Military political science - military management: political science perspective. National Center for Defense Management of the Russian Federation Systems of centralized management of a military organization

Page 10 of 10

MILITARY MANAGEMENT: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The concept " military administration"(the power-administrative function of government bodies and officials to manage people engaged in military activities) has long been entrenched in scientific and political language. One of the first interpretations of it can be found in the Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences of the late 19th century. “Military management,” it says there, “embraces numerous and diverse branches, for the management of which corresponding special bodies are established...” It is also widely used in modern official documents, for example, in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Federal Laws Russian Federation“On defense”, “On martial law”, etc. True, in spirit, and often in the letter of the law, we are talking about the pair “bodies of state power and military command”, or in other words, about the institution of management of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies.

Often the subject of analysis of military command and control, if not exclusively, then predominantly, are issues of command and control. Perhaps the logically complete formula of this approach was proposed by A.G. Ermishyan. According to him, military control (ideally) is an integral part of military art, ensured by the creation and functioning of military open organizational, technical and automatic control systems of various purposes and nature. Ermishyan believes that military command and control bodies are the headquarters of military formations, as well as special bodies - direct executive units, groups or individual officials of these headquarters. But if this phrase is taken literally, then even the commander to whom the headquarters is subordinate is taken outside the framework of the military command and control system.

However, military management is a much broader category. Its full and comprehensive coverage has not yet received adequate coverage in the literature. Suffice it to say that there is no article devoted to this concept either in the two-volume Military Encyclopedic Dictionary published by the publishing house of the Great Russian Encyclopedia, or in the published Military Encyclopedia, seven of the eight volumes of which have already been published. Military management appears as a multifaceted, multifactorial and multifunctional phenomenon and, because of this, it is already an object of study in various branches of knowledge: philosophy and psychology, sociology and pedagogy, history and ergonomics, computer science and jurisprudence, etc. Military management problems are also developed within the framework of operations research, game theory, management, imageology, marketing and many other applied disciplines.

Political science also makes its contribution to the study of military management. It has its own perspective of analysis, in which the following areas can be distinguished: the influence of politics on the nature, content and methods of military control (political determination of military control); political aspects of military-administrative decisions (political content of military-administrative activities); the place and role of military control in the activities of various political actors (military policy imperatives); military command and control as a tool for implementing policy and a factor in increasing its effectiveness (military policy).

In order for the subsequent conversation to be substantive, it seems necessary to define the initial concepts.

Management is a type of human activity consisting of a conscious and purposeful influence on people, objects and - through them - on processes in the interests of giving them the desired parameters of functioning and development (character, direction, dynamics, etc.). The epithet “military” characterizes everything related to war and the army, related to war and the army. And military control is the power-administrative function of government bodies and officials (more broadly, political actors) to manage people engaged in military activities. It represents a special type of social regulation that ensures the creation, preservation and development of a military organization
(in the broad sense of the word), quantitatively and qualitatively corresponding to real threats, as well as maintaining the regime of its activities.

Military activities in the state are carried out by persons who are functionally and organizationally included in its military organization: a) personnel of armed and paramilitary state formations, including irregular ones; b) representatives of government and administrative bodies directly involved in issues of defense and security of the country; c) employees of enterprises and institutions who are fully or partially engaged in the creation of weapons, military equipment and the provision of them to the armed forces; d) the institutions and bodies themselves related to the military organization of the state.

In this sense, it is quite legitimate to distinguish between military-economic, military-financial, military-scientific, military-administrative, military-pedagogical and other types of military activities. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that they acquire a military character not because they are carried out by military people (one can give any number of examples of the inclusion of purely civilians and institutions in military activities), but because they are deployed in the interests of ensuring effective combat training in peacetime and the successful conduct of military operations or special operations in the event of a military conflict, which (combat training and military operations) constitute a system-forming element of military activity, all its types. It follows that, on the one hand, military activity is not limited to the conduct of armed struggle or, as one of the authors writes, “the totality of the organized use of forces and means to achieve set goals” and, on the other hand, not all military activities, in including the managerial level is of a military nature. It is characteristic that in the plan for holding a general meeting (military scientific conference) of the Academy of Military Sciences, among the main issues put forward for consideration and discussion was the following: “The increased share and importance of socio-political, economic, information, military-technical components in the organization and implementation of military control."

S. Huntington once posed the question: “Is there any special skill that is inherent in all military officers, but not characteristic of any of the civilian groups?” Answering it, he wrote: “The special talent of an officer is manifested in the leadership, management and control of an organized mass of people, whose main function is the use of violence.” A. Vladimirov formulated this idea even more harshly: “A military professional is a specialist in managing violence, and only an officer can be one.” It is difficult to agree with such categoricalness.

First, the most important decisions on the use of armed violence are made not by professional officers, but by politicians. Moreover, we are talking not only about strategic decisions and the country’s top military leadership. There are many situations when the actions of an operational and even tactical commander are regulated by political considerations.

Secondly, an officer is a member of the command staff of the armed forces, as they say, a career military man. But even a junior commander and even (in a people’s militia, partisan army, etc.) a non-military person can control the use of violence.

