defines the following as corruption factors: wording like “right” and excessive freedom of sub-legislative rule-making.

This is exactly what the bill under consideration does. So, for example, the draft law contains the phrase “have the right to establish ... in larger size than the upper limit set by the future law. When listing possible payments, words are suddenly added that "other payments may be established." They are a temptation to develop new orders, rewarding especially valuable officials with bonuses for their especially effective activities.

Let us note in conclusion that now the moment is coming when, not in words, but in deeds, the statements made during the approval of the strategy mentioned at the beginning of the article will be verified. This will include a real test of the openness of further work on the project and the involvement of civil society in control over the implementation of the strategy.

V. Tsymbal, A. Privetkin. "Independent military review".

The “Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020” (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy) was developed in order to meet the social needs of military personnel, civilian personnel, military pensioners and their families and was approved on March 28, 2008 by the decision of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. It was planned to implement the Strategy in three stages, the first stage covers 2008-2012.

The leadership of the Russian Federation pays special attention to the social development of the Armed Forces (AF) of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it would seem that everything that is done within the framework of the Strategy should be known not only to all military personnel, but to the whole society. However, the text of the Strategy has been published in a minor edition (cf. Military railroad. - 2008. - No. 19 and No. 20). On the website of the Ministry of Defense, only the name of the document is indicated. Civilian specialists can find it on a specialized website or on the ConsultantPlus website, where the order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation dated April 28, 2008 No. 241 is posted.

At the same time, the Strategy provides for the solution of a number of important tasks in various areas of social policy in the following order:
1) culture and leisure, physical culture and sports, information and commercial services;
2) military education;
3) healthcare;
4) increasing the security of military service;
5) solution of the housing problem;
6) increase in monetary allowance (DD) and pensions;
7) ensuring social protection.

It seems to us that the procedure for solving problems in these areas should be different, since the size of the DD has highest value in improving the material support of military personnel. However, the preparation of management decisions on DD is delayed. An increase in the size of the DD should have entailed an increase in military pensions, but changes in this area are even more problematic, and therefore are being postponed.

The main conclusions on the problems of improving the DD of military personnel and military pensions are as follows:

  • at present, the problem of a decent DD has been solved only for the military personnel of the Central Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense and, selectively, for a smaller part of the officers of the regular troops;
  • the problem of increasing the DD of the bulk of the military has not yet been resolved, and in the period remaining before the promised deadline for its solution, it may remain unresolved;
  • in relation to military pensions, there are trends of both a steady decrease in its level compared to the DD for military personnel, and convergence with the standards for pensions for the majority of the population of the Russian Federation.
The second most important social problem for servicemen is providing them with housing. The following results are evident here:
  • in recent years, the families of servicemen and military pensioners have been given an unprecedented number of apartments to own (up to 100,000 annually);
  • on the official website of the Ministry of Defense, the section "Housing for military personnel" has appeared, which contains information on ready-made and under construction housing with reference to regions, legislative and regulatory acts relating to the provision of housing. An important innovation of the section was the creation of the Unified Register of military personnel recognized as in need of housing;
  • providing military personnel and their families with apartments should be considered as the most important action of the state, which has a “dual (military and civilian)” purpose, contributing to the growth of the well-being of the whole people;
  • housing for military personnel, which is attractive to corrupt officials, can become an area for developing a number of effective mechanisms for introducing public control to fight corruption.
For other areas social problems military personnel are also characterized by certain achievements and problems, but in comparison with the two considered, they fade into the background.

E.V. Trofimova- Ph.D., senior researcher military economics laboratories


VI. Stages and priorities

The Strategy is supposed to be implemented in three stages.
the first stage - 2008 - 2012;
the second stage - 2013 - 2017;
the third stage - 2018 - 2020.
The priorities for the social development of the Armed Forces include:
at the first stage (until 2012):
increase in the monetary allowance of military personnel to the level of 95 percent compared with the average wages of workers in the country's economic sectors;
provision of permanent and service housing for all military personnel who have the right and need it;
optimization of the military social infrastructure and bringing it into line with state standards, norms and requirements established in the relevant field;
increasing the satisfaction of military personnel with the availability and quality of services in the military social sphere to the level of 50 percent or more.
at the second stage (2013 - 2017):
an increase in the monetary allowance of military personnel to the level of 110 percent compared with the average wages of workers in the country's economic sectors;
provision of housing for servicemen through the accumulative mortgage system (up to 100 percent of those who expressed a desire to receive a mortgage loan for an apartment or 80 percent of those eligible for a targeted housing loan);
providing housing for all military personnel who acquire the right to receive housing in the year of dismissal;
improving the quality and efficiency of the activities of organizations in the social sphere of the Armed Forces to a level exceeding the corresponding parameters for the functioning of organizations in the social sphere of the civil sector;
increasing the satisfaction of military personnel with the availability and quality of services in the military social sphere to the level of 70 percent or more.
at the third stage (2018 - 2020):
an increase in the monetary allowance of military personnel to the level of 125 percent compared to the average wages of workers in the country's economic sectors;
reduction of the term for providing housing to military personnel recognized as in need of better housing conditions to three years;
completion of the transition to providing military personnel with housing according to service and official standards (from 60 to 250 square meters per family), taking into account the military rank and military position held;
improving the quality and efficiency of the activities of organizations in the social sphere of the Armed Forces to the level of the best world standards;
increasing the satisfaction of military personnel with the availability and quality of services in the military social sphere to the level of 90 percent or more.

VII. Complex of main events

Achievement of the general goal and solution of the objectives of the Strategy will be ensured through the implementation of a set of specific measures.
1) Improvement of culture and leisure, physical culture and sports, information and commercial and consumer services for military personnel and citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families:
culture and leisure:
introduction in all formations and military units of a guaranteed list of cultural and leisure services, determined by the Ministry of Defense;
development of all forms of services in the field of culture and leisure (theater and concert, museum, library, film and video services, services of dance floors and discos, game rooms / halls, club formations) for military personnel, civilian personnel and members of their families, regardless of places of deployment of formations and military units;
promoting the development of amateur artistic creativity of military personnel, members of their families and civilian personnel;
organization and holding of competitions, reviews and festivals of artistic amateur creativity;
interaction with civil cultural institutions, creative associations;
organization and holding of joint cultural and patronage events;
training, retraining and advanced training of managers and specialists (employees) in the field of cultural and leisure work of the Armed Forces;
modernization of the material and technical base, carrying out current and major repairs, ensuring explosion and fire safety of cultural institutions of the Ministry of Defense;
physical culture and sports:
development of promotion of a healthy lifestyle;
study of physical culture and sports interests of military personnel;
training commanders and sports organizers in the methodology of conducting educational and training work;
organization and conduct of sports work among all categories of military personnel, taking into account their physical culture and sports interests, contributing to the strengthening of sports traditions;
conducting reviews of sports work;
construction of new and reconstruction of existing sports facilities, maintenance and overhaul of physical training and sports facilities;
provision of facilities with sports property, equipment and inventory;
Information Support:
equipping dormitories, barracks, libraries of cultural and leisure centers (Houses of Officers) with subscriber points of Internet access;
providing military units with periodicals;
equipping dormitories (barracks) for personnel with satellite receiving complexes and a cable network for high-quality reception of television and radio signals;
providing military units with a stable broadcast signal;
the transition of newspapers of the Ministry of Defense to 8-page format and color printing.
commercial and consumer services:
organization of trade support, public catering and consumer services for military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, members of their families in places of performance of duties of military service (work), residence and in the field;
development of the military trade system, including:
improving the quality and expanding the range of goods and services;
raising the professional level of workers in trade, public catering, and consumer services;
development of the material and technical base of military trade by creating enterprises of a new type (shopping and leisure centers, minimarkets, cafes with a range of leisure services, consumer service complexes with a range of services), carrying out major and current repairs of existing facilities, replacing and updating outdated trade, technological and refrigeration equipment;
pursuing a price policy to curb price growth at military trade enterprises by monitoring prices, analyzing their relationship with the commercial sector, and eliminating emerging price distortions;
formation of a unified information system military trade;
provision of targeted assistance and provision of discounts on purchased goods, products and services to veterans of the Great Patriotic War, military personnel undergoing treatment in military medical institutions, and some other categories of consumers.
2) Improving vocational education and training of military personnel and state civil servants:
military personnel:
improvement of the professional selection system;
optimization of the network of military educational institutions;
improvement of the educational and material base of military educational institutions;
increasing the scientific and pedagogical potential of military educational institutions;
achieving compliance with the level of military professional training of graduates of military educational institutions to modern requirements;
improvement of the organizational and economic mechanisms for managing the system of military education;
improvement of the system of additional professional education for servicemen;
providing targeted support to military educational institutions that implement innovative training programs;

