Military political science - military management: a political perspective. National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation Systems of centralized control of a military organization

Page 10 of 10

MILITARY ADMINISTRATION: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The concept of " military administration” (the power-administrative function of state authorities and officials in managing people engaged in military activities) has long been entrenched in the scientific and political language. One of the first interpretations of it can be found in the Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences of the late 19th century. “Military management,” it says there, “embraces numerous and versatile industries, for the management of which the relevant special bodies are established ...” It is also widely used in modern official documents, for example, in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Federal Laws Russian Federation“On Defense”, “On Martial Law”, etc. True, in spirit, and often in the letter of the law, we are talking about a pair of “bodies of state power and military command”, or in other words, about the institution of command and control of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies.

Often the subject of analysis of military command and control, if not exclusively, then mainly, is the question of command and control of troops. Perhaps a logically complete formula for this approach was proposed by A.G. Yermishyan. According to him, military control (ideally) is an integral part of military art, ensured by the creation and functioning of military open organizational, technical and automatic control systems for various purposes and nature. Yermishyan believes that the military command and control bodies are the headquarters of military formations, as well as special bodies - direct executive units, groups or individual officials of these headquarters. But if this phrase is taken literally, then even the commander to whom the headquarters is subordinated is taken out of the framework of the military command and control system.

However, military administration is a much broader category. Its full and comprehensive coverage has not yet received due coverage in the literature. Suffice it to say that there is no article devoted to this concept either in the two-volume Military Encyclopedic Dictionary published by the publishing house of the Great Russian Encyclopedia, or in the published Military Encyclopedia, seven of the eight volumes of which have already been published. Military command and control appears as a multifaceted, multifactorial and multifunctional phenomenon and, by virtue of this, already acts as an object of study in various branches of knowledge: philosophy and psychology, sociology and pedagogy, history and ergonomics, computer science and jurisprudence, etc. Military management problems are also developed within the framework of operations research, game theory, management, image science, marketing, and many other applied disciplines.

Political science also makes its contribution to the study of military administration. It has its own perspective of analysis, in which the following areas can be distinguished: the influence of politics on the nature, content and methods of military command (the political determination of military command); political aspects of military management decisions (the political content of military management activities); the place and role of military command and control in the activities of various political actors (military policy imperatives); military administration as a tool for implementing policy and a factor in increasing its effectiveness (military policy).

In order for the subsequent conversation to be substantive, it seems necessary to define the initial concepts.

Management - a type of human activity, which consists in a conscious and purposeful impact on people, objects and - through them - on processes in the interests of giving them the desired parameters of functioning and development (character, direction, dynamics, etc.). The epithet "military" characterizes everything related to the war and the army, related to the war and the army. And military command and control is a power-administrative function of state authorities and officials (more broadly, political actors) to manage people engaged in military activities. It is a special type of social regulation that ensures the creation, preservation and development of a military organization.
(in the broad sense of the word), quantitatively and qualitatively corresponding to real threats, as well as maintaining the regime of its activities.

Military activities in the state are carried out by persons who are functionally and organizationally included in its military organization: a) personnel of armed and paramilitary state formations, including irregular ones; b) representatives of state authorities and administration directly involved in the issues of defense and security of the country; c) employees of enterprises and institutions who are fully or partially engaged in the creation of weapons, military equipment and their provision to the armed forces; d) the institutions themselves and bodies related to the military organization of the state.

In this sense, it is quite legitimate to single out military-economic, military-financial, military-scientific, military-administrative, military-pedagogical and other types of military activities. However, it must be borne in mind that they acquire a military character not because military people are engaged in them (one can give any number of examples of the inclusion of purely civilian persons and institutions in military activities), but because they are deployed in the interests of ensuring effective combat training in peacetime and the successful conduct of military operations or special operations in the event of a military conflict, which (combat training and military operations) constitute a system-forming element of military activity, of all its types. It follows from this that, on the one hand, military activity is not limited solely to the conduct of armed struggle or, as one of the authors writes, "the totality of the organized use of forces and means to achieve the goals" and, on the other hand, not all military activities, in including the managerial level is of a military nature. It is characteristic that in terms of holding a general meeting (military-scientific conference) of the Academy of Military Sciences, among the main issues submitted for consideration and discussion, the following was also posed: “The increased share and importance of socio-political, economic, informational, military-technical components in the organization and implementation of military control.

S. Huntington at one time raised the question: "Is there any special skill inherent in all military officers, but not characteristic of any of the civilian groups?" In response, he wrote: "The special talent of an officer is manifested in the leadership, management and control of an organized mass of people, whose main function is the use of violence." A. Vladimirov formulated this idea even more harshly: "A military professional is a specialist in managing violence, and only an officer can be one." It is difficult to agree with such categoricalness.

First, the most important decisions on the use of armed violence are made not by professional officers, but by politicians. And we are talking not only about strategic decisions and the top military leadership of the country. There are many situations when the actions of the commander of the operational and even tactical level are regulated by political considerations.

Secondly, an officer is the person of the commanding staff of the armed forces, as they say, a regular military man. But even a junior commander and even (in the people's militia, partisan army, etc.) a non-military person can control the use of violence.

Thirdly, the ability, right and duty to make a decision to fight, to manage a fight does not exhaust the peculiarity of an officer, more broadly, a military profession. There are areas of the military sphere that are not directly related to the use of violence (the creation and maintenance of defense infrastructure, medical support, pension service, educational work, public relations, etc.). By the way, Huntington understands this and therefore emphasizes that the activity of a military officer differs from other specialists existing in the armed forces. "Those people who, like doctors, do not possess the skill of" violence management ", but are members of the officer corps, are usually distinguished by special titles and insignia, and they are not allowed to command positions." However, a military doctor, military engineer, military lawyer, educator, etc. not only differ from the commander (military officer), but also have something in common with him, differing from a civilian doctor, engineer, lawyer, etc. The purpose, the nature of the armed forces determine those special duties, areas of responsibility, requirements and standards that must be observed by all military personnel.

Military activity, we repeat, is not limited to the use of military violence. Accordingly, military command and control extends to various spheres, it has moments of economic and political, organizational and technological, legal and pedagogical, etc. character. It is organically related to the types and directions that are deployed in the military sphere, but are not directly related to the conduct of military operations and are not military in the literal sense of the word. Semantically, these types are denoted by compound words in which their main content is emphasized by a second word: military-economic, military-financial, military-administrative, etc. types of management. The same part of management, which is associated with the preparation and use of violence, is called without the prefix "military": strategic, operational, combat, etc. management.

Accordingly, the objects of military control are the defense sphere and the military organization of the state and, consequently, the population, territory, economy, countries, the entire system of social relations and institutions, ordered in a certain way in the interests of ensuring military security. At the same time, managerial efforts are concentrated on the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies. Their immediate and direct object is military personnel and citizens.

In military administration, both narrow departmental isolation, which covers its conservatism with ambitious claims to exclusivity and infallibility, and the unprofessionalism of amateurs, always ready for dubious innovations, are out of place. The development and implementation of new solutions in this area should be the result of an equal dialogue between political and military figures, civil and military communities. The annual general meeting of the AVN specifically emphasized "the diversity and complexity of managerial issues and problems and the need for a combination of military and civilian specialists in this regard." At the same time, however, one should not allow purely professional issues related to the internal competence of the military leadership to become the subject of political discussions.

Semantically, the epithet "military" in the phrase "military administration" carries a double meaning. So they say about the management of society, which is carried out by military bodies and their officials or by military methods. This is always an “abnormal” situation, not typical of a democratic state. However, "abnormal" does not mean illegal. In certain cases, military command is legal in nature and has a legal basis. Such cases include, in particular:

a) the authority of the military authorities in the territory where hostilities are being waged or martial law has been declared. Thus, the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Martial Law” provides that the martial law regime is carried out by state authorities and military command and control bodies, and in the territory where hostilities are taking place, it can be entrusted to military command bodies by decree of the President of the Russian Federation. At the same time, "citizens are obliged to comply with the requirements of ... military command and control bodies," which expands the powers of the latter, the scope of their competence beyond the Armed Forces.

b) power and administrative measures of the military administration for mobilization work, civil defense, pre-conscription training of youth, etc. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the current legislation, coordinates the activities of federal executive authorities, executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation on defense issues, and military commissariats, for example, designed to organize and conduct military mobilization and registration and conscription work and created by the Ministry of Defense as local military command and control bodies, work on the rights of departments (departments) of the relevant state authorities and local government

c) the activities of the occupying troops in the occupied territory. According to the 1907 Hague Convention, a territory is considered occupied when it is actually under the control of the enemy's armed forces. International humanitarian law defines the rights and obligations of the occupying power in relation to the local population, administration, etc.

However, there are situations when the military administration is established and operates in violation of democratic norms and procedures. Examples of this kind are open military dictatorships; militarization (militaryization) of government and administration, the economy and all public life; the inclusion of the military in power structures, etc.

Second, military command is command military organization countries, people and structures engaged in military activities. B.M. Shaposhnikov, who knew firsthand the functions and capabilities of both the army and its headquarters, which he called the brain of the army, wrote: “The leadership in preparing for war on the political and economic fronts should be represented by a special body of the state, and not by the army, and by no means by the general staff .
On the whole, war is being prepared, waged and responsible for success or failure, not by the general staff, but by the government, which itself or through a special body (the defense council) cements the preparations on various lines. M.A. writes about the same thing today. Gareev: "Issues of military-political leadership of the armed struggle cannot be entrusted to the General Staff."

Military administration has several levels or types and forms.

1. Military policy. Its main meaning and purpose is to determine the possibility and limits of the use of military violence for political purposes, the organization and management of military development, the development and implementation of plans for the use of the Armed Forces, territorial and civil defense, the transfer of government bodies and the country's economy to work in wartime, tasks on the accumulation of material assets of the state and mobilization reserves of the Russian Federation, other defense programs. Military policy, in the interests of creating and maintaining, and, if necessary, using military force, has a regulatory effect, and in certain cases, to a certain extent, subordinates to itself the economy and administration, culture and science, education and health systems, organizing them in the interests of solving problems using military force. . Its practical side covers decision-making, development of plans and programs for the development of the military sphere; creation and maintenance of the necessary military power of the country; staffing the Armed Forces and other troops, ensuring their combat and mobilization readiness; creation of operational-strategic groupings; establishing interaction between the Armed Forces, other troops, bodies and paramilitary formations; organizing the production of weapons and military equipment; mobilization training of authorities and administration, enterprises, institutions and organizations; creation and development of defense infrastructure; operational equipment of the territory; formation of moral and psychological readiness of citizens to defend the country; creation and accumulation of mobilization resources and reserves; implementation of civil and territorial defense measures; international military cooperation in the interests of national and international security; legal regulation of defense and all military-political activities; organization of civilian control over the military sphere, etc.