Thirdly, the ability, right and duty to make a decision on a battle, to manage a battle, does not exhaust the peculiarity of the officer, and more broadly, the military profession. There are areas of the military sphere that are not directly related to the use of violence (the creation and maintenance of defense infrastructure, medical care, pension service, educational work, public relations, etc.). By the way, Huntington understands this and therefore emphasizes that the activities of a military officer differ from other specialists existing in the armed forces. “Those men who, like doctors, do not possess the skill of 'violence control', but are members of the officer corps, are usually distinguished by special titles and insignia, and are not allowed into positions of command.” However, a military doctor, military engineer, military lawyer, educator, etc. not only differ from the commander (military officer), but also have something in common with him, differing from a civilian doctor, engineer, lawyer, etc. The purpose and nature of the armed forces determine those special duties, areas of responsibility, requirements and standards that must be observed by all military personnel.

Military activity, we repeat, is not limited to the use of military violence. Accordingly, military control extends to various spheres; it has aspects of economic and political, organizational and technological, legal and pedagogical, etc. character. The types and directions that are deployed in the military sphere are organically connected with it, but are not directly related to the conduct of military operations and are not military in the literal sense of the word. Semantically, these types are designated by complex words in which their main content is emphasized by a second word: military-economic, military-financial, military-administrative, etc. types of management. The same part of management, which is associated with the preparation and use of violence, is called “military” without the prefix: strategic, operational, combat, etc. management.

Accordingly, the objects of military control are the defense sphere and the military organization of the state and, consequently, the population, territory, economy, countries, the entire system of social relations and institutions, ordered in a certain way in the interests of ensuring military security. At the same time, management efforts are concentrated on the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies. Their immediate and direct targets are military personnel and citizens.

In military administration, both narrow departmental isolation, which covers up its conservatism with ambitious claims to exclusivity and infallibility, and the unprofessionalism of amateurs, always ready for dubious innovations, are inappropriate. The development and implementation of new solutions in this area should be the result of an equal dialogue between political and military leaders, the civilian and military communities. At the annual general meeting of the AVN, “the diversity and complexity of management issues and problems and the need in this regard for a combination of military and civilian specialists” were specifically emphasized. At the same time, however, one should not allow purely professional issues related to the internal competence of the military leadership to become the subject of political discussions.

Semantically, the epithet “military” in the phrase “military control” carries a double meaning. This is what they say about the management of society, which is carried out by military authorities and their officials or by military methods. This is always an “abnormal” situation, not typical for a democratic state. However, “abnormal” does not mean illegal. In certain cases, military control is legal in nature and has a legal basis. Such cases include, in particular:

a) the powers of the military authorities in the territory where military operations are ongoing or martial law has been declared. Thus, the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Martial Law” provides that the martial law regime is carried out by state authorities and military command bodies, and in the territory where military operations are ongoing, it can be assigned to military command bodies by decree of the President of the Russian Federation. At the same time, “citizens are obliged to comply with the requirements of ... military command and control bodies,” which expands the powers of the latter and the scope of their competence beyond the Armed Forces.

b) power and administrative measures of the military administration on mobilization work, civil defense, pre-conscription training of youth, etc. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in accordance with current legislation, coordinates the activities of federal executive authorities, executive authorities of constituent entities of the Russian Federation on defense issues, and military commissariats, for example, intended for organizing and conducting military mobilization and registration and conscription work and created by the Ministry of Defense as local military command and control bodies operate as directorates (departments) of the relevant bodies of state power and local government

c) the activities of occupation forces in the occupied territory. According to the Hague Convention of 1907, a territory is considered occupied when it is effectively under the control of enemy armed forces. International humanitarian law defines the rights and obligations of the occupying power in relation to the local population, administration, etc.

However, there are situations where military rule is established and acts in violation of democratic norms and procedures. Examples of this type include open military dictatorship; militarization (militarization) of government and administration, the economy and all public life; inclusion of the military in power structures, etc.

Secondly, military control is control military organization countries, people and structures engaged in military activities. B.M. Shaposhnikov, who knew firsthand the functions and capabilities of both the army and its headquarters, which he called the brain of the army, wrote: “The leadership of preparations for war on the political and economic fronts should be represented by a special body of the state, and not the army, and by no means the general staff .
In general, the war is prepared, conducted and held responsible for success or failure not by the General Staff, but by the government, which itself or through a special body (the Defense Council) cements preparations on various lines.” M.A. writes about the same thing today. Gareev: “Issues of military-political leadership of the armed struggle cannot be entrusted to the General Staff.”

Military control has several levels or types and forms.