Providing targeted support to the best teachers, doctoral students, adjuncts, students and cadets of military universities;
licensing and accreditation of training military units for the training of conscripted military personnel under programs of initial vocational education;
improvement of programs, combat training courses and other regulatory legal documents for the assignment of class qualifications;
creation of a distance learning system in all garrisons and places of compact residence of military personnel;
government civil servants:
advanced training and professional retraining of federal state civil servants of the Ministry of Defense.
3) Preservation and promotion of the health of military personnel, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families, as well as civilian personnel:
prevention, diagnosis, treatment of current classes of diseases: HIV infection, tuberculosis, cardiovascular, dental diseases, etc.;
development of a system of medical examination and promotion of a healthy lifestyle in the Armed Forces;
preservation and strengthening of the physical and mental health of military personnel of the Armed Forces;
provision of high-tech medical care;
providing sanatorium-resort treatment and organized recreation for persons who need it for medical reasons;
provision of preferential sanatorium-and-spa treatment for civilian personnel;
development of a system of medical and psychological rehabilitation and organized recreation for certain categories of military personnel after they have completed tasks that adversely affect their health (flight personnel, duty forces of the Navy, Strategic Missile Forces, KV, Airborne Forces, etc.);
providing free sanatorium treatment for families with many children;
organization of health-improving recreation for children of military personnel;
development of preschool education for children of military personnel;
improving the material and technical base of military medical units, units and institutions, as well as military sanatoriums and rest homes.
4) Improving the security of military service:
creation and organization of the functioning of a single information-analytical and methodological center (body) for ensuring the security of military service in the Armed Forces, which coordinates activities to ensure the UA, as well as the collection, analysis, assessment of UA threats and the development of a unified scientific and methodological support;
identification of the best Russian and foreign experience in the field of security of military service;
development and improvement of standards, norms and requirements for the security of military service;
organizational and technical measures to ensure the security of military service, involving:
creation and equipping of training grounds for the security of military service in military units (military educational institutions of vocational education);
classroom equipment for safety briefings ( study guides, posters, etc.);
equipment with visual aids of corners according to safety requirements in military units (canteens, boiler rooms, car parks, etc.);
injury prevention during military service;
prevention of traffic accidents and accidents in the operation of vehicles;
prevention of suicidal incidents.
5) Improving the living conditions of military families:
construction of housing to provide families of military personnel eligible for permanent housing;
development of the accumulative-mortgage system of housing provision for servicemen;
the formation of service housing stock for the staffing of the Armed Forces at the location of military units;
providing servicemen and members of their families cohabiting with them with living quarters rented at the expense of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in the absence of a service housing fund;
providing military personnel with compensation for sub-renting (hiring) of housing in full, taking into account the composition of the family and housing standards;
fulfillment of state obligations to provide housing for "categories of citizens established by federal legislation" (within the framework of the federal target program "Housing" for 2002-2010).
6) Increasing the size and improving the quality of the provision of monetary allowances to military personnel, wages to civilian personnel and pensions to citizens dismissed from military service:
bringing the size of the monetary allowance of military personnel and the wages of civilian personnel to a level corresponding to the importance of these types of labor activity in the field of ensuring the country's defense capability, taking into account all the factors of complexity and danger of labor, including class qualifications, and forming high competitiveness in the labor market;
setting the size of pensions for military personnel, including veterans, at a level that meets the goals of achieving social attractiveness and compliance with the complexity of military service;
making insurance payments and
temporary allowances for members of the families of servicemen who died in the line of military service;
introduction of mandatory control over the timeliness, correctness and completeness of payments (accrual and receipt) of monetary allowances to military personnel, wages to civilian personnel, pensions, including family members of military personnel, as well as insurance payments and lump-sum benefits to family members of military personnel who died in the line of military duties services.
7) Ensuring social protection of military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families:
development and implementation of an information system for collecting and summarizing information on social guarantees and compensations for military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families, posting it on the website of the Ministry of Defense;
development of a procedure for collecting, summarizing and publishing on the website of the Ministry of Defense information on social guarantees and compensations for military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families;
including priority socially significant categories:
children:
increasing the monetary income of military and civilian personnel with children;
organization of recreation and recreation for children of military and civilian personnel, including in children's health camps of the Ministry of Defense;
material support (allowance) of pupils of military units;
organization of sanatorium recreation and treatment, as well as annual medical examination of children from large families of military personnel;
development of the material and technical base, improvement of the system of military professional orientation, improvement of the financial situation of the civilian personnel of the Suvorov military, the Nakhimov naval, Moscow military music schools and cadet corps of the Ministry of Defense;
promotion of a healthy lifestyle among children and adolescents from among the pupils of military units, families of military personnel and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces;
development of a school-course network (circles, studios, courses) in the Houses of Officers, clubs of military units, houses of culture, etc., which are part of the system of military cultural institutions of the Ministry of Defense;
expanding the range of measures for patriotic education, supporting the activities of public patriotic associations (clubs) of children and youth;
organization of sports and recreational activities for children and adolescents from among the pupils of military units, families of military personnel and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces;
preferential trade and consumer services for preschool educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense;
military veterans:
improving pensions for military veterans;

Organization of sanatorium and resort rest and treatment, as well as annual medical examination of veterans of military service;
holding mass cultural and cultural entertainment events for veterans (holidays, performances, reviews, festivals, concerts, etc.), involving them in the patriotic education of children and youth;
providing targeted assistance to veterans of the Great Patriotic War, including those who are being treated in military medical institutions;
preferential trade and consumer services for veterans of military service;
payment of expenses for the burial of veterans of military service;
military family members who have lost their breadwinner:
the implementation of insurance payments and lump-sum benefits to family members of servicemen who died in the line of military service;
increase in the size of survivor's pensions, compensation payments and monthly allowances;
payment for the travel of family members to the place of burial (burial) of a serviceman;
promoting the realization of rights to better housing conditions;
medical support;
health resort provision;
payment for travel to the place of treatment and back;
preferential trade and consumer services;
assistance in obtaining vocational education;
referral to children's health institutions, camps and all-Russian children's centers "Eaglet" and "Ocean";
military wives (husbands):
organization of training for wives (husbands) of military personnel in educational institutions of higher and secondary vocational education, with the development of educational programs for part-time (evening) or part-time education, using the distance method;
assistance in employment of wives (husbands) of servicemen;
social adaptation:
the creation of a network of regional military training centers that provide professional training for conscripted military personnel and military servicemen undergoing military service under a contract and retiring from military service;
formation of a network of preparatory departments at educational institutions of higher professional education for free training of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, foremen who are serving under a contract;
introduction of a system of state nominal educational certificates;
training in civilian professions for conscripted military personnel during the period of military service with the issuance of a state-recognized document on primary vocational education;
assistance to servicemen undergoing military service under a contract (with the exception of officers), whose continuous duration of military service under a contract is at least three years, in the use of the right of out-of-competition admission and training in state and municipal educational institutions of higher and secondary vocational education by part-time ( evening) or part-time education (informing, career guidance, counseling, etc.);
introduction of remote forms and methods of professional retraining in one of the civilian specialties of military personnel who have been serving under a contract for at least 20 years, in the year of dismissal from military service upon reaching the age limit for military service, expiration of military service or health status;
assistance in employment of citizens dismissed from military service.