2. Troop control. This is the activity of commanders, commanders, headquarters and other command and control bodies to maintain constant combat readiness of troops (forces), prepare operations (combat operations) and lead troops (forces) in the performance of their assigned tasks. It includes: (a) continuous acquisition, collection, study, display, analysis and assessment of situational data; (b) making a decision on an operation (combat); (c) setting tasks for the troops (forces); (d) planning of an operation (combat); (e) organization and maintenance of interaction and all types of support; (e) management organization; (g) preparation of subordinate command and control bodies and troops (forces) for combat operations; (h) organizing control and providing assistance to subordinate commanders (commanders), headquarters, troops (forces); (i) direct control of the actions of troops (forces) in the performance of their combat missions.

3. Management activities of military personnel. The right and duty to make a decision to fight and direct the fight does not exhaust the managerial functions of military personnel. They play a decisive role in the implementation of such tasks of the Armed Forces as formulated in the official publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, such as organizing and conducting information warfare; prevention and suppression of sabotage and terrorist acts; prevention of environmental disasters and other emergencies, elimination of their consequences; involvement of military science in the development and examination of military-political decisions through the relevant committees of the State Duma and the Security Council; improvement of the provision of pensions for servicemen; rehabilitation of the disabled military service; military-patriotic work among citizens, especially young people; participation in solving the problems of homeless and neglected children, etc. Yes, and organization. Everyday life troops requires a mass of managerial decisions that are not directly related to the use of armed violence or its provision.

4. Moral and psychological support for the activities of the troops. The degree of psychological stability of personnel, their moral readiness to conduct combat operations is an integral part and a necessary condition for the combat capability of troops, and in this sense, moral and psychological support is an integral element of command and control. At the same time, this area of ​​activity is broader than command and control. “The burden of war,” wrote military figure and theorist A.E. Snesarev, - only part of the population, that is, the military, cannot bear it, but the entire population must bear it, and for this ... it must go through not only the stage of technical military education that is inevitable in the event of war, it must understand and think through its spiritual side, understand its inevitability, importance, evaluate its state meaning, that is, comprehend the philosophy of war. Almost the same is said in the official publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “High fighting spirit and morale of military personnel do not suddenly and immediately arise. They are the result of a conscious, purposeful and systematic impact on the worldview, intellect, morality and psyche of both the whole people and individual citizens. These qualities are not formed by a group of narrow specialists assigned specifically to educate people. They arise in the family, and then patiently nurtured, encouraged and improved by many institutions of the state, public organizations, and the media.” The moral and psychological state of military personnel is influenced by the socio-political situation in the country and the activities of the media, public and religious associations, cultural and educational organizations, etc.

At all four levels, military administration appears as an activity determined by the possibility of war and the existence of the army. But war and the army are inherently political phenomena, and therefore military administration cannot but have a political character, a political content. Not everything in it fits into the political parameters: there are quite a few operational-strategic, organizational-technical, administrative, economic and other tasks of a non-political nature. Nevertheless, it is characteristic that in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation the first of the three sections is called "Military-Political Foundations", and the already mentioned document of the Ministry of Defense emphasizes the need at the federal level to develop and implement a program of military-political education of Russian citizens and military-political education of military personnel, which would allow every citizen to clearly understand how wars arise, are waged, what wars lead to and what they cost peoples and states.

What is within the political is investigated by political science. Political science is the science of politics. This is an independent scientific and educational discipline, which has its own clearly defined subject of research and study. At the same time, this concept denotes a certain discourse, or a paradigm of the analysis of phenomena and processes that reveal their two-way connection with politics. In the phrase "political science of military command" the term political science does not mean science, but its inherent procedures and research results. In a more detailed and precise formula, one should speak of the political components of military command and control. By the way, it is in this sense that the phrases “philosophy of military command”, “sociology of military command”, “psychology of military command”, “culture (culturology) of military command”, etc. are legitimately used. What is "political"? What determines and expresses its nature, its specificity in comparison with non-political phenomena? How does the political reveal itself and manifest itself in the sphere of military administration?

There are several alternative approaches in interpreting the relationship between politics and governance and, accordingly, in understanding the political content of governance.

The first is characterized by the separation and, in a sense, the opposition of politics and management. Its supporters believe that politics is the business of a small group of people who are at the head of the state (tops), and management is a function of organizational structures that are outside of politics. In Western political thought, this idea is expressed in the formula: "Politicians are engaged in politics, and officials are in control." At the same time, it is understood that the adoption of important decisions for society belongs to management, and the provision of their legitimacy belongs to politics. Meanwhile, as O. Shabrov writes, the official, through whose actions the state controls the destinies of people, does not function in an imaginary political vacuum. As an inhabitant, he is subject to the influence of public opinion, his own political predilections, and material interests. As a functionary, he is included in the implementation of the policy that is currently declared state. In relation to military administration, the Russian military thinker A.M. wrote about this at the beginning of the last century. Volgin: “Changing laws is not the job of the army; its task is one thing - to protect those laws and the political system that exist "today." The army must protect them until the day when the legitimate authority will repeal "today's" law and replace it with a new one, then the army will protect this new law or order.

In the second approach, a special part is singled out in the management system - political management, which is understood as the regulation of power relations, ultimately concentrating around the issues of the structure and functioning of the state. In this sense, political administration differs from other types of administration, according to the principle that separates politics and economics, politics and law, politics and war, etc. According to the followers of this approach, it is characterized by specific political terms and management methods: hearings, negotiations, statements, agreements, etc. They believe that political management develops and implements decisions acceptable to all political actors, based on consensus or compromise. There is no place for coercion, forceful pressure or restraint. Such an understanding of political management echoes the idea of ​​M. Weber, who saw in politics not the use of power, but only “the desire to participate in power or to influence the distribution of power” ... It follows, for example, from the recognition that pedagogical methods political problems are not solved, or the demand for the abandonment of administrative methods in politics.

There are no words: the organization of society's vital activity is not exhausted by political management. Much of it is provided by the structures and mechanisms of non-political governance. Coercion in relation to criminals, traffic control, determining the organizational structure of a military unit or the daily routine in it, like so many other things, are in themselves devoid of political content. However, it has long been said that there is nothing that would not be related to politics in one way or another, just as there is nothing that would be fully included in politics. The line between political and non-political governance is not so impenetrable. Its vagueness is explained, firstly, by the fact that political power sometimes takes upon itself the regulation of issues that are not related to the system of power. Second, the unresolved or inadequate regulation of private matters can be a cause of public concern and require policy intervention.

Political management cannot abstract from the fact that the main thing in politics is the division of people into opposite groups in their attitude to power, its formation, organization, administration. No management decision can equally affect different groups of the population. And it is no coincidence that the state in its internal policy not least relies on law and enforcement agencies, and externally it ensures sovereignty and territorial supremacy, including the ability to protect them by military means. At the same time, any purely economic, purely administrative, purely ecological, etc., and in this case a purely military managerial decision has some political content or another. A problem and its solution have a political character if it: (1) concerns the issue of state power; (2) affects the interests and is in the sphere of attention of the general population; (3) has a legal dimension and requires a legal definition and decision; (4) the public authority, its structures and persons recognize the right to solve this problem or the masses demand such a solution from them; (5) citizens show their attitude towards it through traditional mechanisms of political participation; (6) becomes an object (subject) of rivalry and struggle for power between different political groups.

The foregoing fully applies to military command and control. In the military command and control system, policy and strategy, operational and administrative functions are closely interconnected, although they have relative independence. At the very least, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security states that each signatory state will at all times ensure and maintain effective leadership and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities. with democratic legitimacy and create leverage to ensure that such bodies fulfill their constitutional and legal obligations.

Political in military management is as follows.

First, the content and nature of military command, its direction and scope, like many other parameters, are "given" by politics. It is she who determines the purpose of the army, its functions and tasks, the procedure and rules for its use, including in cases not related to ensuring military security. The decision on the use of force and, if it is made, the choice of the right moment for its use, is in the hands of political leaders. Military administration serves to implement their decisions. Its scope includes creating the framework within which such decisions can be made, preparing options, planning for contingencies and ensuring the highest degree of effectiveness of the military organization and the armed forces as its core. At the same time, political attitudes determine not only the goals of military command, but also its principles, specific tasks, methods, and so on.

It is clear, after all, that the possibilities and limits of military control differ significantly in conditions when politics is oriented towards subordinating the entire life of the country to the task of creating and maintaining an army (“first priority in meeting the needs of defense”, “guns instead of butter”) and when it seeks to solve socio-economic problems of society due to the curtailment of the defense efforts of the state (“the residual principle of ensuring the defense sphere”, “oil instead of guns”). Of course, between these extremes there is a so-called golden mean. In the Russian Federation, for example, "development and military planning are now based on the geopolitical needs of the Russian Federation and the principle of defense sufficiency, and not on the actually existing potential." The change of these principles of military development, the transition from one to another is determined not by the maturity of the armed forces, not by the military command's own considerations, but by the political position and decisions of the state authorities.

The subordination of military control to political control in its most open and hypertrophied form manifests itself during periods of social upheaval and political transformations, when direct control over military leaders by the authorities is introduced. This control can be exercised by commissars, as was the case during the civil war in France and Russia, by political agencies operating in the Soviet army, and by other institutions. In a stable, consolidated and democratic society, there is no need for such control. However, even in it the army cannot be and is not a self-sufficient entity. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security establishes that each participating State will at all times ensure and maintain effective leadership and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities with democratic legitimacy, clearly defining functions and tasks of such forces and create leverage to ensure that such bodies fulfill their constitutional and legal obligations, and will not allow the existence of forces that are not accountable to their constitutionally established authorities or are not controlled by them, and will not support such forces. It sees democratic political control of military and paramilitary forces, internal security forces, and intelligence services and police as an indispensable element of stability and security.

However, civilian control cannot be regarded as a kind of counterbalance to military control, much less as an alternative to it. Meanwhile, in our country there are attempts of such absolutization. Thus, in the State Duma of the last convocation, the draft law “On civilian control and management of military organization and activities” was discussed. In its name, control and management are completely unlawfully combined. After all, such a formulation, in essence, takes military professionals beyond the framework of developing, adopting and implementing military and military-political decisions. It is quite natural that civilian control, so understood, does not, to put it mildly, find support among those who understand the meaning of unity of command, the significance of state secrets, the peculiarities of army operational and administrative activities, and so on. Quite rightly, the report of the Ministry of Defense emphasizes that the effectiveness of civilian control over the military sphere depends on the fact that the subjects of control have solid military knowledge, without which even well-intentioned creativity in this matter will be subject to superficial or distorted ideas and judgments about the state of affairs in the army, may take ugly forms or fall under the influence of pacifist myths about the "original sinfulness" of all the military in general.