1. Military policy. Its main meaning and purpose is to determine the possibility and limits of the use of military violence for political purposes, the organization and management of military construction, the development and implementation of Plans for the use of the Armed Forces, territorial and civil defense, the transfer of government bodies and the country's economy to work in wartime conditions, tasks on the accumulation of material assets of the state and mobilization reserves of the Russian Federation, and other defense programs. Military policy in the interests of creating and maintaining, and, if necessary, using military force, has a regulatory effect, and in certain cases, to a certain extent, subjugates the economy and administration, culture and science, education and health systems, organizing them in the interests of solving problems using military force . Its practical side covers decision-making, development of plans and programs for the development of the military sphere; creating and maintaining the necessary military power of the country; recruiting the Armed Forces and other troops, ensuring their combat and mobilization readiness; creation of operational-strategic groupings; establishing interaction between the Armed Forces, other troops, agencies and paramilitary forces; organization of production of weapons and military equipment; mobilization training of government and management bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations; creation and development of defense infrastructure; operational equipment of the territory; formation of moral and psychological readiness of citizens to defend the country; creation and accumulation of mobilization resources and reserves; implementation of civil and territorial defense measures; international military cooperation in the interests of national and international security; legal regulation of defense and all military-political activities; organization of civilian control over the military sphere, etc.

2. Troop control. This is the activity of commanders, commanders, headquarters and other command and control bodies to maintain constant combat readiness of troops (forces), prepare operations (combat actions) and lead troops (forces) in carrying out the tasks assigned to them. It includes: (a) continuous acquisition, collection, study, display, analysis and assessment of situational data; (b) making a decision on an operation (battle); (c) setting tasks for troops (forces); (d) planning an operation (battle); (e) organizing and maintaining interaction and all types of support; (e) management organization; (g) preparing subordinate command and control bodies and troops (forces) for combat operations; (h) organizing control and providing assistance to subordinate commanders (commanders), headquarters, troops (forces); (and) direct management of the actions of troops (forces) when they perform combat missions.

3. Management activities of military personnel. The right and duty to make a decision on a battle and to manage a battle does not exhaust the managerial functions of military personnel. They play a decisive role in the implementation of such tasks of the Armed Forces, formulated in the official publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as organizing and conducting information warfare; prevention and suppression of sabotage and terrorist acts; prevention of environmental disasters and other emergency situations, elimination of their consequences; involvement of military science in the development and examination of military-political decisions through the relevant committees of the State Duma and the Security Council; improving pension provision for military personnel; rehabilitation of disabled people military service; military-patriotic work among citizens, especially young people; participation in solving the problems of homeless and neglected children, etc. And the organization Everyday life troops requires a mass of management decisions that are not directly related to the use of armed violence or its enforcement.

4. Moral and psychological support for the activities of troops. The degree of psychological stability of personnel, their moral readiness to conduct combat operations is an integral part and a necessary condition for the combat effectiveness of troops, and in this sense, moral and psychological support is an integral element of command and control. At the same time, this area of ​​activity is broader than troop control. “The burden of war,” wrote military leader and theorist A.E. at the beginning of the last century. Snesarev, - only one part of the population, that is, the military, cannot bear, but the entire population must bear, and for this ... it must go through not only that stage of technical military education, which is inevitable in the event of war, it must understand and think through its spiritual side, understand its inevitability, importance, evaluate its national meaning, that is, comprehend the philosophy of war.” Almost the same thing is said in the official publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “High morale and moral strength of military personnel do not arise suddenly and immediately. They are the result of a conscious, purposeful and systematic influence on the worldview, intellect, morality and psyche of both the entire people and individual citizens. These qualities are not formed by a group of narrow specialists assigned specifically to educate people. They arise in the family, and then are patiently nurtured, encouraged and improved by many state institutions, public organizations, and the media.” The moral and psychological state of military personnel is influenced by the socio-political situation in the country and the activities of the media, public and religious associations, cultural and educational organizations, etc.

At all four levels, military control appears as an activity conditioned by the possibility of war and the existence of the army. But war and the army are essentially political phenomena, therefore military control cannot but have a political character, political content. Not everything in it fits into political parameters: there are many operational-strategic, organizational-technical, administrative, economic and other tasks of a non-political nature. However, it is characteristic that in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation the first of three sections is called “Military-Political Fundamentals”, and the already mentioned document of the Ministry of Defense emphasizes the need at the federal level to develop and implement a program of military-political education of Russian citizens and military-political education of military personnel, which would allow every citizen to clearly understand how wars arise, are fought, what they lead to and what they cost peoples and states.

What is within the political framework is studied by political science. Political science is the science of politics. This is an independent scientific and educational discipline, which has its own clearly defined subject of research and study. At the same time, this concept denotes a certain discourse, or paradigm for the analysis of phenomena and processes that reveal their two-way connection with politics. In the phrase “political science of military management,” the term political science does not mean science, but its inherent procedures and research results. In a more detailed and precise formula, it would be necessary to talk about the political components of military control. By the way, it is in this sense that the phrases “philosophy of military control”, “sociology of military control”, “psychology of military control”, “culture (culturology) of military control”, etc. are legitimately used. What is “political”? How is its nature determined and expressed, its specificity in comparison with non-political phenomena? How does the political reveal itself and manifest itself in the sphere of military governance?

There are several alternative approaches to interpreting the relationship between politics and management and, accordingly, to understanding the political content of management.