VIII. The necessary conditions

To achieve the general goal and solve the problems of the Strategy, it is required:
improvement of legislation and legal support for the social development of the Armed Forces;
strengthening the role of innovations in the military-social sphere through the creation of mechanisms for identifying, studying and implementing the best domestic and world practice in the implementation of the Strategy;
development and implementation in the activities of the Ministry of Defense of modern mechanisms for managing the military-social sphere and appropriate training of personnel;
creation of an automated information system for managing the social development of the Armed Forces;
providing information support for the implementation of the Strategy;
development of public-private partnership in the military-social sphere;
ensuring funding for the implementation of the Strategy from the following main sources:
federal budget;
budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation;
extrabudgetary funds.

IX. Risks

Significant risks of achieving the general goal of the Strategy, solving its tasks and obtaining the planned results are due to the possible negative impact of a number of factors of a military, political, social, economic and operational nature.
Partially managed risks include:
a possible significant increase in the planned terms for the approval and approval by the Government of the Russian Federation of the draft regulatory legal acts developed by the Ministry of Defense required for the implementation of the Strategy, as well as the terms for their consideration by the State Duma. To minimize the impact of this risk, it is planned to involve the main stakeholders in their discussion at the stage of developing draft documents, which should subsequently take part in their approval;
failure to achieve synchronous interaction with federal executive authorities, public authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and other interested parties. To prevent the impact of this risk, it is planned to carry out work to conclude and control the implementation of agreements on interaction with federal executive authorities, state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and other interested parties.
Unmanaged risks are:
outstripping growth of the average wage in the country compared to the growth of the monetary allowance of military personnel, the wages of civilian personnel of the Armed Forces and the level of pensions for persons who served in the military;
lack of production and construction capacities to ensure the implementation of the measures of the Strategy related to the construction of housing for military personnel, cultural and sports facilities, etc.;
a sharp rise in housing prices;
the possibility of participation of the Armed Forces in the performance of tasks in a state of emergency or armed conflict;
legislative change in the strength of the Armed Forces.
In the event of the impact of any of the above factors, it is planned to assess the scope and consequences of these factors, their impact on the achievement of the general goal, the achievement of the objectives of the Strategy and the achievement of planned results, and the appropriate adjustment of the Strategy.

X. Control mechanism

In order to ensure the implementation of the Strategy, achieve its general goal and solve problems, an appropriate control mechanism is being formed, which includes the following elements:
assigning responsibility for achieving the general goal, solving problems and fulfilling the planned indicators for the implementation of the Strategy to the relevant main and central departments of the Ministry of Defense, as well as other military command and control bodies;
creation of a working body in the Ministry of Defense (Commission for the implementation of the Strategy), the main task of which will be to make key decisions related to the control of the implementation of the Strategy. This body is expected to include representatives of all major stakeholders, including government authorities of the Russian Federation, public and scientific organizations;
creation of a monitoring system to track the implementation of indicators characterizing the achievement of the general goal and the achievement of the objectives of the Strategy;
annual review of the results of the implementation of the Strategy at meetings of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense.
The Ministry of Defense manages the implementation of the Strategy and is responsible for the results achieved, coordinates the actions of all participants in the implementation of the Strategy, prepares within its powers the regulatory legal acts necessary for the implementation of the Strategy, generates reports on the implementation of the Strategy, monitors the progress of its implementation and its adjustment.
The Ministry of Defense provides public discussion of the results of the Strategy and their presentation in the media.
The Strategy Implementation Commission coordinates and makes decisions related to monitoring the implementation of the Strategy, which require agreement with representatives of all interested parties, and also ensures effective interaction between all interested parties in the framework of achieving the general goal and solving the problems of the Strategy.
The central authorities and other military command and control bodies are responsible and exercise control over the solution of the relevant tasks and the implementation of the measures of the Strategy, form and submit reports on the results achieved.
An annual report on the results of the implementation of the Strategy will be submitted to the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation.

Attachment 1

Designations and abbreviations
BVS - security of military service
VDV - Airborne Troops
Navy - Navy
Armed Forces - Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
RF Armed Forces - Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
VPO - higher professional education
university - higher education institution
KV - Space Forces
Ministry of Defense - Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
NGO - Primary Vocational Education
Subprogram GZhS - subprogram "State housing certificates"
Strategic Missile Forces - Rocket troops strategic purpose
Mass media - mass media
SPO - secondary vocational education
Strategy - Strategy for the social development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020

Annex 2

Definitions
Military social infrastructure - a network of organizations subordinate to the Ministry of Defense that provide services in the field of culture and leisure, mass communications, physical culture and sports, healthcare, education, and consumer services.
Military consumers - military personnel, members of their families and the population in the places of service and residence.
The general goal (long-term strategic goal) is the specific state of certain characteristics of the social sphere of the Armed Forces desired by the Ministry of Defense in the long term, to which its activities are directed.
State social policy - a set of specific measures and activities of the state to create the most favorable conditions for the implementation of the social needs of priority social groups and the entire population of the country, maintaining their income, level of education, health care, culture, employment, security, etc.
A task (long-term strategic objective) is a specific, measurable, time-bound activity of the Ministry of Defense aimed at achieving socially significant results required for the successful implementation of the set general (long-term strategic) goal.
Stakeholders - federal, regional and municipal executive authorities, organizations, citizens who, in accordance with the law, have an interest in the results of activities in the field of social development of the Armed Forces and who can influence the development of this area.
The Social Development Index of the Armed Forces is one of the main indicators that characterizes the success of the implementation of the Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces and is defined as the proportion of task indicators for which target values ​​have been achieved, among all task indicators.
Final socially significant results - results implementation of the Strategy, characterizing the solution of the tasks set and the achievement of the established goal, incl. effects from the implementation of the Strategy for the main stakeholders (social, economic, political, military, etc.).
Control over the implementation of the Strategy - the process of monitoring, analyzing and evaluating the implementation of the Strategy within the available resources, assessing the achievement of the general goal and objectives, developing and making corrective management decisions.
Monitoring is a continuous process of monitoring the implementation of the Strategy.
A large family is a family with three or more children.
Immediate results - the results of the implementation of the measures of the Strategy, characterizing, among other things, the quantity (volume) and quality of the services provided, payments.
A program is a set of interrelated activities aimed at solving a specific problem and described by measurable target indicators.
The subsistence minimum is the cost estimate of the minimum set of food products necessary for a person, as well as the costs of non-food products and services, taxes and mandatory payments.
The register of social indicators is a structured set of data on indicators characterizing the achievement of the general goal, the solution of tasks and the results of programs for the implementation of the Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces. The register contains key information on social indicators, including the name of the indicator, data on those responsible for achieving the indicator, the names of the corresponding goals, objectives, programs, the methodology for calculating the indicator (calculation methodology, initial data and sources of initial data), the target value of the indicator, the basis for its establishment, etc. The register is designed to ensure regular assessments of the social development of the Armed Forces, including the degree of implementation of the Strategy, and the adoption of timely corrective measures.
The register of social programs is a structured set of data on programs for the implementation of the Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces. The register reflects generalized data on the results of programs that make up their social spending obligations, customers, program executors, validity periods, regulations that approved the programs, type of programs (federal target program, analytical program of the department, target program of the department). The creation of this tool will make it possible to obtain complete and complete information on the implementation of programs, reasonably adjust the composition, structure and content of programs in accordance with the general goal, objectives of the Strategy, and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their implementation.
Register of social expenditure obligations - a structured set of data on social expenditure obligations, fixed by the relevant regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, the authority to execute which, in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, is vested in the Ministry of Defense.
Efficiency - type of result measurement
atov activity, reflecting the degree of achievement of goals and objectives.
Risk - the probability of the occurrence of circumstances that impede the achievement of the general goal and the achievement of the objectives of the Strategy, the achievement of the planned results.
Social spending obligations are the obligations of the Russian Federation, a subject of the Russian Federation, a municipality, stipulated by law, other regulatory legal act, contract or agreement, to provide individuals or legal entities, public authorities, authorities local government funds of the relevant budget for the implementation of social guarantees.
Social protection of military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families - the activities of state authorities, military administration and local self-government to create conditions for the realization of the rights and legitimate interests, freedoms and duties of these categories, as well as social guarantees and compensations arising from the peculiarities of military service.
The Social Development Strategy of the Armed Forces is a set of modern views, targets, principles and priorities in the activities of the Ministry of Defense, other federal state authorities and authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the field of social development of the Armed Forces.
Poverty level - a normatively established level of monetary income of a person, family (household) for a certain period, providing a living wage.
Satisfaction level is an indicator that allows assessing consumer satisfaction with the quality and availability of any services, taking into account the significance of factors affecting the quality and availability of these services. The value of the indicator is expressed as a percentage.
Target value of the indicator - the desired value of the indicator of achievement of the general goal, task; the value of the indicator to be achieved.
Efficiency is a type of performance measurement that reflects the cost of acquiring input resources.
Efficiency is a type of performance measurement that reflects the transformation of inputs into outputs.