Secondly, as a specific type of activity, military management involves a realistic assessment of the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in the world and possible trends in its development, understanding the associated place of the armed forces in the life of society, domestic and foreign policy of the state. It is deployed with a focus on the outside world: based on the existing peaceful conditions, it also takes into account all possible, that is, theoretically permissible options for the outbreak of wars and armed conflicts and the corresponding requirements for the army. It has long been said that the behavior of an army that does not strive to master all the means, all the methods of struggle that the enemy has or can have is unreasonable or even criminal. Military management is effective, which takes into account the trends in the development of military affairs in the world, adequately responds to the military efforts of other states and guarantees the military security of the country. At the same time, in conditions where the limited capabilities of the state do not allow reaching the required level of its defense capability, one has to look for non-standard solutions that can ensure the country's military security, whether it is the creation of a nuclear deterrence potential, the organization of collective self-defense, or hope for peace as a reward for curtailing any there was no military effort of its own. But both that, and another, and the third belong to the sphere of politics.

Thirdly, military construction, although relatively independent, is an integral part of the state's defense efforts and, as such, cannot be a self-sufficient process. It is conducted on the basis of and taking into account the demographic, economic, scientific, technical and other possibilities of the country. The creation and maintenance of military power includes all aspects of all areas of state building. Because of this, on the one hand, its content is decisively influenced by the nature of the political regime established in the country, the history and culture of the people, the level of institutional and socio-economic development of society, etc. These factors in each state have specific content and forms, which determines variety of approaches to security problems. On the other hand, various bodies of state power and local government. In the Russian Federation, their functions and powers in this area are defined in the laws "On Defense", "On the State of War", the Concept of National Security and other documents. As for the military leaders themselves, they are appointed to the post by the political authorities and must be loyal to it. This is not about personal loyalty, but about loyalty to the regime. In the United States, Congress formally approves every appointment and production of officers. In our country, according to the Constitution, the President appoints and dismisses the high command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Fourthly, military administration is carried out on a strictly legitimate and legal basis, it is built in accordance with and through law, which has a special branch - military law. Military practice cannot be discretionary. Signatory States to the above-mentioned Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security committed themselves to ensuring that the commanding staff of the armed forces comply with national laws and international law, and that they are aware of the possibility of individual liability under these laws for the unlawful exercise of such powers. Orders contrary to national law and international law must not be issued. At the same time, the responsibility of superiors in no way relieves subordinates of their own individual responsibility. At the same time, the political and military leadership must ensure public agreement on the measures taken in the military field. Such agreement is achieved by the justification of the measures themselves, as well as by explanatory work on their necessity and content.

Fifthly, management activities are public in nature. The Armed Forces are, first of all, people and their management is carried out by people, has as its object a mass of military personnel. The military organism does not depersonalize military personnel. Each of them in their activities is guided by certain personal interests, guided by consciousness and feelings, adheres to moral standards, one way or another conforms to legal requirements. All this inevitably leaves an imprint on the motivation of behavior and the very behavior of people, their attitude to military duty and thus on the appearance and capabilities of the armed forces.

That is why information and ideological support is an integral and important part of military construction and management. "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" emphasize the need for a set of state measures to increase the prestige of military service; creation and improvement of the system of military-patriotic education and pre-conscription training; formation of the moral and psychological readiness of citizens to defend the Fatherland; creation and improvement of the system of education of servicemen of the Armed Forces and other troops. The effectiveness of military construction is largely determined by the value orientations and attitudes of people entering the military system. “The first need of the army,” wrote Russian General R.A. Fadeev, - the high opinion of the military about their rank, which finds a sympathetic response in society. If a society is fully aware of itself as a nation, then (in the state of the world that continues for the time being) it must highly value its army, in which national power is exercised; to appreciate the army means to appreciate the people who make it up. That is why among the important tasks of military administrative activity is to ensure the development and introduction of the positive idea of ​​the army into the public consciousness of the country.

Military theory and practice are not self-sufficient quantities. In their content, character, forms, the nature of the era, the level of development of military affairs, sociocultural factors, historical traditions and national characteristics of peoples, the political goals of states, etc. are refracted in a certain way. Accordingly, military administration is not a given quantity once and for all.

It can be based on different worldview foundations (for example, secular or religious), philosophical trends and schools (materialistic or idealistic, behaviorist or existentialist), military-political attitudes and priorities (here the extremes are militarism(a set of economic political, ideological means aimed at preparing for war) and pacifism(unconditional condemnation of any war, renunciation of war), as well as aggressive, militaristic, aggressive, defensive, hegemonic, expansionist, pacifist and other premises, etc.

However, in any case, we are talking about the sum of rules that are by no means arbitrary, but constitute an organic integrity, the obligatory adherence to which expands the possibilities in foresight, understanding and resolving constantly arising problems in military organizational development.

The subordination of all forces and means to a single command does not depend on the name of the control body in the theater of operations (TVD). For a scientifically based solution of this issue, it is desirable to take into account firstly, positive and negative sides from the experience of the past, and Secondly, - and this is the main thing - to clearly define for the solution of what defense tasks and in what conditions of the conduct of armed struggle a new system of military command and control is being created.

SOME LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Back in the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries. (in the Franco-Prussian, Russian-Turkish, Russian-Japanese wars) several separate armies operated on the battlefields, united by command in the theater of operations. With the increase in the scope of the armed struggle during the First World War, when 8-10 armies acted on the line of the Russian-German confrontation on both sides, it became necessary to create front commands (army groups), which included 3-4 armies each. In the Russian army - the Northern, Western and South-Western fronts, the control of the fronts was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command through the field headquarters.

In World War II the scope of the armed struggle increased even more and from the Soviet side in the army in different periods it was necessary to create up to 10-15 front commands (as organs of the operational-strategic level), including 5-9 combined arms armies, 40-70 rifle divisions, 1-3 tank armies, 1-2 air armies with a total strength of up to 800 thousand people.

At the same time, it was necessary to manage several fleets, separate formations of the Air Force, Air Defense, large formations of the reserve of the Supreme High Command and other troops. All this complicated and hampered the operational control of the Armed Forces. In addition, before the start of the war, the very organization of the strategic command and control of the Armed Forces had not been sufficiently thought out.

It was suggested that, as in the period civil war, the head of state will head the Defense Council (GKO) of the country, and the main military command will be headed by the people's commissar of defense. But since he, without the knowledge of Stalin, could not make any decisions and this slowed down the management process, the latter stood at the head of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The command and control of the services, branches of the Armed Forces, logistics, technical and other services remained very low and fragmented.

In connection with this, the current situation has demanded an increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of command and control of the Armed Forces in two directions.

Firstly, emphasis was placed on enhancing the role of the General Staff as the main (and not "working") body of strategic control of the Armed Forces, freeing it from some secondary functions of recruiting and providing troops (forces). The position and status were raised, the rights and functional duties of the commands of the types of the Armed Forces, the branches of service and, above all, the Air Force, artillery, armored troops, communications, engineering troops were expanded, and a centralized rear of the Armed Forces was created. These measures have fully justified themselves.

Secondly, in order to improve control and coordination of the actions of the fronts, on 07/10/1941 it was decided to create high commands in strategic directions.

In the first, most difficult period of the war, they brought some benefit, but they did not fully justify themselves, and in September 1942 they were abolished. First of all, because they could not be turned into an ordinary governing body with the functions of planning operations and setting tasks for the fronts assigned to them. The appearance of such an intermediate link between the Headquarters and the fronts would sharply (by 2-3 days) reduce the efficiency of command and control.

All strategic operations were planned by the General Staff and operational directives were issued on behalf of the Headquarters. In addition, having no directly subordinated forces and means at their disposal, they could not significantly influence the course of operations.

However, in the course of the war, for the first time, such a new form of strategic action arose as the operation of a group of fronts, where the efforts of several fronts, fleets, air armies and air defense formations were combined to achieve certain strategic goals. To coordinate the efforts of the fronts and other formations in such operations, it was necessary to introduce the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Most often, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, N.N. Voronov, S.K. Timoshenko and others.

Major General M. Vildanov.
Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences;
Colonel V. Satarov, Candidate of Military Sciences

The strategic forces (SS) of the United States, according to their purpose and the nature of the tasks being solved, are divided into offensive and defensive. The Strategic Offensive Forces (SNA) consist of three components: land-based strategic missile forces, strategic aviation, and sea-based strategic missile forces. The Strategic Defense Forces (SDF) include three components: the forces and means of warning of a nuclear missile attack (SPRYAU), space control (SCP) and anti-missile defense (ABM).
Since 2003, the US military leadership has been implementing a set of operational, organizational and technical measures

on the transformation of the nuclear triad of the times of the Cold War into a new strategic triad, which is a single strategic offensive-defensive complex1. It includes three components connected by a unified system of combat control (SBU), intelligence and operational planning: strategic offensive forces, strategic defensive forces of the enterprise and organizations of the military-industrial complex. Special hopes are pinned on the creation of this complex, since it is believed that it will provide a significant increase in the combat capabilities of nuclear and conventional forces, including advanced weapons systems based on information technology.

The formation of a new strategic triad presupposes the improvement of the system of operational and administrative command and control of strategic forces with a further delineation of the tasks and functions of military command and control bodies2.
The operational management of the SS involves; operational planning; organization of combat duty; maintaining interaction with the branches of the armed forces and the joint commands (OC);
preparation and conduct of strategic exercises Operational control is exercised by the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of the Joint Strategic Command (OGK) of the Armed Forces of the country.

In accordance with the "Plan of the Joint Command of the US Armed Forces" approved by the US President, USC does not have its own area of ​​responsibility and solves problems both on a global scale and in the interests of other OKs. The Commander of the USC was given significant managerial, coordinating and control functions in solving operational-strategic tasks. He is responsible for the planning, integration and coordination of intelligence activities in the interests of ensuring strategic and global operations, the organization of missile defense; planning and conducting space operations; performing the functions of the governing body for the integration and coordination of activities of the Ministry of Defense to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; preparation of proposals for making decisions on the transfer of strategic forces from peacetime to wartime; notification of state and military authorities about the threat of an enemy nuclear missile strike; timely communication of orders and instructions for the combat use of the SS. The Commander of the USC has the right to report to the President of the United States on the status, problematic issues of operational planning and management of the combat use of strategic forces, compliance with the security requirements for the maintenance of nuclear weapons that are part of the duty forces, proposals for the development and construction of the SS, and improvement of interaction with military command and control.

Operational planning is the basis for the operational command and control of strategic forces. At the same time, the chairman of the KNSh organizes the development of documents for the concept of combat use of the SS, bringing to the USC the initial data for planning, approves the composition of the forces and means of the SS components involved in combat duty, establishes the procedure for developing, coordinating and approving the operational plan (OPLAN) and other operational documents . High-level government organizations are involved in the development of OPLAN. In the process of planning the combat use of the SS, the president of the country, the National Security Council, and the Ministry of Defense participate. The CNS and USC Headquarters of the US Armed Forces, the Commander and Staff of the USC, with the participation of the joint commands, organizes the development of other planning documents related to the preparation and conduct of nuclear operations in the theater. At the same time, the OK headquarters submit proposals on the list of objects of destruction in the area of ​​​​responsibility, which is required along with nuclear weapons, the forms and methods of their combat use, the combat capabilities of groupings of troops (forces), necessary parameters tactical and technical characteristics of weapons, and also carry out the development of their operational documents.