The first is characterized by separation and, in a sense, opposition between politics and management. Its supporters believe that politics is the business of a small group of people at the head of the state (the top), and management is a function of organizational structures that are outside politics. In Western political thought, this idea is expressed in the formula: “politics is done by politicians, and government is done by bureaucrats.” This means that management includes making decisions that are important for society, and politics includes ensuring their legitimacy. Meanwhile, as O. Shabrov writes, the official, through whose actions the state controls the destinies of people, does not function in an imaginary political vacuum. As an ordinary person, he is influenced by public opinion, his own political preferences, and material interests. As a functionary, he is involved in the implementation of the policy that is currently declared by the state. In relation to military management, the Russian military thinker A.M. wrote about this at the beginning of the last century. Volgin: “Changing laws is not the job of the army; its only business is to protect those laws and the political system that exist “today.” The army must protect them until the day when the legitimate government repeals the “today’s” law and replaces it with a new one, then the army will protect this new law or order.”

In the second approach, a special part is identified in the management system - political management, which is understood as the regulation of power relations, ultimately concentrating around issues of the structure and functioning of the state. In this sense, political management differs from other types of management, according to the principle that separates politics and economics, politics and law, politics and war, etc. According to the followers of this approach, it is characterized by specific political components and management methods: hearings, negotiations, statements, agreements, etc. They believe that political governance develops and implements decisions acceptable to all political actors, based on consensus or compromise. There is no place for coercion, coercion or restraint. This understanding of political management echoes the idea of ​​M. Weber, who saw in politics not the use of power, but only “the desire to participate in power or to influence the distribution of power”... It follows, for example, the recognition that pedagogical methods political problems are not solved, or the requirement to abandon administrative methods in politics.

There are no words: the organization of the life of society by political management is not limited to. Much of it is ensured by the structures and mechanisms of non-political governance. Coercion in relation to criminals, traffic control, determination of the organizational structure of a military unit or the daily routine in it, like so many other things, are in themselves devoid of political content. However, it has long been said that there is nothing that is not in one way or another related to politics, just as there is nothing that is completely included in politics. The line between political and non-political governance is not so permeable. Its vagueness is explained, firstly, by the fact that political power sometimes takes upon itself the regulation of issues that are not related to the system of power. Second, unregulated or inadequately regulated private issues may become a cause of public concern and require policy intervention.

Political management cannot abstract from the fact that the main thing in politics is the division of people into opposing groups in their attitude to power, its formation, organization, and administration. No management decision can affect different groups of the population equally. And it is not at all by chance that the state, in its internal policy, relies not least on the law and coercive bodies, and externally, it ensures sovereignty and territorial supremacy, including the ability to protect them by military means. At the same time, any purely economic, purely administrative, purely environmental, etc., and in this case purely military management decision has one or another political content. A problem and its solution are of a political nature if it: (1) concerns the issue of state power; (2) affects the interests and is within the scope of attention of the general public; (3) has a legal dimension and requires legal determination and decision; (4) public power, its structures and individuals recognize the right to solve this problem or the masses demand such a solution from them; (5) citizens express their attitude towards it through traditional mechanisms of political participation; (6) becomes the object (subject) of rivalry and struggle for power of different political groups.

The above fully applies to military control. In the military command and control system, policy and strategy, operational and administrative functions are closely interconnected, although they have relative independence. At the very least, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security states that each signatory State will ensure and maintain at all times effective direction and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by its constitutionally established authorities with democratic legitimacy, and to create levers to ensure that such bodies fulfill their constitutional and legal responsibilities.

The political aspect of military control is as follows.

Firstly, the content and nature of military command, its directions and scale, like many other parameters, are “set” by politics. It is this that determines the purpose of the army, its functions and tasks, the procedure and rules for its use, including in cases not related to ensuring military security. The decision to use force and, if made, the timing of its use lies within the purview of political leaders. Military control serves to implement the decisions they make. Its scope includes creating the framework within which such decisions can be made, preparing options, making contingency plans, and ensuring the highest degree of effectiveness of the military organization and the armed forces at its core. At the same time, political guidelines determine not only the goals of military control, but also its principles, specific tasks, methods, etc.

It is clear that the capabilities and limits of military control differ significantly in conditions when policy is focused on subordinating the entire life of the country to the task of creating and providing an army (“priority in meeting the needs of defense”, “guns instead of butter”) and when it seeks to solve socio-economic problems problems of society due to the curtailment of the state’s defense efforts (“the residual principle of providing the defense sector”, “butter instead of guns”). Of course, between these extremes there is a so-called golden mean. In the Russian Federation, for example, “development and military planning are now based on the geopolitical needs of the Russian Federation and the principle of defense sufficiency, and not on the actual potential.” The change in the named principles of military development, the transition from one to another is determined not by the maturity of the armed forces, not by the own considerations of the military command, but by the political position and decisions of the state authorities.

The subordination of military control to political control in its most open and hypertrophied form is manifested in periods of social upheaval and political transformation, when direct control over military leaders by the authorities is introduced. This control can be exercised by commissars, as was the case during the civil war in France and Russia, by political agencies operating in the Soviet army, and by other institutions. In a stable, consolidated and democratic society there is no need for such control. However, even in it the army cannot and is not a self-sufficient entity. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security establishes that each participating State will at all times ensure and maintain effective direction and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities with democratic legitimacy, clearly defined functions and tasks of such forces and create levers to ensure that such authorities fulfill their constitutional and legal responsibilities, and will not tolerate or support the existence of forces not accountable to or under the control of their constitutionally constituted authorities. It views democratic political control of military and paramilitary forces, internal security forces, and intelligence services and police as an indispensable element of stability and security.