Appendix 3
Passport Strategy

Title - Social development strategy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020
Basis for development - Instruction of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation dated July 5, 2007 No. 205/2/184
State customer - coordinator - Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Main developers - Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Foundation "Institute of Economics and Social Policy"
General goal - Satisfying the social needs of military personnel, civilian personnel, as well as citizens discharged from military service, and their families, which will contribute to strengthening the country's defense capability and developing human capital
Main goals:
1. Improving culture and leisure, physical culture and sports, information and commercial and consumer services for military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families;
2. Improving vocational education and training of military personnel and state civil servants;
3. Preservation and strengthening of the health of military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families;
4. Improving the security of military service;
5. Improving the living conditions of military families;
6. Increasing the size and improving the quality of the provision of monetary allowances to military personnel, wages to civilian personnel of the Armed Forces and pensions to citizens dismissed from military service;
7. Ensuring social protection of military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families.

Implementation period - 2008 - 2020

Performers of the main program activities - Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Final socially significant results:
Increasing the monetary allowance of military personnel to the level of 125 percent compared to the average wages of workers in the country's economic sectors;
Achievement of 80 percent of the amount of pensions of citizens dismissed from military service, of the amount of monetary allowance of military personnel;
Ensuring the equality of the average wages of civilian personnel of military units and organizations financed from the federal budget, and the average wages of workers in the country's economic sectors;
Provision of families of all military personnel eligible for housing with appropriate living quarters;
Reducing the death of military personnel by more than 3.8 times;
Increasing the proportion of military personnel who do not have diseases or have some deviations in their state of health, to the level of 90 percent or more;
Achieving compliance of the level of professional education and qualifications with the qualification requirements for the military position held for 100 percent of the officer corps;
Increasing the share of military personnel who passed the standards for physical training as "good" and "excellent" to the level of 90 percent or more;
Increasing the share of free time of military personnel, civilian personnel and members of their families engaged in the consumption of cultural services, up to 30 percent or more;
Improving the quality and efficiency of the activities of organizations in the social sphere of the Armed Forces to the level of the best world standards;
Increasing the satisfaction of military personnel with the availability and quality of services in the military social sphere to the level of 90 percent or more;
Increasing the satisfaction of military personnel with professional service activities to the level of 90 percent or more;
Increasing the satisfaction of civilian personnel of the Armed Forces with professional service activities and work to a level of 90 percent or more;
The Armed Forces have reached a new qualitative level of social development that meets the increased requirements both for personnel (to the level of their professional, physical, psychological and intellectual training), and for the effectiveness of the performance by military personnel of their professional tasks to ensure security and protect the political and economic interests of the Russian Federation. Federations;
Achievement of the level of social development of the Armed Forces, identical to the socio-economic indicators established in the armed forces of the most economically developed countries of the world.

Prospects for the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

“...We must secure our country from any form of military-political pressure and potential external aggression. And in this regard, the most important task remains the modernization of our Armed Forces ... "

President of Russia V. Putin

Wars and armed conflicts of the future

The large-scale changes taking place in the Armed Forces, related to their radical restructuring within the framework of the main provisions of the military reform, have been completed. Today, the construction of the Armed Forces is underway on the basis of the legal, political, organizational and structural prerequisites created in the process of reform, taking into account the newly comprehended national interests and the degree of reality of threats to Russia's national security.

The starting point in assessing the level of military danger for the Russian Federation today is that military force in the system of international relations has not lost its significance lately. Moreover, the military-political situation does not exclude the possibility of major armed conflicts arising near Russia's borders that affect the security interests of the Russian Federation.

The existing threats also influence the development of the military-political and military-strategic situation in the world, the creation of hotbeds of tension, the nature of wars and armed conflicts.

Moreover, it should be noted that wars and armed conflicts of the future will be generated not by any one factor, even if it is very significant, but by a complex interweaving of various socio-political, economic, national and religious contradictions and causes.

The main feature of conflicts today is the redistribution of roles in armed confrontation: the course and outcome of armed struggle as a whole will be determined in the aerospace sphere and at sea, and land groups will consolidate the military success achieved.

Against this background, an increase in the interdependence and mutual influence of actions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in armed struggle was revealed. This suggests that the old concept of wars, both limited and large-scale, is undergoing significant changes, since even local conflicts can now be fought over relatively large areas. In this case, the main tasks will be solved not in the course of a collision of forward units, but by means of fire engagement from extreme ranges.

Speaking about the factor of nuclear deterrence, one must also take into account the fact that in modern conditions it can be implemented effectively only if there are highly equipped and combat-ready general-purpose forces. Only then will the threat of using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack be credible.

Based on the analysis of conflicts of the late 20th - early 21st centuries, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the military-political features of armed struggle at the present stage and in the foreseeable future;

The armed forces confirm their central place in the implementation of security operations. The real combat role of paramilitary, paramilitary formations, militias, internal security forces is not as significant as it was assumed before the outbreak of armed conflicts. They are unable to conduct active military operations against the regular Armenians (Iraq);

The decisive moment for achieving military-political success is the seizure of the strategic initiative in the course of an armed conflict. Passive conduct of combat operations, counting on "exhaling" the offensive impulse of the enemy, leads to the loss of controllability of one's own grouping and to a loss in the conflict;

A feature of the armed struggle of the future will be that in the course of the war, not only military facilities and troops will be under the blows of the enemy, but at the same time the country's economy with all its infrastructure, civilian population and territory. Despite the development of the accuracy of means of destruction, all the recent armed conflicts studied were, to one degree or another, humanitarianly “dirty” and entailed significant casualties among the civilian population. In this regard, there is a need for a highly organized and effective system of civil defense of the country;

The criteria for military victory in armed conflicts will be different, but on the whole it is obvious that the solution of political tasks in an armed conflict is of primary importance, while military-political and operational-tactical tasks are predominantly of an auxiliary nature. In none of the conflicts considered, the victorious side was able to inflict the planned damage on the enemy. But nevertheless managed to achieve the political goals of the conflict;

Despite the increasing role of the groupings of forces and assets deployed by the time of the threatened period, a significant role in the outcome of the armed conflict will be played by the presence of a combat-ready reserve and a system for its mobilization and deployment. This will make it possible to preserve the strategic resource of force response in any development of the situation in the course of an armed conflict;

Combat operations will be characterized by a combination of maneuver operations and positional operations. Reconnaissance and sabotage operations and guerrilla warfare are seen as part of a "normal" war. This confirms the need for a balanced composition of forces and means of the armed forces, as well as comprehensive combat training;

A perfect intelligence system with a single command center and well-defended centers will be of decisive importance for the defenders.