In accordance with the requirements of the "Global Strike" concept, the USC commander and headquarters organize planning for delivering preventive strikes against the most important (currently) enemy targets. In the event of a sudden change in the military-political situation in the world (region), detection of important stationary and mobile targets of the enemy by the USC headquarters using automated system data preparation, adaptive planning of the combat use of assets and their operational retargeting is carried out.

An important activity of the USC command in the operational control system is the organization of combat duty of the SS4 components. In peacetime, the USC is operationally subordinate to the forces and means on combat duty (ICBMs, SSBNs, SKKP, SPRYAUs and missile defense systems). During a period of growing military threat or with the transfer of strategic forces from peacetime to wartime, the SNS and SOS groups of the entire composition, as well as forces and support means (strategic reconnaissance and refueling aircraft, aircraft of the CPSU and meteorological support) are transferred to the operational subordination of the USC. At the same time, the USC commander has the right to conduct comprehensive training of duty forces and monitor their readiness. At the same time, he is not authorized to use the attached forces and means for other purposes, change their organizational and staff structure, the initial state of the personnel on duty forces and weapons, or reappoint the leadership.

As part of improving the operational management of the SS, a set of measures is being taken to optimize the organizational and staffing structure aimed at improving the efficiency of the USC. Thus, it was reformed in the interests of solving various tasks: planning and delivering SNA strikes against targets anywhere in the world; organization of missile defense; planning and conducting global information operations; implementation of organizational and technical measures to ensure the functioning of all types of intelligence in the interests of the SS. New functional commands have been created: global strikes and integration; PRO; intelligence operations; space operations; combat operations in information networks. In addition, the USC includes: the command of joint information operations, the joint center for the protection of computer networks, the center for global investment and strategy, the center for combating the threats of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction.

The main tasks of the functional commands are defined as follows: collection, analysis, assessment of data on the situation and preparation of proposals for the US military-political leadership for decision-making; planning and management of the combat use of subordinate forces and means, control over the fulfillment of their assigned tasks. In order to work out managerial tasks and coordinate functional commands under the leadership of the USC commander, command-staff exercises and training, KShVI (command-staff military games) and other operational training events are held annually.

In the structure of operational control of the SS, a key place is occupied by the combat control system, which includes the combat control subsystems of the SNS and SOS and is currently under reform. Further development of the Security Service of Ukraine is envisaged within the framework of the strategic concept of combat command and control "Combat operations based on a single information and communication space" (Network - Centric Warfare) and the program for the formation of a global information and management network -GIUS (Global Information Grid, which is designed for network integration into a single complex all reconnaissance systems, controls and weapons, regardless of their type.As part of the USC, it is planned to deploy the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) combat control, communications, computer technology, reconnaissance and surveillance systems.

The administrative control of the strategic forces is carried out along the administrative vertical of the head of the military department through the apparatus and central departments of the Ministry of Defense, ministries of types of armed forces. It covers the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe development and implementation of plans for the construction and development of the SS; modernization, formation of orders and supplies of weapons and military equipment; organization of their operation; planning and conducting research and development on promising types of weapons and military equipment; formation and execution of the military budget, in part relating to the strategic forces; staffing of command and control bodies and troops; organizing the fulfillment of contractual obligations in the field of limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms and the preparation of a new START Treaty; comprehensive logistical and logistic support of the SS.

As part of the administrative management of the strategic forces, the ministries of the Armed Forces are responsible for the state of combat readiness of the forces and assets. They organize combat and mobilization training of command and control bodies and troops, maintenance of weapons and military equipment in readiness for combat use; financing and implementation of measures for the logistical and logistic support of the combat and daily activities of units and subunits. In addition, these departments are working on recruiting duty forces with personnel, selecting, training and appointing senior staff, seconding their representatives to the USC headquarters, and are also called upon to comply with directives and instructions emanating from the USC headquarters, to monitor the technical readiness of units and subunits, allocated to the USC.

According to the calculations of American specialists, the state of the administrative department of the SS ensures stable financing and the implementation of programs for the modernization of existing and the development of promising types of strategic offensive and defensive weapons. This is confirmed by the effectiveness of work to improve the performance characteristics and extend the operational life of the Minuteman-3 ICBM, SBA aircraft, Ohio-type SSBNs and the planned purchases of Trident-2 SLBMs. The US military leadership uses a flexible and pragmatic approach in the implementation of treaty obligations in the field of reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. This made it possible to create a significant returnable nuclear potential, which ensures the operational build-up of the combat capabilities of the SNS.

According to foreign experts, the measures taken to improve the system of operational and administrative control of the SS provide an increase in the combat readiness of strategic offensive and defensive forces. The strength is the presence of an extensive network of stationary protected reserve command and control posts and mobile ground command posts, ensuring stable control of the SS in any situation. A significant scientific and technical reserve has been created and is being maintained for the modernization of the main elements of the SBU infrastructure.

At the same time, according to foreign military experts, it was not possible to achieve a clear delineation of the tasks and functions of operational and administrative control. The issues of interaction during the acceptance and transfer of SS components to the operational subordination of the USC have not been fully worked out. Insufficient survivability of ground infrastructure facilities of the SBU of the strategic forces, as well as their weak physical security, is noted.

The creation of a new triad involves the following: further development of the system of operational and administrative control of the SS; improvement of forms and methods of combat use of SS components; implementation of measures for non-nuclear deterrence of potential adversaries; adopting new means of aerospace attack into service with strategic offensive arms; building up the forces and means of the US global missile defense system.

It is envisaged to develop and implement a unified system for planning combat use, organizing operational, combat and mobilization training, and operating weapons and military equipment components of the SS. US military experts believe that the creation of a new strategic triad will require the development of a unified operational plan that reflects the integrated use of SNS, SOS and space systems. The possibility of creating a unified system for planning and conducting research and development, the formation of orders and deliveries of weapons and military equipment is being explored. The prospects for further optimization of the organizational and staffing structure of the USC and other military command and control bodies are considered.

Thus, the composition and content of the measures taken by the US military-political leadership to further improve the systems of operational and administrative control of strategic forces testify to the growth of their role and place in ensuring the national security of the United States and its allies.

1 For more details, see Air Force Doctrine Document 2-12” Nuclear Operations / United States Air Force. May 7, 2009.

2 For more details, see Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United Stales /Joint Chiefs of Staff 14 May 2007.

foreign military review. - 2010.- №1.- S. 15-20

The problem of state management of the military sphere has always been relevant for our Fatherland, and its solution has been one of the highest priorities throughout the history of the Russian state.

The military command and control system of the Russian state

Long before education Old Russian state the Slavs developed a form of government in the form of a people's assembly - a vecha, at which a military leader was chosen, the directions and routes of campaigns, the number and composition of the troops were determined.

With the development of feudal relations, tribal nobility emerged, uniting around princes - military leaders with hereditary power. At the head of the first Old Russian state stood the prince, who relied on the retinue, which in Rus' was not only a military force, but also took an active part in governing the country. Under the princes, "councils" were created to resolve military issues. important place in the state hierarchy were occupied by governors - the leaders of the princely regiments in wartime and the governors of the prince in cities subject to him in peacetime.

In the course of the unification of the Russian lands around Moscow, the military organization of the Moscow principality was also improved.

A rather harmonious system of military command and control developed during the reforms of Ivan IV the Terrible. The general leadership of all the armed forces of the state was carried out by the tsar, relying on the Boyar Duma. The direct management of the construction and training of the armed forces was concentrated in the orders (Streletsky, Armory, Bronny, Pushkarsky, Yamsky, etc.). Since 1535, the highest body of military administration was the Discharge Order - the founder of the Military Ministry created in the future. He was in charge of all the military people of the state, kept records of the local troops, distributed them among the regiments, carried out inspections and assembled troops, at the direction of the tsar appointed the chief governor and commander of the regiments, brought to them a plan of military operations.

With education in the XVII century. regiments of the "new system" there were changes in the system of higher military command. A military-territorial system appeared, and with it the corresponding governing bodies - ranks.

Early 18th century in Russia was marked by large-scale reforms. The completion of the transformation of the permanent army into a regular army required the creation of a unified centralized system of military command and control. 12 colleges were created, including the Military and Admiralty Colleges. The military collegium dealt with all the military affairs of the state, determined the staffs of the regiments, kept records of the command staff and submitted for the assignment of officer ranks. Naval affairs were managed by the Admiralty Board. It was these bodies of military control that became the prototype of the War Ministry. The closest associate of Peter I, Field Marshal A.D., was appointed the first president of the Military Collegium. Menshikov. The Admiralty Board was headed by another associate of the tsar, Admiral General F.M. Apraksin.

Thanks to the activity of Peter I and the constant control over the work of the collegiums in the early years, they were quite effective. But after his death, the boards began to turn into bureaucratic instances, often hindering the adoption of the necessary military management decisions. The presidents of the colleges gradually lost their power, and new governing bodies (councils, committees, etc.) began to emerge at the court.

Insufficient efficiency in resolving issues of command and control of the armed forces led to the creation of a special military commission with the accession to the throne in 1762 of Catherine II in order to review all existing military personnel, transform military institutions and improve the organizational foundations of the Russian army. In 1763, at the suggestion of this commission, the General Staff was established, the leadership of which was headed by the vice-president of the Military College, General-in-Chief Count Z.G. Chernyshev. According to the Regulations of 1772, presented to the Empress by Major General F.V. Baur, the General Staff was entrusted with the tasks of preparing data for the combat activities of troops, studying the terrain, organizing the movement and deployment of troops, compiling topographic maps for military needs, and a military-historical journal of military operations. In 1774, the General Staff was renamed the Department of the General Staff, and in 1796, by decree of Paul I, it was abolished. Instead, a retinue of His Imperial Majesty is created for the quartermaster department, subordinated directly to the tsar.

Russia entered the 19th century as one of the most powerful and influential states in Europe. AT to no small extent this was facilitated by a well-functioning military organization. At the same time, the numerical growth of Russia's armed forces and the increasing complexity of the organization of troops demanded more flexible and efficient command and control. In the course of the reform of the public administration system on September 8 (20), 1802, 8 ministries were created in Russia, including the Ministry of Military Ground Forces (since 1808 - the Military Ministry). It united under its command all branches of military administration. The first minister of the military land forces of Russia was the infantry general, who was personally subordinate to Emperor Alexander I.

Sergei Kuzmich Vyazmitinov was not only a military leader, but also a political figure on a national scale. After retiring, he was a member of the State Council, Minister of Police, Governor of St. Petersburg, then led the Committee of Ministers.

The Military Collegium continued to be the executive body of the War Department. In 1812, it was finally abolished, and a Council, general and chancellery, 7 departments (inspector, artillery, engineering, food, medical, commissar, audit) were established under the ministry. The Ministry also established the Military Scientific Committee and the Military Topographical Depot.

In 1802, along with the Ministry of Military Land Forces, the Ministry of Naval Forces was established (since 1815 - the Naval Ministry).