However, civilian control cannot be considered as a kind of counterbalance to military control, much less be an alternative to it. Meanwhile, in our country, attempts at such absolutization are taking place. Thus, in the State Duma of the last convocation, the bill “On civilian control and management of military organizations and activities” was discussed. Its name completely inappropriately combines control and management. After all, such a formulation, in essence, takes military professionals beyond the framework of the development, adoption and implementation of military and military-political decisions. It is quite natural that civil control, so understood, to put it mildly, does not meet with support from those who understand the meaning of unity of command, the importance of state secrets, the peculiarities of army operational and administrative activities, etc. Quite rightly, the report of the Ministry of Defense emphasizes that the effectiveness of civilian control over the military sphere depends on the presence of solid military knowledge among the subjects of control, without which even well-intentioned creativity in a given matter will be subject to superficial or distorted ideas and judgments about the state of affairs in the army, and may take ugly forms or will fall under the influence of pacifist myths about the “original sin” of all military personnel in general.

Secondly, as a specific type of activity, military control presupposes and includes a realistic assessment of the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in the world and possible trends in its development, understanding the related place of the armed forces in the life of society, the domestic and foreign policies of the state. It is deployed with an orientation toward the outside world: based on existing peaceful conditions, it takes into account all possible, that is, theoretically permissible options for the outbreak of wars and armed conflicts and the corresponding requirements for the army. It has long been said: the behavior of an army that does not strive to master all the means, all the methods of struggle that the enemy has or may have is unreasonable or even criminal. An effective military command is one that takes into account trends in the development of military affairs in the world, adequately responds to the military efforts of other states and guarantees the military security of the country. At the same time, in conditions when the limited capabilities of the state do not allow it to achieve the required level of its defense capability, it is necessary to look for non-standard solutions that can ensure the military security of the country, be it the creation of a nuclear deterrent potential, the organization of collective self-defense, or relying on peace as a reward for curtailing any there was no military effort of its own. But both, and the other, and the third relate to the sphere of politics.

Thirdly, military construction, although relatively independent, is an integral part of the state’s defense efforts and, as such, cannot be a self-sufficient process. It is carried out on the basis and taking into account the demographic, economic, scientific, technical and other capabilities of the country. The creation and maintenance of military power involves all aspects of all areas of nation-building. Because of this, on the one hand, its content is decisively influenced by the nature of the political regime established in the country, the history and culture of the people, the level of institutional and socio-economic development of society, etc. The named factors in each state have specific content and forms, which determines variety of approaches to security problems. On the other hand, various bodies of state power and local government. In the Russian Federation, their functions and powers in this area are defined in the laws “On Defense”, “On Martial Law”, the Concept of National Security and other documents. As for military leaders directly, they are appointed to the position by political power and must be loyal to it. This is not about personal loyalty, but about loyalty to the regime. In the United States, Congress formally approves every appointment and promotion of officers. In our country, according to the Constitution, the President appoints and dismisses the high command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Fourthly, military administration is conducted on a strictly legitimate and legal basis; it is built in accordance with and through the law, which has a special branch - military law. Military practice cannot be discretionary. States that are signatories to the above-mentioned Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security are committed to ensuring that armed forces leadership complies with national and international laws and is aware of the possibility of individual liability under those laws for the unlawful exercise of such powers. Orders that are contrary to national law and international law must not be issued. At the same time, the responsibility of superiors in no way relieves subordinates from their own individual responsibility. At the same time, the political and military leadership must ensure public consent on measures taken in the military field. Such agreement is achieved by the validity of the measures themselves, as well as explanatory work about their necessity and content.

Fifthly, management activities are public in nature. The Armed Forces are, first of all, people and they are controlled by people and have as their object a mass of military personnel. The military body does not depersonalize military personnel. Each of them in their activities is guided by certain personal interests, guided by consciousness and feelings, adheres to moral standards, and in one way or another complies with legal requirements. All this inevitably leaves an imprint on the motivation of behavior and the very behavior of people, their attitude towards military duty and thereby on the appearance and capabilities of the armed forces.

That is why information and ideological support is an integral and important part of military development and management. “The main provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation” emphasize the need to implement a set of government measures to increase the prestige of military service; creating and improving the system of military-patriotic education and pre-conscription training; formation of moral and psychological readiness of citizens to defend the Fatherland; creating and improving the education system for military personnel of the Armed Forces and other troops. The effectiveness of military development is largely determined by the value orientations and attitudes of people joining the military system. “The first need of the army,” wrote Russian general R.A. more than a hundred years ago. Fadeev, the military have a high opinion of their rank, which finds sympathetic response in society. If a society is fully aware of itself as a nation, then (in the state of the world that still continues) it should highly value its army, in which national power is exercised; to value the army means to value the people who compose it.” That is why one of the important tasks of military management activities is to ensure the development and introduction of a positive idea of ​​the army into the public consciousness of the country.