(points) for the collection and processing of intelligence information of all types of armed forces and special services. They have the ability to bring the processed intelligence data to all interested authorities in the shortest possible time, close to the real time scale. The presence of such reconnaissance contributes to the timely discovery of the enemy's preparation for an attack and the implementation of all urgent measures of the threatened period and, first of all, the transfer of troops to the highest degree of combat readiness;

In the grouping of troops, in addition to the usual elements in the operational formation (battle formation), there should be: an intelligence and information center operating in real time; automated, highly secure command and control system for troops and weapons; aerospace echelon (or part of it) of high-precision weapons; highly protected reserve;

The nature of the weapons used in modern wars determines the need for forces and means to deliver strikes against enemy military instruments (long-range precision weapons, long-range aviation) located outside the boundaries of the immediate conflict area. This requires both the presence of its own potential for long-range precision weapons, and other means that make it possible to transfer combat operations directly to enemy territory;

The main attention should be paid to the creation of a stable duplicate system of command and control of troops (forces) at all levels of command and control. To this end, it is necessary to use all existing and new communication systems, to use air command posts to the maximum, and also to ensure unconditional communication to the executors of the orders of the country's top leadership and their implementation;

The key condition for victory in almost all conflicts was to undermine the morale of the troops and stimulate unrest in the officer corps. An essential role in the armed conflicts of the late 20th - early 21st centuries is played by the ratio of the levels of moral and psychological stability of the parties, especially the highest command personnel. This means the need to strengthen military discipline, legality, create a truly effective system of moral and psychological training of the armed forces from a soldier to a general, as well as increase the efficiency of military counterintelligence agencies. Of great importance for the outcome of armed conflicts will be the availability of tools for conducting information and propaganda work among the troops and population of the enemy.

At the same time, an analysis of the listed characteristic features of wars shows that this is by no means a classic image of a "contactless" war, but rather an intermediate (transitional) version, in which the features of both traditional wars and the features of new generation wars, called "contactless" are visible. . To date, the concept of "non-contact" war remains only a theoretical model, reflecting the desire of certain states to reduce their involvement in regional conflicts with the presence of ground forces. Of course, it is hardly possible to achieve complete contactlessness of hostilities. To do this, you will probably have to go to the formation of coalitions, in which one of the partners takes on the brunt of the ground war. However, this will come with significant political costs.

The identified features of modern wars and armed conflicts raise the problem of formulating a new understanding of the main tasks of the RF Armed Forces. These tasks should take into account both the specific features of the development of the military-political situation in the zones of Russia's interests and the nature of the armed struggle, as well as possible directions for the development of the principles of conducting combat operations, taking into account the changing geopolitical situation and improving the means of warfare.

Today, there are several fundamental requirements for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which will determine the main parameters of military organizational development:

Ability to implement strategic deterrence;

High combat and mobilization readiness;

strategic mobility;

Staffing with well trained and trained personnel;

Technical equipment and resource availability.

Their implementation makes it possible to choose priorities for reforming and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the present time and in the foreseeable future.

The main ones include:

Preservation of the potential of the Strategic Deterrence Force;

Increasing the number of formations and units of constant readiness and the formation of groupings of troops on their basis;

Improving operational (combat) training of troops (forces);

Improving the recruitment system of the Armed Forces;

Improvement of military science and military education;

Improving the social security of military personnel, education and moral and psychological training.

The most important direction in this work is the implementation of the program for the modernization of weapons, military and special equipment and maintaining them in a state of combat readiness.

Modernization of the army - tasks of a nationwide scale

To date, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are provided with the main types of weapons, military equipment and other materiel at the proper level. However, a qualitative analysis shows that the share of modern weapons and military equipment is 20 - 30%, while in the armies of the world this figure is more than 70%.

The current state of armaments allows us to count on a certain period of time - on the order of 10-15 years, during which it is necessary, on the one hand, to ensure the maintenance of existing means, and on the other, to carry out the rearmament of the army and navy.

In 2003, fundamental documents in the field of military-technical policy of the Russian Federation were developed and adopted, and a list of basic military technologies for the future was determined.

Particular emphasis in these programs and plans is placed on the modernization of weapons, military and special equipment. In the short term, funding for the development of weapons and military equipment will be carried out in three areas:

Maintenance of armament, military and special equipment of units of constant readiness in combat readiness;

Completion of developmental developments that have breakthrough results in terms of improving the quality characteristics of weapons;

Modernization of obsolete weapons.

The improvement of the technical equipment system is planned to be based on the balanced development of the Strategic Deterrence Forces, combat control systems (information support), as well as the General Purpose Forces.

Particular attention will be paid to the development of models and systems of weapons and military equipment (WME), which have a decisive influence on the outcome of future armed struggle: long-range high-precision weapons, reconnaissance and target designation systems (ground, air, space), electronic countermeasures, automated systems control of troops and weapons.

The result of the implementation of the proposed measures should be an increase in the level of provision of military formations with modern weapons and military equipment by 2010 as a whole up to 35%, and by 2015 - up to 40-45%. A complete replacement of the existing weapons of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation may occur by 2020-2025.

Until 2025, due to a gradual reduction in the costs of the current maintenance of the Armed Forces, the total costs for the development, purchase, modernization and repair of weapons and military equipment should be about 50-60% of national defense spending.

In order to centralize orders and deliveries to the VT in the Ministry of Defense and other bodies with military formations, streamline spending funds and eliminate parallelism in procurement, acceptance and deliveries, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 311 dated March 11, 2003, a State Committee under the defense order under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

As a result of the implementation of the main measures for the development priorities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, it is expected to ensure the growth of their key parameters and qualitative characteristics (compared to 2000):

Specific resource availability by 2.2 times by 2005 and by 4 times by 2010;

Unit costs for combat training - 2.3 and 3 times, respectively;

Specific expenditures for the purchase of weapons and military equipment - by 3 and 6 times, respectively.

An important direction of military development is the integration of the entire support process of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation through the transition to interdepartmental unified (interrelated) technical and logistic support systems (MUSTiTO) of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies of the Russian Federation.

The main goal of the transition to MUSTiTO of the Armed Forces is to increase the efficiency of technical and logistical support for all military formations based on the integration of the relevant bodies of power ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, as well as the joint rational use of the existing material and technical base and infrastructure.

The systems being created will ensure the unification of warehouse, transport, medical and other infrastructures on a territorial basis with management from a single body. This will make it possible to carry out technical and logistic support for all troops, regardless of their departmental affiliation and subordination, both stationed within the boundaries of the military district and arriving on its territory to perform various tasks.

The transition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops and military formations to interdepartmental (related) unified systems of technical and logistic support is supposed to be carried out sequentially, completing it in 2006.

The improvement of the technical support system is based on the creation of a unified regulatory framework for the implementation of centralized program-targeted planning of orders, supplies and operation of weapons, military and special equipment (AMSE) and other materiel, organization and implementation of measures for the technical support of a military organization in peacetime, crisis situations and wartime.