The creation of the Military and Naval Ministries was the most important landmark event in the history of reforming the country's central military command and control system. The most trained, experienced people who had proven themselves in military service were appointed to key posts in the Military and Naval Ministries. They made a significant contribution to the creation of an advanced military organization of the state at that time, which proved its strength during the Patriotic War of 1812. The defeat of the Napoleonic army predetermined the leading role of Russia in Europe for half a century.

In December 1815, the management of the military department was divided into two parts. All issues of command and control of the troops were transferred to the jurisdiction of the chief of the newly created General Staff, and the Minister of War, who headed the Ministry of War, managed economic activities and, unlike the chief of the General Staff, did not have the right to report directly to the emperor. The "bifurcation" of the system of central military command introduced a fair amount of confusion and made it difficult to resolve many issues related to the leadership of the armed forces. The main headquarters of His Imperial Majesty, as such, in its former form was abolished only in 1832 (the name was retained), and soon became part of the War Ministry, received new functions and organizational structure. The unity of the higher military administration was restored, and it was concentrated in the hands of the Minister of War (in 1832, he became the cavalry general and adjutant general count, who had been its manager since 1827).

Largely thanks to the efforts of A.I. Chernyshev, flintlock weapons were replaced by shock weapons, artillery guns were improved, and mountain artillery was created. Work was carried out on the military-statistical description of the provinces, 8 cadet corps were founded. While still in military service, cavalry general and adjutant general Count A.I. Chernyshev is appointed chairman of the State Council.

By the middle of the XIX century. the ever-increasing extreme centralization of military command and control, the strict regulation of the activities of its lower echelons, and the numerical growth of the administrative apparatus significantly complicated the command and control system, which ceased to meet the requirements of the times. The problems and shortcomings that existed in the Russian army were exposed with particular acuteness during the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853-1856. The defeat in the Crimean War put forward the modernization of the army as a priority. The initiator and organizer of the urgently urgent reforms in the military field was the War Ministry, headed by.

One of the most important links in the reforms was the introduction of a military district system in Russia. In 1864, according to the "Regulations on military districts", the entire territory of the country was divided into 15 military districts. The military district administrations were military ministries in miniature, combining military administrative leadership and military command and control.

The process of reorganization of the central military administration lasted from 1862 to 1868. On January 1, 1869, it was completed with the release of the “Regulations on the Military Ministry”. The rights of the Minister of War in accordance with it were significantly expanded. The importance of the Military Council has increased. Its five main committees decided on the organization of the army, its internal administration, equipment, weapons, officer training, and legislative acts. The departments of the War Ministry were transformed into main directorates (there were 7 of them) with the provision of greater administrative rights to their chiefs.

In 1863, the Department of the General Staff (as it began to be called from 1832) was transformed into the Main Directorate of the General Staff, which turned into a body covering all the main issues of commanding the armed forces in peacetime and wartime. In 1865, the Main Directorate of the General Staff and the Inspection Department were merged into the General Staff, which became one of the departments of the War Ministry. Under the General Staff were the Military Scientific Committee, the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, the editorial offices of the newspaper "Russian invalid" and the magazine "Military collection". The apparatus of the War Ministry was reduced by a thousand people, and the volume of incoming and outgoing documents - by 2 times.

On January 1, 1874, the Law on universal military service was approved in Russia, which made it possible to create a massive modern army and have trained reserves.

The victory of the Russian army over Turkey in the war of 1877-1878. confirmed the correctness of the course of reforms carried out in the army under the leadership of D.A. Milyutin. In 1898 he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal.

Increased attention to the armed forces of Russia during the reign of Alexander II led to a qualitative improvement in the military command and control system, a significant increase in the level of managerial activity of leading personnel, and the professionalism of commanders and chiefs of all levels.

However, at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. the military command and control system began to gradually lag behind the requirements of modern warfare, acquiring a cumbersome staff with many, including unusual functions. After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which revealed the shortcomings of the military administrative apparatus, in which society saw "the root of all our troubles and failures", in 1905-1912. military reforms were carried out, largely preparing the army and navy for a world war and restoring their reputation.

To unite the activities of the land and naval departments and organize interaction between them and other ministries, in June 1905, the Council of State Defense (SGO) was created. It included the military and naval ministers, chiefs of the General Staff and the Main Naval Staff, inspector generals of all branches of service (weapons) and a number of military district commanders. Under the supervision of the SGO, a program was developed to restore the combat capability of the armed forces.

In order to renew and rejuvenate senior officers under the Council in 1906, the Higher Attestation Commission was created, which without fail considered all candidates for appointment to senior positions from the brigade commander and above.

The introduction in the middle of 1905 of the posts of inspector generals of the military branches (weapons) into the SGO did not bring any practical benefit to the army. They were either the great princes, or their entourage. They interfered in the decisions of commanders of all levels, often disregarding their opinion and not coordinating their actions with the War Department.

In the same year, the Main Directorate of the General Staff was removed from the War Ministry. The post of Chief of the General Staff was re-established, reporting directly to Emperor Nicholas II. The military department was again dismembered. The minister, with his apparatus, dealt with administrative and economic issues, and the Main Directorate of the General Staff - preparing the country for war in a strategic sense. A multi-authority was created, which further disorganized the army, which was already upset after the lost war. The need for drastic measures to reform the military organization of the state has again become obvious.

Due to sharp disagreements with the tsar on issues of further military development and the subsequent resignation of its leader in 1908, the Council of State Defense lost its significance, and a year later was abolished. After that, the power of the Minister of War increased significantly. He began to lead the Higher Attestation Commission, inspector generals. At the end of 1908, the Main Directorate of the General Staff was also returned to the Ministry of War, the chief of the General Staff became subordinate to the minister and became his closest assistant on military operational issues. Thus, the unity of the central military command was again restored.

Under the direct supervision of the War Ministry, a new organizational and staffing structure of the troops was introduced, a certain degree of technical modernization of the army was carried out, a new branch of the military, aviation, was created, and some reduction in defense spending was also achieved. At the same time, the underestimation of the role of the domestic defense industry led to the fact that quite significant supplies of weapons, military equipment and ammunition were carried out to the army from abroad. This was one of the reasons for the unpreparedness of Russia for the First World War.

With the outbreak of World War I, the leadership of the army in the field passed to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his headquarters, the War Ministry was engaged in meeting the needs and needs of the front, from food supplies to the formation of new units and formations.

The reorganization of the military administration was actively carried out during the First World War. In 1916, the Directorate of the Air Force was formed in the Military Ministry, and in 1917, the Directorate for Foreign Supply. Since 1915, a Special Conference on Defense was created to control the supply of the army and navy and coordinate the efforts of various departments.

The failures of the Russian army on the fronts of the First World War, the revolutionary events that were brewing in the country, led to the fact that in three years, from July 1915 to October 1917, six leaders were replaced at the helm of the military department.

Military department of the Soviet state

As a result of the October Revolution, by the end of 1917, the old Russian army ceased to exist. The creation of a new army was the first and most important task for the Bolsheviks who came to power. This was required by the external and internal political situation in the country. The volunteer Red Guard detachments were not able to save Soviet power and stop the international intervention. As the first months of the Civil War showed, the "universal arming of the people" did not give positive results either. In connection with the abolition of the old links of the central military administration, it was necessary to create a completely new system of leadership of the army and navy. Under these conditions, there was an acute shortage of command personnel, and the lack of experience in military development in the country's leadership was reflected.

The management of the armed forces being created was established gradually, often spontaneously, it was multi-stage, the names and functions of the governing bodies often changed. At the end of November 1917, the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs was formed, headed by the Board (its predecessor was the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs, then the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) for Military and Naval Affairs). Already in February 1918, it was divided into two people's commissariats - for military and naval affairs. By this time, the previously existing Military and Naval Ministries were disbanded.

The general leadership of the defense of the country and the Armed Forces of the Republic since November 1918 was carried out by the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense (since 1923 - the Council of Labor and Defense), created by analogy with the State Defense Council of 1905-1909, which, through the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) united the activities of two people's commissariats: for military and naval affairs, developed and implemented plans for the defense of the country, directed the construction of the army and navy and military operations through the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the RVS of the fronts and armies.

The frequent change of senior military leaders was characteristic of the period of formation of the military command and control bodies of the new army. The field headquarters of the RVS of the Republic developed strategic plans, collected and processed intelligence information, and provided command and control. After the abolition in May 1918 of the General Staff of the old Russian army, the All-Russian General Staff was created, which was engaged in organizing, mobilizing, recruiting and replenishing the army, and training command personnel.

The command and control structure of the armed forces during this period was cumbersome and clumsy. Many bodies duplicated each other, and the number of staff reached 11 thousand employees and 9 thousand service personnel, while in the Military Ministry of the Imperial Army in 1914 only about 3.5 thousand people worked.

At the same time, the new military command and control bodies played a significant role in the victory of Soviet power and the strengthening of the workers' and peasants' state.

After the end of the Civil War and the formation of the USSR, the separate People's Commissariats in July 1923 were merged into the all-Union People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. People's Commissar was simultaneously the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In November, the first Regulations on the People's Commissariat were approved, which determined its functions, tasks and organizational structure.

He became the first people's commissar for military affairs in the Soviet government. From 1918 to 1925 he was at the head of the military department. Despite the lack of military education, having high organizational skills, he quickly brought order to the troops and laid the foundation for military reforms, continued under his successor.

During the military reforms of the 1920s. the central administration of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) was subjected to repeated reorganization. The centralization of management led to the merger in 1921 of the All-Russian General Staff and the Field Headquarters into the Headquarters of the Red Army. It was the executive body of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and reported to the Commander-in-Chief, and through him to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. As part of the headquarters, the number of departments and departments was reduced by 2 times, their work was streamlined and functions were clarified.

M.V., who led the commission for the preparation and implementation of the military reform. Frunze emphasized that "this operational headquarters should become not only the brain of the Red Army, it should become the military brain for our entire Soviet state."

Under the direct supervision and with the personal participation of People's Commissar M.V. Frunze created military scientific societies, the journals "Military Science and Revolution", "Red Army", "War and Revolution", the style and methods of work of the central apparatus changed, personnel leapfrog stopped, the reporting system of lower military command and control bodies, which had reached unprecedented proportions, was eliminated. superiors, the first steps were taken towards the technical re-equipment of the army.

However, starting from the second half of the 1920s, a wave of repressions hit the command staff of the army and navy. The search for class enemies, hidden pests, Japanese-German spies and saboteurs, Trotskyist-Zinoviev traitors caused irreparable harm to the entire system of the highest military administration of the USSR.

The further development of the military command and control system was carried out on the eve of a new world war, under the conditions of the construction of a mass army and the introduction of universal conscription.

The Council of Labor and Defense, which had existed since the Civil War, was abolished, instead of which the Committee on Military and Naval Affairs was formed under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - a collegiate body that united and coordinated activities to strengthen the country's defense and build the armed forces.

In 1934, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO) of the USSR, under which a Military Council of an advisory nature was created. Since 1938, the Main Military Council of the Red Army began to operate, to which in 1940 the role and functions of the Military Council were transferred. He considered the main issues of the construction and organization of the Ground Forces and the Air Force, the organization and training of personnel, the development of new types of weapons and equipment. In 1937, an independent People's Commissariat of the Navy was created.