Military theory and practice are not self-sufficient quantities. Their content, character, and forms reflect in a certain way the character of the era, the level of development of military affairs, sociocultural factors, historical traditions and national characteristics of peoples, the political goals of states, etc. Accordingly, military control is not a given value once and for all.

It can be based on different ideological foundations (for example, secular or religious), philosophical directions and schools (materialistic or idealistic, behaviorist or existentialist), military-political attitudes and priorities (here the extremes are militarism(a set of economic, political, ideological means aimed at preparing for war) and pacifism(unconditional condemnation of any war, renunciation of war), as well as aggressive, militaristic, aggressive, defensive, hegemonic, expansionist, pacifist and other prerequisites, etc.

However, in any case, we are talking about a sum of rules that are by no means arbitrary, but constitute an organic integrity, the mandatory adherence to which expands the possibilities for anticipating, comprehending and resolving constantly arising problems in military development.

The subordination of all forces and assets to a single command does not depend on the name of the command authority in the theater of military operations (TVD). For a scientifically based solution to this issue, it is advisable to take into account Firstly, positive and negative aspects from past experience, and Secondly, - and this is the main thing - to clearly define what defense tasks and under what conditions of armed struggle a new system of military command and control will be created.

SOME LESSONS FROM PAST EXPERIENCE

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. (in the Franco-Prussian, Russian-Turkish, Russian-Japanese wars) several separate armies, united by command in the theater of operations, operated on the battlefields. With the increasing scope of armed struggle during the First World War, when 8-10 armies were operating on the line of Russian-German confrontation on both sides, the need arose to create front-line commands (army groups), which included 3-4 armies. In the Russian army - the Northern, Western and Southwestern fronts, the management of the fronts was carried out by the Supreme Command Headquarters through the field headquarters.

In World War II the scope of the armed struggle increased even more and on the Soviet side in the active army at different periods it was necessary to create up to 10-15 front-line commands (as operational-strategic bodies), which included 5-9 combined arms armies, 40-70 rifle divisions, 1-3 tank armies, 1-2 air armies with a total number of up to 800 thousand people.

At the same time, it was necessary to manage several fleets, individual air force formations, air defense forces, large formations of the Supreme High Command reserve and other troops. All this complicated and complicated the operational management of the Armed Forces. In addition, before the start of the war, the organization of strategic management of the Armed Forces itself was not sufficiently thought out.

It was suggested that, as in the period Civil War, the head of state will head the country's Defense Council (GKO), and the main military command will be headed by the People's Commissar of Defense. But since he could not make any decisions without Stalin’s knowledge and this slowed down the management process, the latter became the head of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The management of branches, branches of the Armed Forces, logistics, technical and other services remained very humiliated and fragmented.

In this regard, the current situation required increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of command and control of the Armed Forces in two directions.

Firstly, emphasis was placed on increasing the role of the General Staff as the main (and not “working”) body of strategic management of the Armed Forces, freeing it from some secondary functions of recruiting and supplying troops (forces). The official position and status were increased, the rights and functional responsibilities of the commands of the armed forces, branches of the armed forces and, above all, the Air Force, artillery, armored forces, communications, and engineering troops were expanded, and a centralized rear of the Armed Forces was created. These measures have fully justified themselves.

Secondly, in order to improve control and coordination of the actions of the fronts, on July 10, 1941, a decision was made to create high commands in strategic directions.

In the first, most difficult period of the war, they brought some benefit, but did not fully justify themselves, and in September 1942 they were abolished. First of all, because they could not be turned into a regular governing body with the functions of planning operations and setting tasks for the fronts assigned to them. The appearance of such an intermediate link between Headquarters and the fronts would sharply (by 2-3 days) reduce the efficiency of troop control.

All strategic operations were planned by the General Staff and operational directives were issued on behalf of Headquarters. In addition, not having at their disposal any directly subordinate forces and means, they could not significantly influence the course of operations.

At the same time, During the war, for the first time, such a new form of strategic action as a front group operation arose, where the efforts of several fronts, fleets, air armies and air defense formations were combined to achieve certain strategic goals. To coordinate the efforts of the fronts and other formations in such operations, it was necessary to introduce the institution of representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters. Most often this role was played by G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, N.N. Voronov, S.K. Timoshenko and others.

Major General M. Vildanov.
Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences;
Colonel V. Satarov, Candidate of Military Sciences

The US strategic forces (SS) are divided into offensive and defensive based on their purpose and the nature of the tasks they perform. The Strategic Offensive Force (SAF) consists of three components: a land-based strategic missile force, a strategic air force, and a sea-based strategic missile force. The Strategic Defense Forces (SDF) include three components: forces and means of warning about a nuclear missile strike (NSYAU), space control (SCP) and missile defense (ABM).
Since 2003, the US military leadership has been implementing a complex of operational, organizational and technical measures

to transform the Cold War nuclear triad into a new strategic triad, which represents a single strategic offensive-defensive complex1. It includes three components connected by a unified system of combat command and control (SBU), reconnaissance and operational planning: strategic offensive forces, strategic defensive forces, enterprises and organizations of the military-industrial complex. Particular hopes are placed on the creation of this complex, since it is believed that it will provide a significant increase in the combat capabilities of nuclear and conventional forces, including advanced weapon systems based on information technology.