By the beginning of 2005, the territorial principle of overhaul of weapons and military equipment, other general-purpose materiel, and technical support for groupings of troops (forces), regardless of departmental affiliation, should be implemented on the terms of ensuring cost reduction.

In the future, it is planned to increase efforts to modernize and bring into good technical condition all types of military and military equipment with which troops and military formations are equipped, which are stored in warehouses, arsenals and bases, as well as to maintain their high technical readiness.

In improving the logistic support system, the priority areas are: the formation of a unified policy for the development of rear services and a unified pricing policy for the purchase of general-purpose products; creation of a unified regulatory legal framework for logistics support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops and military formations; interfacing departmental systems of logistic support for troops and military formations in such important areas as the provision of fuel and lubricants, clothing and food, and the training of logistics specialists; creation of stocks of material and technical means for joint actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops and military formations in wartime and in crisis situations.

In 2006 - 2010, full-scale supply of troops and military formations with all types of allowances for rear services, bringing current and emergency supplies of materiel to the established norms should be ensured.

The next stages of the transition to MUSTiTO for the period up to 2020 will be its adaptation and improvement of quality parameters through the implementation of modern market mechanisms for the purchase of materiel on a competitive basis, standardization and unification of supplies, improvement of the functioning of military health care and training of logistics personnel.

The ultimate goal of these measures is to eliminate parallelism, eliminate duplicate links or redirect them to solve other defense tasks and ensure, if necessary, the integrated use of the Armed Forces and military units of power ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.

Modern Russian military policy is an integral part of the policy in the field of national security and is based on the provisions of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, which was approved in 2000 and has largely fulfilled its tasks. Now there is a need to develop a new concept. This is due to the fact that in the 21st century Russia is facing new threats that require an appropriate detailed analysis and response. The Russian Armed Forces, after a long period of reform and overcoming the crisis, are acquiring new qualitative characteristics both in terms of their combat readiness and effectiveness, and in terms of their ability to ensure the political and economic interests of the Russian Federation.

An indicator of the maturity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and their overcoming the most difficult period of their existence is that their development and military planning are now carried out taking into account the geopolitical needs of the Russian Federation and the principle of defense sufficiency, and not from the actually existing potential.

In the introductory part of the lesson, it is necessary to emphasize that over the past years, after Russia gained sovereignty, the Russian Armed Forces have come a difficult way. They, like our country, were in the process of active reform, associated with a radical change in the geopolitical conditions in the world and the formation of a renewed Russian statehood.

During the disclosure of the first question of the lesson, it is necessary to focus the attention of listeners on information about wars and armed conflicts of the future, which should differ significantly from today's armed clashes.

Opening the second question, it is necessary to be guided by the provisions of the brochure "Actual tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", which sets out the main views of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense on the specifics of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the foreseeable future. It is recommended to talk about the upcoming changes in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and give a comprehensive vision of the main directions of development of the army and navy.

At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions on the topic under study, answer questions from the audience.

1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation. - M., 1993.

3. Actual tasks of development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation //

4. Gordievsky A. Armed Forces of the Russian Federation // Landmark. - 2004, No. 2.

Senior Editor of Orientir magazine, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander Gordievsky

2011-06-03 / Vitaly Ivanovich Tsymbal - retired colonel, doctor of technical sciences; Andrey Anatolyevich Privetkin - reserve lieutenant colonel, candidate of economic sciences.


The spring of this year has finally brought some intelligible hope for the fulfillment of long-standing promises of the military-political leadership of Russia - to make the monetary allowance (DD) and the general status of our military personnel such that it fully corresponds to the ideas of the army of a powerful, modern state. Of course, the path to such a goal is not easy. We recall that an attempt to solve this problem, undertaken in 2002, was useful, but was reduced mainly to equalizing the military commanders' DD with the monetary allowance (DS) of the upper echelons of civil bureaucracy.

The junior officers were not really taken care of then. Therefore, many cadets of military schools and graduates, feeling deceived, began to quit - as best they could. And to the people of private and junior command staff (RMKS), even to those who served under the contract, the legislators reacted completely dismissively. The servicemen of the RMKS, who bear the bulk of the hardships and hardships of military service, were equated in status with referents ... of the lowest rank of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

To conclude a contract, they did not have before, and did not have any significant incentives.

Therefore, in 2003, when substantiating the federal target program (FTP) for the transfer of permanent readiness military units mainly to voluntary recruitment under the contract, it was decided to introduce a new “stimulating” allowance for the RMKS, and at the same time for junior and middle-level officers commanding them. However, senior officers, especially in the central apparatus (CA) of the Ministry of Defense, felt as if "offended." They turned to the then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov with a request-proposal to introduce another allowance - exclusively for them. The allowance is not simple, but long-term acting in their "favor". The results of such a policy are illustrated at the bottom of the page in a graph.

It shows that the size of the DD, expressed in current prices for the period 2002-2008, grew for all servicemen. But among the employees of the central apparatus, they "soared up." Each increase in salary by position (with indexation parrying inflation) led (due to allowances) to an increase in the DD of “apparatchiks” by an amount exceeding not only the increase in DD for soldiers and sergeants, but also the size of the entire DD of the RMKS military personnel. It all the years remained less than the average salary in the country. Time passed, the ruble depreciated, the cost of the federal target program grew when it was adjusted, but not a “stimulating” supplement.

A GOOD INTENTION TURNED INTO TROUBLE

It was precisely this situation with DD that was accepted from Sergei Ivanov by the new Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Serdyukov, who replaced him at the post. And no matter what ill-wishers say about his incompetence in military affairs, one cannot fail to note the noble initiative of the civilian manager: under him, the development of the "Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020" began. In April 2008, it was approved. At the same time, by order of the Minister of Defense No. 241 dated April 28, 2008, a commission was established to implement the strategy.

The plans were grandiose. Recall, in particular, the intention to make the Russian Armed Forces one of the "five best armies in the world, including in terms of key socio-economic indicators", and military personnel serving under the contract - to the "middle class of the country." To do this, as expected, their AP should exceed the average wage (AW) in the country by 25%, and military pensions (MP) should rise to 80% of the AP. Another promise was also made: "For the first time, civil society will be able to take part in monitoring the implementation of activities and programs that ensure the implementation of the strategy." True, the next statement - that "the army is becoming truly open" did not harmonize with the factual behind-the-scenes work of the commission and the closed nature of drafting bills on changes in the army, even when they were discussed in the State Duma.

However, shortly after the strategy was approved, negative distracting developments occurred. This is the August 2008 war, during which the Russian Armed Forces defended their peacekeepers and civilians in South Ossetia. At the same time, an economic crisis broke out.

In the fall of 2008, the President of the Russian Federation, at the suggestion of military leaders, announced a transition to a “new look” for our army, we note, also behind the scenes, secretly from the majority of not only civilians, but also military personnel.

For a short time, the interests of contractors, who were previously forced to sign a “voluntary” contract, and military leaders, who allowed coercion instead of making the service attractive, coincided, including at the expense of a decent DD. The contractors began to scatter, and the generals escaped responsibility for the failure of the FTP by accusing the contractors of lack of patriotism.

Under these conditions, in order to save budget funds, it was decided to fill the bulk of the positions of the RMKS (700 thousand people) by conscription. The fact that it would not be possible to call up so many young men in the current demographic situation was neglected. And the fact that the combat effectiveness of persons undergoing military service for only one year is extremely low was also neglected. The generals convinced the deputies of the legitimacy to send military personnel into battle, who served only 3 months. And such an amendment was made to the law.