Of great importance was the transformation in 1935 of the Headquarters of the Red Army into the General Staff as part of the People's Commissariat of Defense, which increased the efficiency of the entire central apparatus. Under the People's Commissariat of Defense, inspections of the infantry, cavalry, artillery, air force, armored troops, signal troops and engineering troops were formed. New bodies were created: the military-technical supply department, the department of the chief of supplies of the Red Army (Main quartermaster department).

With the deployment of military branches and the complexity of the tasks they solved, their directorates were enlarged and reorganized into the main ones, the directorates of the military construction of the Red Army and the airborne troops were formed. In order to carry out activities related to the preparation of pre-conscription and conscript contingents, the conduct of regular conscriptions, registration and training of those liable for military service, the NPO of the USSR had local military administration bodies (military commissariats) in the union and autonomous republics, regions, cities and districts, subordinate to the military councils of the districts. Under the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republics, authorized NGOs of the USSR continued to remain.

The measures taken contributed to the improvement of command and control of the Armed Forces. Significant work was carried out under the leadership of the People's Commissar of Defense for the development of the Armed Forces, their technical re-equipment, training of personnel, training and education of troops. However, continuous personnel changes in the conditions of repressions of the commanding and commanding staff caused significant damage, primarily to the link of the top and senior military leadership.

The most essential issues of restructuring the bodies of the military leadership were resolved already during the Great Patriotic War and at a very high price. “War is the most severe test of the ability to manage troops,” the marshal emphasized in his memoirs. This test had to be passed.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the military leadership system urgently adapted to the new conditions. By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command was created, from July 10 - the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and from August 8 - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK), which was subordinate to the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR. Chairman of the GKO, People's Commissar of Defense (since July 19, 1941) and Supreme Commander USSR Armed Forces (since August 8, 1941) became.

The General Staff became the main working body of the Headquarters for strategic planning and leadership of the army and navy. The General Staff was entrusted with the tasks of collecting and analyzing data on the situation at the fronts, preparing conclusions and proposals for the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, developing plans for campaigns and strategic operations, organizing strategic interaction between the branches of the Armed Forces and fronts, communicating decisions, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander to the troops, and monitoring them. implementation, leadership of military intelligence, organization of operational transportation of troops, control over the formation and deployment of reserves to the front.

Officers * representatives of the General Staff were sent to the troops to assist the headquarters of formations and formations (up to and including the division) and to provide the center with objective information. To generalize combat experience, a department was created (since 1944 - department) for the use of war experience.

The People's Commissariats (defense and navy) became other working bodies of the Stavka.

The directorates of NCOs solved problems of an organizational and administrative nature, dealing with the development, construction and training of the Armed Forces, their provision, recruitment, equipping with the necessary technical means, and preparation for performing missions for combat missions. The People's Commissariat of the Navy led the fleet, reporting to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and coordinating work with the General Staff of the Red Army.

At the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in May 1942, local headquarters were also created to organize and manage the partisan struggle. To coordinate the actions of the fronts, the main commands of the strategic directions are created (North-Western, Western, North Caucasian and South-Western, abolished in 1942). For logistic support, the Logistics Directorate of the Red Army was created. The structure of command and control of combat arms was developed and improved, and the role and importance of staffs in achieving continuous command and control of troops increased many times over.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, the military leadership system was strictly centralized. The highest military and civil power was concentrated in the hands of a single body, a viable structure of command and control of the Armed Forces was formed from the Commander-in-Chief to the Headquarters and from it to the General Staff, People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy. The troops operated a system debugged over the years: commander - headquarters at all levels (up to and including the battalion). In many ways, the perfection of the existing organization, the talent of military leaders, the dedication and heroism of the command corps contributed to the victory of the Soviet people over the enemy.

After the end of the war, all emergency military command and control bodies were abolished: State Committee Defense, Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces of the USSR, created as a result of the merger in February 1946 of the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy (since March - the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR), became the single body for the leadership of the army, aviation and navy. The People's Commissariat also included the General Staff, which became its leading governing body.

In February 1950, the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR was again divided into the Military Ministry of the USSR and the Naval Ministry of the USSR. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was transformed into the General Staff of the Soviet Army (SA), at the same time, the Naval General Staff was created on its model. However, in March 1953, the Soviet government abandoned such a decentralization of the higher military administration by creating a single USSR Ministry of Defense. The General Staff of the Soviet Army in September 1955 was transformed into the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, which included the Naval General Staff.

At this time, the military command and control system of the Soviet state was finally formed and included the following main elements. The supreme leadership of the country's defense and the Armed Forces was carried out by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the highest bodies of state power - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The direct leadership of the USSR Armed Forces (except for the Border and Internal Troops) was carried out by the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by the Minister of Defense. The types of the Armed Forces were subordinate to the commander-in-chief, who was the deputy minister of defense.

The USSR Armed Forces were led by the Ministry of Defense through the General Staff, the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, the Logistics Headquarters, the Civil Defense Headquarters, and the main and central departments of the ministry.

Party political work was led by the Central Committee of the CPSU through the Main Political Directorate of the SA and Navy, which worked as a department of the Central Committee of the Party.

In the post-war period, the supreme body of military command played a leading role in equipping the Armed Forces with nuclear missiles, introducing modern types of conventional weapons, and creating and developing new types of armed forces and combat arms. Fundamental changes have taken place in the structure of the combat strength, armament and deployment of the Armed Forces and their groupings in various sectors, and in the organizational structure of their formations and formations. The combat potentials of the allied armies under the Warsaw Treaty Organization (OVD) and the level of their interaction with the Soviet groups of troops and border military districts were significantly increased. Ultimately, a military-strategic balance (parity) was achieved both in strategic nuclear forces and in conventional weapons, between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Behind all this was the hard daily work of the leaders and ordinary employees of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

At various times, the Ministry of Defense was led by talented, bright personalities who, by their example, responsible attitude to business, and brilliant organizational skills, raised not only the work of the military department itself, but also the country's defense capability as a whole, to a new level.

During this period, profound structural changes were carried out in the Armed Forces and other troops, their partial transfer to recruitment only by contract military personnel, with the creation of a training system for trained reservists, which made it possible in 2008 to reduce the term of conscription to one year .
The liquidation of framed units and formations and the formation of permanent readiness units on a contract basis were carried out.

Much attention was paid to the formation of a unified system for training military personnel and manning the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as the reorganization of the military-industrial complex, which ensures the production of modern weapons and military equipment in the required quantity for the defense needs of Russia and its allies.

In accordance with the tasks of ensuring military security, the operational functions of the Armed Forces and other law enforcement agencies were revised in order to eliminate their duplication and ensure more effective coordination of their activities.

Has been installed one system military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation in order to allow law enforcement agencies to make the most of the country's military infrastructure and avoid dispersal of forces.

The Ministry of Defense received the exclusive right to order military equipment and weapons, including for other law enforcement agencies, as well as leadership functions in relation to the logistics system of the power bloc.

A new silo- and mobile-based intercontinental missile Topol-M was put into service.

February 15, 2007 was appointed Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. His name is associated with the launch of a radical reform of the Russian Armed Forces, giving them a "new look". The military conflict with Georgia in August 2008 became the catalyst that accelerated the decision to reform. The experience of the participation of the Russian Armed Forces in the conflict revealed a lot of problems associated both with shortcomings in the command and control system and with outdated weapons, equipment and communications. The beginning of the reform was officially announced on October 14, 2008. The changes affected all the main elements of the Armed Forces.

Thus, instead of six military districts, four military districts and four joint strategic commands were formed, under whose subordination the main groupings of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms were transferred.

Reorganization and downsizing of the bodies of the central military administration was carried out with a significant reduction in the role of commands of branches of the Armed Forces and branches of service. The strength of the Armed Forces, including the number of officer positions, has been significantly reduced.

The system of military education has been reformed, which consists in the consolidation and transformation of 65 military educational institutions into ten systemic military universities. Military educational and scientific centers have been created that implement educational programs of various levels, profiles and specialties.

The Ground Forces were transferred to a brigade basis with the abolition of the divisional and regimental level and the transformation of all formations into permanent readiness forces.

The Air Force and Air Defense were reorganized with the abolition of armies, corps, divisions and aviation regiments and the transition to a system of air bases and aerospace defense brigades.

All support and maintenance systems for the Russian Armed Forces have been transferred to outsourcing (servicing by civilian organizations).

A rearmament program has been launched, which provides for equipping the Armed Forces with the latest models of weapons and military equipment, including military production.

Currently, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is a federal executive body that performs the functions of developing and implementing state policy, legal regulation in the field of defense, as well as other functions established by federal constitutional laws, federal laws, acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of Russia in this area. The activities of the Ministry of Defense are managed by the President of the Russian Federation.

The Ministry of Defense performs the tasks of developing and implementing state policy in the field of defense; legal regulation in the field of defense; legal regulation of the activities of the Armed Forces and federal executive bodies subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense; coordinating the activities of federal executive authorities and executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation on defense issues, coordinating the activities of troops, military formations and bodies for the performance of tasks in the field of defense, as well as coordinating the construction of troops and military formations; coordination and control of the activities of executive authorities subordinate to the Ministry of Defense; organizing the use of the Armed Forces in accordance with federal constitutional laws, federal laws and international treaties of the Russian Federation; maintaining the necessary readiness of the Armed Forces; implementation of measures for the construction of the Armed Forces; ensuring social protection of military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service and members of their families; development and implementation of state policy in the field of international military and military-technical cooperation.

The Ministry of Defense of Russia is the governing body of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. It consists of the General Staff, main and central departments and a number of other subdivisions.

The Ministry of Defense of Russia includes the main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy), the commands of the military branches of the Armed Forces ( Missile troops Strategic Purpose, Aerospace Defense Troops, Airborne Troops), Logistics Department of the Armed Forces, as well as other governing bodies.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the main body of operational control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, coordinating the activities and organizing the interaction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops in the performance of tasks in the field of defense. The General Staff comprehensively analyzes and assesses the emerging military-political situation, determines trends in the development of means of warfare, methods of their use, organizes the training of the Armed Forces and the implementation of the necessary measures to ensure their high combat readiness to repel any aggression, and exercises control during the conduct of hostilities.

The main structural subdivisions of the General Staff include: the Main Operational Directorate, the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate.

The main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces, the commands of the arms of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation develop and implement plans for the construction and use of the types (arms) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, plan and carry out operational and mobilization training of their troops (forces), their technical equipment, personnel training, provide command and control of troops (forces) in daily activities, develop the basing system and infrastructure.

The main and central departments of the Russian Ministry of Defense are designed to manage certain areas of work or individual services on the scale of the Armed Forces. These directorates report directly to the Minister of Defense or his deputies and work closely with the General Staff.

Over its 210-year history, the Ministry of Defense has repeatedly changed its name, but its purpose has always remained unchanged - ensuring the country's territorial integrity and independence, reliable protection of state interests.