The formation of a new strategic triad involves improving the system of operational and administrative control of strategic forces with further delimitation of the tasks and functions of military command and control bodies2.
Operational management of the SS involves; operational planning; organization of combat duty; maintaining interaction with the branches of the Armed Forces and joint commands (UC);
preparation and conduct of strategic exercises. Operational control is exercised by the US President through the Secretary of Defense and the commander of the Joint Strategic Command (USC) of the country's Armed Forces. The Chairman of the KNS is the chief military adviser to the President, the head of the Union of Security Forces and the Minister of Defense.

In accordance with the “Unified Command Plan of the US Armed Forces” approved by the President of the United States, the USC does not have its own area of ​​​​responsibility and solves problems both on a global scale and in the interests of other OCs. The commander of the USC is given significant administrative, coordinating and control functions in solving operational and strategic tasks. He is responsible for planning, integrating and coordinating intelligence activities in the interests of supporting strategic and global operations, organizing missile defense; planning and conducting space operations; performing the functions of the governing body for the integration and coordination of the Ministry of Defense's activities to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; preparation of proposals for decision-making on the transfer of strategic forces from peacetime to wartime; notifying government and military authorities about the threat of an enemy nuclear missile strike; timely delivery of orders and instructions for the combat use of the SS. The commander of the USC has the right to report to the President of the United States on the status, problematic issues of operational planning and control of the combat use of strategic forces, compliance with the safety requirements for the maintenance of nuclear weapons located in the duty forces, proposals for the development and construction of the SS, and improving interaction with military command and control bodies.

The basis of operational management of strategic forces is operational planning3. At the same time, the chairman of the KNS organizes the development of documents on the concept of the combat use of the SS, bringing the initial data for planning to the USC, approves the composition of the forces and assets of the SS components involved in combat duty, establishes the procedure for the development, coordination and approval of the operational plan (OPLAN) and other operational documents . Government organizations at a high level are involved in the development of OPLAN. The president of the country, the National Security Council, and the Ministry of Defense participate in the process of planning the combat use of the SS. The Commander-in-Chief and the headquarters of the USC US Armed Forces, the Commander and headquarters of the USC, with the participation of the joint commands, organizes the development of other planning documents related to the preparation and conduct of nuclear operations in theaters. At the same time, OK headquarters submit proposals on the list of targets in the area of ​​responsibility, the required number of nuclear weapons, forms and methods of their combat use, the combat capabilities of groupings of troops (forces), necessary parameters tactical and technical characteristics of weapons, and also develop their operational documents.

In accordance with the requirements of the “Global Strike” concept, the commander and headquarters of the USC organize planning for preventive strikes against the most important (at the moment) enemy targets. In the event of a sudden change in the military-political situation in the world (region), detection of important stationary and mobile enemy targets by the USC headquarters using automated system Data preparation is carried out for adaptive planning of the combat use of weapons and their operational retargeting.

An important area of ​​activity of the USC command in the operational control system is the organization of combat duty of SS4 components. In peacetime conditions, the operational subordination of the USC includes forces and assets on combat duty (ICBMs, SSBNs, SKKP, SPRYAU and missile defense systems). During a period of increasing military threat or with the transfer of strategic forces from peacetime to wartime, full strength SNS and SOS groups, as well as support forces and means (strategic reconnaissance and refueling aircraft, CPSU and weather support aircraft) are transferred to the operational subordination of the USC. At the same time, the commander of the USC has the right to conduct comprehensive training of the forces on duty and monitor their readiness. At the same time, he is not authorized to use the assigned forces and means for other purposes, to change their organizational structure, the initial state of the personnel of the duty forces and weapons, or to reassign the leadership.

As part of improving the operational management of the SS, a set of measures is being carried out to optimize the organizational and staffing structure, aimed at increasing the efficiency of the functioning of the USC. Thus, it was reformed in the interests of solving various problems: planning and launching SNS strikes against targets anywhere in the world; organization of missile defense; planning and conducting global information operations; implementation of organizational and technical measures to ensure the functioning of all types of intelligence in the interests of the SS. New functional commands were created: global strikes and integration; PRO; intelligence operations; space operations; combat operations in information networks. In addition, the USC includes: a joint information operations command, a joint computer network protection center, a global investment and strategy center, and a center for combating threats of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction.

The main tasks of the functional commands are defined as: collection, analysis, assessment of data on the situation and preparation of proposals to the US military-political leadership for decision-making; planning and managing the combat use of subordinate forces and assets, monitoring their implementation of assigned tasks. In order to practice management tasks and harmonize functional commands, under the leadership of the USC commander, command post exercises and training, command post military games (command staff war games) and other operational training events are held annually.