But everyone, it would seem, knows the impact on road safety of hastily trained young drivers of vehicles. Even if they do not drive in combat vehicles, but in comfortable foreign cars. The appearance of the term "teapot" in relation to them is not accidental. And so, in relation to our army, it turned out that it began to consist mainly of "dummies". A joking suggestion suggests itself: the leading commanders who justified such a transition to such a look of the RF Armed Forces should be renamed "bosses". But if it were only a matter of how we call them! And from the point of view of the country's defense capability, there is no time for jokes.

As for the size of the DD, then, having saved on military personnel of the lower level of the military hierarchy (after replacing contract soldiers with conscripts), some people wanted to transfer these funds to the more “needy”. Under plausible pretexts, a number of ministerial orders were developed to “bonuse money” for some military personnel according to criteria that were not entirely clear. The ill-fated orders still excite the military personnel and their families, and the main result of the undertaking was reduced to confusion and a split in the ranks of the “military brotherhood”.

BACKGROUND LEGISLATION IS CRAZY

Order No. 115 of March 28, 2009, deftly titled "On Additional Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Using Funds for the Monetary Allowance of Military Personnel and Remuneration of Civilian Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," became the apotheosis of the concern of the highest officials of the Ministry of Defense for themselves. Clause 7 of the “Procedure” attached to this order announced that the specific amounts of “incentives are determined within the limits of budgetary funds ... based on the results of the performance of official duties by military personnel and civilian personnel and are not limited to maximum sizes.” It is impossible to show such an unlimited increase in DD after 2008 on the above graph, as well as to link it with any indicators of the combat capability of the troops and the country's defense capability. How the effectiveness of the use of DD funds has increased remains a mystery. But the income of many military and civilian officials at the end of the budget year exceeded the income of not only regular troops, but also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief! The bewildering meaning of this order was then corrected by the order of the Minister of Defense No. 1010 of 26.07. 2010.

Let us give an example of a completely different attitude of our authorities to the payment of funds to military personnel. This example applies to most military personnel. The Ministry of Finance, in its letter No. 03-04-08-01/9 dated January 27, 2009, signed by the director of the Department of Tax and Customs Tariff Policy, initiated the withholding of personal income tax (PIT) with one of the compensation payments to military personnel. We are talking about compensation provided for in Article 16 of the Federal Law of 1998 No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel”. Unfortunately, this compensation does not have an official name. It is provided either “for”, or “for” sanatorium treatment, and if in meaning, then “besides” it. Without delving into the game of pretexts, the Ministry of Finance decided that personal income tax should be collected from this compensation. The calculation was that, firstly, the amounts of these compensations of 600 and 300 rubles per year (for a serviceman and family members, respectively) against the background of DD are insignificant, so the losses are not very noticeable, and secondly, the military are people accustomed to infringements . They grumble and calm down. There are enough other problems (both personal and official). Yes, and much larger problems in the system of monetary allowance continue to disturb the military ...

So it’s not the conjectures of critics, not the “subversive” activities of human rights activists, but life itself has shown and continues to show the fallacy of behind-the-scenes development of plans and the procedure for implementing them, especially in the systems of DD and army recruitment. Therefore, in February 2011, the parameters of the "new look" of the RF Armed Forces were again changed. It was also said about the necessary increase in the staffing of the RMKS under the contract, the approximate number was named, although there is no program for this yet.

True, the president and prime minister regularly reminded officials of the need to adopt a law on a new DD for military personnel. For some time, a draft of such a law “hung” on the Internet, but then it disappeared. Perhaps this is due to the fact that high-ranking officials in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense are quite satisfied with the current procedure, since the high size and continuous growth of their DD guarantees it anyway. It seems that the implementation of the strategy mentioned above was stalled from the military department itself.

Many in the Russian Federation discussed the current situation, as well as the reasons for the slowdown in the strategy. This was done by military and civilian experts, in particular from the IEP.

Only after March 17 this year, when the preliminary consideration of the draft law on DD in the State Duma Committee on Defense took place, and the materials were partially published in the media, the discussion of the new system of DD was updated.

Most recently, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation submitted a draft law to the Russian government, and at its meeting on May 26, as it was announced, they were going to consider the document in order to then send it to the State Duma. But, we note, there is still little time left for the passage of the future law through all instances by the promised date of introduction - 01/01/2012. After all, by-laws will also be needed. At speeds, it's hard to fix anything. But the officials who developed the bills can report that they have carried out the president's order.

The following materials are now available for independent review:

1. Draft federal law "On monetary allowance and certain payments to military personnel" and the explanatory note and financial and economic justification accompanying this bill.

2. Information about the draft federal law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law “On Monetary Allowance and Certain Payments to Military Personnel” and the documents accompanying this bill.

3. A number of other documents accompanying the bills, but not included in them, as well as publications that are indirectly related to the problem. There are many retellings of the presented materials in the media, but there is little analytics.

What did the results of our independent study show?

ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABILITY AND PURPOSE OF BILLS

The appearance of the bills under consideration should certainly be considered a favorable event. They contain provisions that deserve support, but in general, as analysis has shown, support cannot be unconditional. It does not follow from the bills that they correspond to the main thing:

The aspirations of the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation;

The course announced by the President of the Russian Federation for the modernization of society, including the full involvement of young people in innovative activities, as well as the suppression of corruption;

The socially significant interests of military personnel, at least in the form in which they were set out in the “Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020”.

Neither the explanatory notes to the bills, nor the certificates prepared for the meeting of the State Duma Committee on Defense, give an answer to the question of what caused the need for a radical change in the military personnel's DD. The explanatory notes are based on a purely bureaucratic approach - a listing of some instructions and instructions from the leadership, in pursuance of which the bills were developed. However, this list cannot be considered complete, much less accessible for analysis by independent experts.

At the same time, as shown in the table below, there are official documents in the state on the problem under consideration, which should have been completed long ago. And this is not counting the strategy mentioned above, which, as a departmental document, could not be mentioned by the drafters of laws due to the status sign. The table includes some current top-level documents that are related to the need to increase the attractiveness of military service. There are those that have not been implemented for many years, their text has been corrected, but not in the right direction. Perhaps someone has forgotten them. The time has come, in our opinion, to remember and fulfill.

Documents not mentioned by the developers, but also enforceable documents Comments
1 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 30, 1992 No. 918 on the beginning of the transition to voluntary recruitment The execution was interrupted in 1995, among other reasons, due to the lack of attractiveness of military service.
2 Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of May 16, 1996 No. 722 and of November 25, 1996 No. 1592 on the completion of the transition to exclusively voluntary manning of the RF Armed Forces and, to a limited extent, to other troops. Implementation has been deferred until “the creation of the necessary conditions”, which, first of all, depend on ensuring the attractiveness of military service. It's time to create them.
3 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on February 5, 2010 (subparagraph “g”, paragraph 30) The need for "training highly professional servicemen devoted to the Fatherland, increasing the prestige of military service" was noted. You can't do without the growth of DD.

In any case, it is incompetent to forget about the interests of military personnel of any category, as well as about the true reasons for the reform of the DD. The table below shows their indicative list, which is formed on the basis of publicly available information. And we should also add the demand for the highest rates of staffing the military organization of the state with highly professional military personnel and building up the combat capability of the troops.