The material was prepared by the Research Institute (Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

IMINOV VLADISLAV TAIROVICH, retired lieutenant general, candidate historical sciences, Professor.

At the turn of the 20th-21st centuries, the interest of the Russian public in the activities of the highest political, state and military bodies for the strategic leadership of the armed struggle of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War increased markedly. And this is no coincidence, since the system of government and the army created in that exceptionally difficult period for the USSR was at a fairly high level, it was harmonious and well balanced both vertically and horizontally, and most importantly, effective, capable of successfully and quickly solving problems. incredible complexity. It was one of the essential factors that ensured the crushing defeat of the aggressor and played an important role in achieving a common victory over fascist Germany and its allies.

A high assessment of the activities of the strategic leadership bodies and the system as a whole during the war years, especially in the second half, was given in their memoirs by such outstanding commanders as Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky , I.S. Konev, other prominent Soviet military leaders, as well as a number of foreign political and military figures, including those representing the opposing side. However, the very victorious outcome for the USSR of a war unprecedented in the history of mankind, despite the mistakes and miscalculations that took place in the course of its conduct, more than eloquently testifies to the superiority of the Soviet system of strategic leadership created during the war years over the German one, to the highest organizational and creative capabilities included into its composition of organs, maturity, professionalism, responsibility and outstanding abilities of the people who headed these organs, their “ordinary” employees.

At the same time, starting from the second half of the 1980s, and even at the present time, one often has to read and hear something directly opposite: in particular, the arguments of some domestic “researchers-new readers” of the history of the past war that everything is supposedly in in the course of its conduct it was “not so”, events in the state and on the Soviet-German front developed almost spontaneously, and the country, the peoples inhabiting it, defeated the formidable and insidious enemy not thanks to, but contrary to their leadership, due to an accidental combination of circumstances . Attempts were made, continuing, by the way, to this day, to prove that the Armed Forces of the USSR, both did not know how to fight, and did not learn in almost four years of military hard times, "paved the road to Berlin with corpses", that their Supreme High Command, and first of all the General the headquarters as its “think tank”, almost until the end of the war, was not up to the task assigned to it, inferior in many respects to similar bodies of the strategic leadership of Germany, was responsible for the heavy losses of the Red Army troops, etc.

For the sake of fairness, it must be noted at the same time that, of course, the fault that the war began in this way and not otherwise lies largely with the system of leadership bodies, primarily such as the General Staff, which failed to predict in advance the nature of and the scope of the impending war, and in this regard, it must be taken into account that their organizational structure and activities did not immediately begin to fully correspond to the scale of the unfolding armed struggle, the forms and methods of conducting military operations, especially at its beginning. The most expedient and effective methods, techniques and style of work of the highest military administrative bodies were developed, developed and improved gradually, as experience was gained in the course of the war, primarily in its first period.

And the point here, to a large extent, was that with the attack of Nazi Germany, the general system of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces that had developed in the USSR by the summer of 1941, which was acceptable mainly for peacetime, turned out to be of little use in war conditions. It turned out, first of all, that the country did not have a single body of state power endowed with emergency powers that could lead the war as a whole, and there was no High Command of the Armed Forces. Moreover, there was not even an approved regulation on their management in wartime. All this required an immediate reorganization of the structure and redistribution of the functions of the existing both military-political and military bodies of strategic leadership in the direction of its maximum centralization.

In order to concentrate all power in the country in one authorized body, on June 30, 1941, by a joint decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed. I.V. Stalin became its chairman. All decisions of the State Defense Committee as an emergency supreme authority had the force of martial law and were subject to strict implementation by all other government and public structures, citizens of the USSR. In terms of the conduct of hostilities, the GKO, based on general political goals, determined the military-political tasks of the Armed Forces, outlined the forces and means necessary to achieve them, established the number and terms of conscription of those liable for military service, the volume of production of weapons, military equipment and military equipment , allocated resources for new formations of military branches, the timing of their deliveries, etc.

On the second day of the war, June 23, 1941, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Headquarters of the High Command was formed. On July 10, 1941, in connection with the creation of three main commands of strategic directions - the North-Western, Western and South-Western - by the decision of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the High Command was renamed the Headquarters of the High Command, which was again headed by I.V. Stalin. On July 19, 1941, he was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8 - Supreme Commander. On the same day, the Headquarters was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the highest body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces. The range of tasks she solved was extremely wide: she planned and carried out measures to develop the army and navy, improve their organizational structure; determined the plans for military campaigns and operations, set tasks for the fronts and fleet forces, created appropriate groupings to solve them; organized interaction between the fronts and individual armies; she supervised the creation of strategic reserves, the material and technical support of the troops (forces), the partisan movement, etc. At the final stage of the war, the Headquarters coordinated the actions of the Red Army troops with the Allied troops.

The main working body of the Supreme Command Headquarters for the leadership of the Armed Forces was the General Staff of the Red Army. Along with the Headquarters and the General Staff, other military command and control bodies also played an important role in their leadership. Thus, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of the Red Army Troops (Glavuprform), established in July 1941, was engaged in the preparation of strategic reserves and replenishments for the army. The fulfillment of tasks related to the development of artillery, aviation, armored, engineering troops, communications troops, air defense, was in charge of the respective commanders and chiefs, their main and central headquarters. There was no special body for the leadership of the Ground Forces either in the prewar years or during the war. The People's Commissariat of the Navy led the development of fleets and flotillas.

In order to centralize the work of the logistics services, in August 1941, the post of chief of the Logistics of the Red Army was established with his subordination to the Headquarters (the Main Directorate of Logistics was created under the head of the Logistics). The general leadership of the partisan forces since May 1942 was carried out by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. It should be specially emphasized that all these military control bodies organized their work in accordance with the instructions of the General Staff.

One of the links in the general system of leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War were intermediate instances that functioned at first as the main commands of strategic directions, and from the spring of 1942 - as an institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at the fronts. Objectively, the creation of these links was caused by the desire to bring the leadership closer to the troops, to increase the efficiency of command and control of them and to ensure coordination of the actions of groups of fronts that were solving one strategic task. It is characteristic that the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in contrast to the high commands of the directions, was preserved until the end of 1944. Most of the largest operations in 1945 were carried out under the direct supervision of the Stavka.

Usually, representatives of the Stavka were sent to where, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the main tasks were solved. In the operations of 1943 and 1944, representatives of the Headquarters also carried out direct leadership of the fronts, which contributed to the successful implementation of its directives, as well as orders of the General Staff, helped the command of the fronts (armies) make rational operational decisions, and organized interaction between the formations on the spot. A.M. Vasilevsky, N.N. Voronov, G.K. Zhukov, A.A. Novikov, S.K. Timoshenko and others worked as representatives of the Stavka many times.

Before the war, the competence of the General Staff, which was the main working body of the People's Commissariat of Defense, included the solution of both operational and basic administrative tasks related to the composition, strength, structure, mobilization of the Armed Forces, their training, logistics, etc. By the middle In 1941, it consisted of 8 departments (operational, intelligence, organizational, mobilization, staffing and service of troops, military communications, logistics and supply, military topographic) and 4 departments (fortified areas, military history, personnel and general).

During the war, the structure of the General Staff was repeatedly reorganized and its functions changed. The main goal of these measures was to free the General Staff from solving tasks unusual for it and to concentrate efforts on the operational management of formations with a pronounced specialization of each department and department. It must be said that the General Staff did not immediately succeed in overcoming the biased attitude that had taken place in the pre-war period and some distrust of itself on the part of the country's top military-political leadership. It took a certain time and a huge effort of the entire staff of the General Staff before it managed to advance to the upper rung of the hierarchical ladder that belonged to it by definition, to the leading role in the system of ensuring the leadership of the Armed Forces, to turn into a competent, efficient and highly effective body, with the proposals of which the Headquarters is forced was to be considered.

To a large extent, the improvement of the activities of the General Staff of the Red Army was facilitated by GKO Resolution No. 330 of January 28, 1941, which, along with other issues, determined the organizational structure and tasks of the General Staff in wartime, as well as the place and role of its chief in the overall system of top military leadership. In particular, he was given the right to sign orders and directives of the Headquarters together with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief or to issue orders at his direction. As Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and a member of the Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff was authorized to unite and coordinate the activities of all structures of the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, to give a final conclusion on the compliance with the decisions of the Supreme High Command of their planned operational and organizational measures.

In order to free the General Staff from administrative tasks not related to operational activities, the organizational and mobilization directions, the departments of staffing and service of troops, military communications, rear and supply arrangements were withdrawn from its composition. The General Staff retained the operational, reconnaissance, military topographic, operational logistics and construction of fortified command and control areas, as well as the departments: encryption, military history, personnel and general. In addition, on February 11, 1942, for closer communication with the troops in the General Staff, on the rights of a department, a group of officers was formed - its representatives at the headquarters from the front to the division inclusive (in June 1943 this group was reorganized into a corps of officers - representatives of the General Staff with reporting to the chief of operations). The structure of the directorates themselves also underwent changes, especially the operational one, the leading body of the General Staff. Instead of the departments that were previously in charge of the corresponding military districts, directions were created in it for each front (group of fronts) consisting of the chief, his deputy and 5-10 officer-operators. Along with this, special departments (aviation, air defense, communications) continued to function in the administration, and, in addition, new ones were created - operational transportation, organizational accounting and reserves.

All of the above and other changes were then reflected in the “Regulations on the General Staff” approved on August 10, 1941 by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in which, in addition, the main directions for further improving the forms, methods and style of its work were determined. The main requirements for the activities of the General Staff were: high professionalism of the personnel, planning, efficiency, accurate calculation and comprehensive validity of the proposed decisions and measures.

The organizational restructuring and specification of the functional responsibilities of the General Staff allowed it to focus on solving mainly those issues that were directly related to the leadership of military operations. “As a result of the reorganization,” Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov noted in his memoirs, “the General Staff became a more efficient, operational body and was able to perform the tasks assigned to it much more efficiently.”

The tasks of the General Staff were diverse, complex and responsible. It was entrusted with: collecting, processing and evaluating information about the situation on the fronts and in the rear; on the basis of this, the development of proposals for the Headquarters of the Supreme Command regarding the plans for military campaigns and operations of groups of fronts (often front-line operations), their planning in accordance with the decisions taken by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief; development of orders, directives of the Headquarters and other operational documents, bringing them to the troops and control over execution, as well as over the development of operations in the fronts; creation of groupings of forces and means for carrying out operations, organization of interaction between associations and formations of military branches; organizing operational-strategic transportation, directing the activities of all types of intelligence, analyzing its data and informing members of the Headquarters, headquarters and troops; solution of air defense problems of important administrative-political centers and industrial regions of the country; organization and organization of the operational rear of the army in the field; management of the construction of fortified areas, the work of the military topographic service and the supply of maps to the army in the field; organizing an encryption service and providing covert command and control of troops (forces). The scope of activities of the General Staff also included: operational training of the command, headquarters, services and rear services; development of regulations, instructions, guidelines for staff service; publication of theater descriptions; collection and generalization of materials on the study of war experience and its implementation in combat practice, etc.