Reasons for the need for legislative reform DD Comments
1 The impossibility of solving (within the framework of the previous order and sizes of DD) the problem of voluntary recruitment of regular troops of the RF Armed Forces by such citizens who would be interested and able to solve all military tasks in peacetime and wartime This is evidenced by the failure of the first stage of recruiting the Armed Forces after 1992, then the failure of the FTP of 2004-2007, the observed early dismissal of young officers and cadets from the Armed Forces
2 The corruption of conscription and the preservation in it, as in the rudiment of the Russian serf past, of the inequality of citizens of the Russian Federation and the transfer of this inequality to DD This is evidenced by the materials of the military prosecutor's office and the data of the committees of soldiers' mothers.
3 The impossibility of Russia's entry into the group (five) of states with the best modern armies, declared in 2008 in the Social Development Strategy of the RF Armed Forces, including in terms of socio-economic indicators Russia from this year will remain in the G8 G8 the only state that retains the conscription
4 Unmotivated violation of the constitutional principles of equality of citizens, including civil servants (civil / military; under contract / conscription; serving in various federal executive authorities, etc.) There are regular facts that the DD of military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lags behind DD in some other troops, as well as from the monetary content of civil civil servants
5 Lack of legislative linkage of the DD of military personnel with the average wage (SWP) in the country The sizes of DD and SZP, their growth rates are not linked, which leads to the loss of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the competitive labor market
6 Incorrect from a socio-economic point of view, the proportions of the ratios of the maximum and minimum DD within the existing order (up to 10 times when taking into account all allowances), which leads to an increase in social discontent and is fraught with negative consequences. The bills are contrary to the National Security Council-2020, in which such ratios (maximum income to minimum) are elevated to the number of the most important indicators of socio-economic security
7 A general decrease in the prestige of military service, contrary to the entry of contract servicemen into the category of the “middle class of the country”, declared in the Strategy, which is designed to solve the problem of staffing the country's defense capability Simultaneously with the decrease in DD and VP, other incentives have fallen, which in other countries make military service attractive, and the social status of a serviceman is high.

There is another group of reasons that make it necessary to reform not only the system of DD for military personnel, but also the provision of pensions for military pensioners, but this requires a separate analysis, and not a passing mention. Although it is probably worth noting that the government is still trying to establish an unacceptable procedure for calculating pensions for the vast majority of retired military men. In a press release for the meeting on May 26, it was stated as follows: “The procedure for calculating the pensions of citizens who have served in the military is being changed in such a way that, by reducing the amount of monetary allowance accepted for calculating pensions, in order to ensure an increase in the pensions themselves, on average, by at least 1.5 times." This is much less than what military pensioners expect, and directly contradicts what was stated in Serdyukov's strategy.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION OF BILLS

The considered bills are an attempt to implement the instructions of the top military-political leadership of the Russian Federation on the introduction of new, significantly increased sizes of military personnel's allowances from 2012. Such an attempt deserves support in principle. Undoubtedly positive in the bill is, for example, the establishment of lump-sum benefits in the amount of 3 and 2 million rubles. and further descending by 500 thousand rubles. - solid, although it is not clear from what considerations the developers proceeded.

At the same time, the bills do not solve many problems that are among the most relevant for citizens and society, as well as for the state:

1. According to the main parameters of DD and VP, the bills do not contain direct action laws - instead of them, references are made to future by-laws. The published tables of the future sizes of DD and VP, given as supposedly illustrating the submitted bills, in fact, have no direct relation to the law - the mentioned sizes are not fixed by law. This means that the DD parameters actually promised to citizens after the adoption of laws will not receive guaranteed grounds. And by-laws, due to established traditions, will be drawn up without proper public (and even parliamentary) control. And whether the parameters they introduced will meet today's promises is a big question.

2. The general impression of future laws, if we abandon solid promises, is that in terms of their content and semantic load, these are not independent new laws, but modified versions of Articles 12 and 13 of the 1998 Law No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel” and a number of changes in other articles of the said and other laws.

3. Separate legal provisions are not productive, not precise or even clearly erroneous, they contain provisions that look like they contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 (paragraph 2 of article 19 and paragraph 2 of article 55), and therefore need justification, which not in the explanatory note. There are also discrepancies with a number of existing laws, while their provisions are not proposed to be canceled in connection with the entry into force of new laws.

4. Prerequisites are being laid for the destruction of the unity of the civil service system in the Russian Federation, provided for by the Federal Law of 2003 No. 58-FZ “On the System of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation” (clause 1, article 3), in particular, due to deepening discrepancies between the system of DD for military personnel and the DS system for civil servants. The previously formulated requirements of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 2002 No. 249 "On measures to improve the system of monetary allowances for military personnel" are called into question. This even applies to such a provision as the status of an official who establishes the size of the DD of military personnel and DS of state civil servants. Now they are different. Article 12 of the Federal Law No. 76 of 1998 “On the status of military personnel” (clause 2, part 3) states: “Salaries for standard military positions of military personnel, salaries for military ranks of military personnel serving under a contract, and additional payments are determined by the Government of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (another federal executive body in which military service is provided for by federal law) in compliance with the condition of unity of the basic norms of the monetary allowance of military personnel. And in Article 50 of the Federal Law No. 58 of 2003 "On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation" it is written that "the size of official salaries and salaries for the class rank of federal civil servants are established by decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation."

The preservation of this distinction proposed in the bill actually lowers the status of servicemen.

In the same way, the proposed division of military personnel into "grades" corresponding to their departmental affiliation is a violation.

Most of all, the rights of low-paid categories of military personnel to a decent DD are ignored, which undermines the plans for the accelerated transfer of regular Russian troops to voluntary military service under a contract by recruiting the necessary specialists on a competitive basis; Ultimately, the achievement of the goal set in the Address of the President of the Russian Federation is not ensured.

5. Some legal norms regulated by other laws are abolished; changes in a number of existing norms are not stipulated; there are still opportunities for sub-legislative expansion of the supposedly “final” list of payments and the finite number of categories of citizens to whom the bill applies, in particular, this applies to the “equal persons” mentioned in the bill.

WHAT CAN YOU OFFER IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

The authors of this publication attempted two possible answers to the question posed. The first is the development of a new alternative project and proposals for its wide open discussion. The second is the formulation of conceptual (fundamental) provisions, which the introduced laws must comply with when they are finalized. Materials on both attempts were handed over to a number of officials involved in solving this problem, in due course.

For implementation, the second answer seems more realistic. His wording, proposed by us, about the size of DD is as follows.

The size of the DD for military personnel is annually (during the development of the federal budget) established (adjusted) by the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation with the participation of all federal executive bodies in which military service is provided for by law, based on the following values ​​achieved:

a) the size of the SZP in the country - this size is most important for citizens concluding the first contract for service in the regular forces (with a coefficient exceeding DD over SZP of 1.25, which can be specified when preparing the draft federal budget);

b) the size of the DS of civil servants - these sizes are important for all (especially for high-ranking) contracted military personnel who are reassigned to new positions and (or) renegotiate contracts, in accordance with the updated scale of correspondence between the positions of military and civil servants.

The specified data is used to adjust the grid of tariff categories and, accordingly, salaries.

Citizens called to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland and perform military service on conscription are assigned the following DD:

During the period of study in training military units (centers) to prepare for further service in the regular troops or for staying in a military-trained reserve (reserve) - corresponding to standard state student scholarships;

During the period of further conscription service in the positions of soldiers, sailors and sergeants in the regular troops - the corresponding DD of military personnel undergoing the same service under the contract.

All servicemen doing military service in the Russian Federation receive DD in accordance with the same scales of official salaries, salaries by military rank and all allowances, except for an allowance for special conditions of military service. It may be different for various authorities in which military service is provided for by federal law.

And, of course, we cannot ignore the problem of anti-corruption expertise of the submitted bills. Indeed, the methodology for conducting anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts, which was approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 2010 No. 96 “On anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts”, defines the following as corruption factors: wording like “right” and excessive freedom of sub-legislative rule-making.

This is exactly what the bill under consideration does. So, for example, the draft law contains the phrase “they have the right to establish ... in a larger amount” than the upper limit set by the future law. When listing possible payments, words are suddenly added that "other payments may be established." They are a temptation to develop new orders, rewarding especially valuable officials with bonuses for their especially effective activities.