One of the responsible tasks of the General Staff in the final stages of the war was also the preparation of proposals, reports and materials on military issues discussed at government meetings and international conferences of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Through its structures, communication was carried out with the headquarters armed forces allies in order to coordinate efforts for the final defeat of the opposing enemy - fascist Germany.

During the war years, the General Staff acquired vast experience in operating under various conditions. As it accumulated under the influence of developments on the fronts, changes in the nature of the armed struggle, the qualifications of employees improved, the procedure, style and methods of work both as a whole of the General Staff and its individual structural units were improved. A significant role in this was played by Marshal of the Soviet Union BM Shaposhnikov, who headed the General Staff during the war (July 1941 - May 1942); Colonel General, from January 18, 1943 Army General, from February 16, 1943 Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky (May 1942 - February 1945); Army General A.I.Antonov (since February 1945), other senior officials. The results of this process increasingly had a positive effect on the course of the armed struggle.

In total, during the Great Patriotic War, the Armed Forces of the USSR conducted, as you know, eight campaigns, of which two - summer-autumn 1941 and 1942 - were defensive and six offensive, depending on what type of military operations was the main one in this military campaign. . At the same time, in the course of defensive campaigns, Soviet troops also carried out offensive operations in certain directions, as well as in the framework of most offensive campaigns, defense was used.

Gradually, in the course of the war, a certain, rather harmonious and effective procedure for planning military campaigns was developed.

The General Staff, based on the military-political goal and tasks of the armed struggle, which at each period of time were determined by politics (political leadership), and in accordance with the emerging strategic situation on the entire Soviet-German front, 2-3 months before the start of the campaign, developed proposals and made preliminary calculations for the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command regarding its general strategic plan, as well as the logistics of the troops, the preparation of the required number of strategic reserves and their use, and on many other issues. Prepared proposals with the necessary justifications were reported by the Chief of the General Staff at meetings at Headquarters with the participation of members of the GKO. At the same time, only plans for initial (initial) operations were developed in detail. The subsequent ones were outlined in general terms, but they, as a rule, were provided in advance with human and material resources, a certain part of which came during the preparation of the campaign, and a large part during it. Such operations were planned already in the course of hostilities, depending on the results of the initial operations. This was largely due to the fact that within the framework of military campaigns, the situation usually changed rapidly, the front line moved in one direction or another, the grouping of forces changed, new tasks that were not envisaged by the plan arose, and the methods of conducting military operations also changed. All this forced the General Staff to make serious adjustments to the ideas and plans of campaigns, to create additional groupings of forces and means for conducting new operations. That is why most campaigns in the last war were divided into periods.

Defensive campaigns occupied a special place in the course of the armed struggle. In them, the conduct of strategic defense by the Armed Forces of the USSR was not planned in advance, since the transition to it in both cases was forced. Under these conditions, the circumstances allowed the Headquarters to determine only the general goal and method of the troops' actions: in stubborn defensive battles, combined with private offensive operations in a number of areas and inflicting counterattacks, to exhaust, bleed the enemy, stop his advance and create conditions for a counteroffensive. To achieve this goal, it was practically impossible to outline any definite time and territory framework, since the strategic initiative was in the hands of the German command, and a large number of factors that were difficult to take into account influenced the course and results of defensive actions.

Nevertheless, the foregoing does not mean at all that the armed struggle in defensive campaigns was carried out spontaneously, without the directing and coordinating influence of the Supreme High Command on its course. In order to stop and eventually bleed the powerful strike groups of the Wehrmacht, the Headquarters, the General Staff had to revise many theoretical provisions and views, in particular, on the forms of warfare, develop and put into practice new ones during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941. So, on the basis of an analysis of defensive battles in the initial period of the war, the General Staff came to the conclusion that in the conditions of the large spatial scope of the armed struggle, its dynamism and tension, the use of a huge number of troops and the latest military equipment, a sharp increase in losses and a weakening as a result of this combat and numerical strength it is not enough to unite and combine the efforts of one front to solve problems in one or another strategic direction, and that defensive operations on each of them must be carried out by the forces and means of several (groups) interacting fronts with the broad involvement of long-range aviation, and in the coastal direction, the forces of the fleet.

With the start of such operations (somewhere in mid-July 1941), the scope of the Wehrmacht offensive began to gradually decrease, and the onslaught of its groups weakened, and the German command was forced to make certain adjustments to the originally developed plans. All this made it possible for the Soviet troops to delay the advance of the enemy, inflict significant losses on him, thereby preparing the necessary conditions for going on the counteroffensive. However, in order to create such conditions for the Headquarters, the General Staff had to carry out in the summer and autumn of 1941 in each strategic direction several consecutive defensive operations in depth. Their simultaneous organization, as well as the command and control of the Armed Forces in a situation of fierce battles, accompanied in most cases by a deep withdrawal of Soviet troops, demanded from the General Staff an enormous effort of strength, mind and will, the greatest efficiency and coherence in work. And it must be admitted that in the end he coped with these unparalleled problems in the past.

The nature of the planning of military operations in offensive campaigns was influenced by the various military-political goals pursued in them, specifically by the strategic situation that developed on the Soviet-German front, the different balance of forces and means in certain periods of the war, and other factors. Campaigns associated with the struggle to seize the strategic initiative (winter 1941/42 and 1942/43) began with a counteroffensive in decisive directions (Moscow - in early December 1941 and Stalingrad - in November 1942). Subsequently, as the results of the counteroffensive were revealed, the General Staff, in accordance with the decisions of the Headquarters, planned and organized new offensive operations, but already on a wider front and to a considerable depth (general offensive). At the same time, it was not possible to avoid major miscalculations, which is most significant for the second stage of the winter campaign of 1941/42.

In the future, with the growth of the economic capabilities of the country, the combat power of the Armed Forces, the accumulation of experience, the planning of offensive campaigns by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff becomes more and more skillful. It already clearly shows elements of deep foresight of the development of the situation, a persistent desire to impose its will on the enemy where it is beneficial to the Soviet side, not to give the enemy a respite after the defeats inflicted on him, and to concentrate the main efforts on solving the main tasks by delivering several simultaneous and successive blows.

All this took place already during the preparation and conduct of the winter campaign of 1942/43, the most important military-political events of which were the defeat German troops and their allies near Stalingrad, on the Upper and Middle Don, in the North Caucasus, breaking through the blockade of Leningrad and others, but the most vividly creative approach to solving urgent problems of armed struggle was demonstrated when planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. This campaign, on the whole offensive, began with a deliberate, comprehensively prepared defensive operation on two fronts in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, during which the Soviet troops repelled a powerful enemy offensive under the Citadel plan, not forced, as it was before, but deliberate, comprehensively prepared. and then, going over to the counteroffensive, which was also foreseen in advance by the plan of the Supreme High Command, they completed its defeat in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. Subsequently, the Red Army launched a general strategic offensive on the front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea.

In the campaigns of 1944 and 1945, the General Staff, relying on the experience gained, demonstrated the highest level of skill in solving the problems of planning a strategic offensive by sequentially (along the front and in depth) and simultaneously conducting a number of operations of groups of fronts, connected by a unity of intent and covering most of the and even the entire Soviet-German front. At the same time, the operational part of the campaign plans was worked out on maps. Other planning documents of the General Staff reflected all issues related to the provision of fronts with reserves, weapons, transport, materiel.

Before the start of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff created four strategic strike groups (in South Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus, in Belarus, the western regions of Ukraine and Moldova), which in turn, without significant temporary pauses, went on the offensive against the given Headquarters of the Supreme High Command directions, forcing the enemy to urgently transfer the available forces and means from one sector of the Soviet-German front to another.

In the same campaign, the General Staff and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command showed that they were able to successfully plan and carry out operations not only consistent along the front, but also in depth. Thus, during the offensive in the Balkans, Soviet troops for four months to a depth of 1100 km sequentially, one after another, with virtually no pauses, carried out the Iasi-Kishinev, Belgrade and Budapest (ended on February 13, 1945) offensive operations of front groups and the Debrecen front operation . At the same time, the planning and preparation of each subsequent of these operations was carried out during the previous one. With this method of conducting an offensive, the enemy did not have time to fully restore his front of defense in the strategic direction.

In the campaign of 1945 in Europe, the General Staff, fulfilling the task set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the Red Army, to complete the defeat of the armed forces of fascist Germany, planned a strategic offensive through simultaneous operations, which made it possible to pin down almost all enemy forces in combat operations, depriving him of the ability to maneuver them along the Soviet German front. This was facilitated both by the increased economic power of the USSR by the end of the war, the reduction in the length of the front line, and the significant overall superiority of the Soviet troops, as a result of which it became possible to create several powerful strike groups and almost simultaneously launch an offensive from the Baltic Sea to the Danube with the main attack on the Warsaw Berlin direction.

In preparing this campaign, its initial operations were planned in detail and in full, while the further tasks of the troops were determined, as before, only in general terms, and the planning of subsequent operations itself was carried out in the course of a strategic offensive, based on the specific situation that was developing.

The idea of ​​the initial stage of the campaign was brought to the attention of the commanders of the fronts, who prepared their proposals for the participation of subordinate troops in solving the assigned tasks and submitted them to the General Staff, where these considerations were considered, linked to each other and brought into line with the general plan of the campaign. .

On the basis of the decisions taken by the Headquarters, the General Staff, together with the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the headquarters of the military branches, the headquarters of the Logistics of the Red Army, developed for each front separately operational directives and directives for the rear, as well as various instructions related to the preparation of operations. In accordance with them, plans for front-line operations were developed in the fronts, which were then approved by the Headquarters.

In general, it must be said that during the years of the war the General Staff gradually developed a quite definite, quite effective, repeatedly tested and justified in practice system of planning operations, characterized by a more detailed study of all related issues than in campaigns. The General Staff and the Headquarters have accumulated a truly unique experience in this field of activity.

An important activity of the General Staff was to provide direct leadership of the formations of the armed forces during military operations, which was expressed primarily in the practical organization at a high professional level of the implementation of the decisions taken by the Headquarters, maintaining an advantageous balance of forces in the decisive sectors of the Soviet-German front, timely orientation of the front commanders and fleets for further actions, flexible response to all changes in the situation, in the creation and purposeful, rational use of strategic reserves, and much more.

The General Staff also successfully solved such problems as achieving close interaction between groupings of troops, formations and units of military branches; conducting effective reconnaissance, improving the command and control system at all levels, carrying out operational camouflage measures, etc. Constantly in his field of attention were also issues of improving the organizational and staffing structure of troops, organizing operational training of command and staffs to perform tasks in a specific situation on the theater of operations.

All this contributed to the superiority of the Red Army troops over the Wehrmacht. The events of the Great Patriotic War show that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, during its conduct, more than once demonstrated brilliant examples of skillful, flexible planning and leadership of armed struggle, especially during offensive operations against a strong and sophisticated enemy.