In the structure of the operational command and control of the SS, a key place is occupied by the combat command and control system, which includes the subsystems of the combat command and control of the SNS and SOS and is currently in the stage of reform. Further development of the SBU is provided within the framework of the strategic concept of combat control “Conducting combat operations based on a single information and communication space” (Network - Centric Warfare) and the program for the formation of a global information and control network - GIUS (Global Information Grid, which is intended for network integration into a single complex all reconnaissance systems, command and control devices and weapons, regardless of their type.Within the framework of the USC, it is planned to deploy the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) system of combat command, communications, computer technology, reconnaissance and surveillance.

Administrative control of strategic forces is carried out along the management vertical of the head of the military department through the apparatus and central departments of the Ministry of Defense, the ministries of the branches of the Armed Forces. It covers the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe development and implementation of plans for the construction and development of the SS; modernization, formation of orders and supplies of weapons and military equipment; organizing their operation; planning and conducting R&D on promising types of weapons and military equipment; formation and execution of the military budget, as it relates to strategic forces; staffing command and control bodies and troops with personnel; organizing the implementation of treaty obligations in the field of limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms and the preparation of a new START Treaty; comprehensive logistics and logistics support for the SS.

As part of the administrative management of strategic forces, the ministries of the armed forces are responsible for the state of combat readiness of forces and assets. They organize combat and mobilization training of command and control bodies and troops, maintaining weapons and military equipment in readiness for combat use; financing and implementation of measures for logistics and logistics support for combat and daily activities of units and subunits. In addition, these departments carry out work on staffing the duty forces, selecting, training and appointing leadership, seconding their representatives to the USC headquarters, and are also called upon to carry out directives and instructions emanating from the USC headquarters, monitor the technical readiness of units and subunits, allocated to the USC.

According to the calculations of American experts, the state of the SS administrative management ensures stable financing and implementation of programs for the modernization of existing and development of promising types of strategic offensive and defensive weapons. This is confirmed by the effectiveness of work to improve the tactical and technical characteristics and extend the operational life of the Minuteman-3 ICBM, SBA aircraft, Ohio-class SSBNs and the planned purchases of Trident-2 SLBMs. The US military leadership uses a flexible and pragmatic approach in implementing treaty obligations in the field of reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons. This made it possible to create a significant returnable nuclear potential, ensuring a rapid increase in the combat capabilities of the SNA.

According to foreign experts, measures taken to improve the system of operational and administrative management of the SS ensure an increase in the combat readiness of strategic offensive and defensive forces. The strength is the presence of an extensive network of stationary protected reserve control posts and mobile ground command posts, ensuring stable control of the SS in any situation. A significant scientific and technical basis has been created and maintained for the modernization of the main elements of the SBU infrastructure.

At the same time, according to foreign military experts, it was not possible to achieve a clear distinction between the tasks and functions of operational and administrative management. The issues of interaction during the acceptance and transfer of SS components to the operational subordination of the USC have not been fully worked out. There is insufficient survivability of the ground infrastructure of the SBU strategic forces, as well as their weak physical security.

The creation of a new triad assumes the following: further development of the system of operational and administrative management of the SS; improvement of forms and methods of combat use of SS components; implementation of measures for non-nuclear deterrence of potential adversaries; the adoption of new aerospace attack weapons by the strategic offensive forces; building up the forces and means of the US global missile defense system.

It is planned to develop and implement a unified system for planning combat use, organizing operational, combat and mobilization training, and operating weapons and military equipment of SS components. American military experts believe that the creation of a new strategic triad will require the development of a unified operational plan reflecting the integrated use of SNS, SOS and space systems. The possibility of creating a unified system for planning and conducting R&D, placing orders and supplying weapons and military equipment is being explored. The prospects for further optimization of the organizational and staffing structure of the USC and other military command and control bodies are being considered.

Thus, the composition and content of activities carried out by the US military-political leadership to further improve the systems of operational and administrative control of strategic forces indicate an increase in their role and place in ensuring the national security of the United States and its allies.

1 For more details, see Air Force Doctrine Document 2-12" Nuclear Operations / United States Air Force. 7 May 2009.

2 For more details, see: Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United Stales /Joint Chiefs of Staff 14 May 2007.

Foreign military review. - 2010.- No. 1.- P. 15-20

The problem of state management of the military sphere has always been relevant for our Fatherland, and its solution has been one of the highest priorities throughout the history of the Russian state.

Military control system of the Russian state

Long before education Old Russian state The Slavs developed a form of government in the form of a national assembly - a meeting, at which a military leader was elected, the directions and routes of campaigns, the number and composition of the army were determined.

With the development of feudal relations, tribal nobility emerged, uniting around princes - military leaders with hereditary power. The first Old Russian state was headed by a prince who relied on a squad, which in Rus' was not only a military force, but also took an active part in governing the country. Under the princes, “councils” were created to resolve military issues. Important place in the state hierarchy were occupied by governors - leaders of princely regiments in wartime and governors of the prince in the cities under his control in peacetime.

During the unification of Russian lands around Moscow, the military organization of the Moscow principality was also improved.

A fairly coherent system of military control developed during the reforms of Ivan IV the Terrible. The general leadership of all the armed forces of the state was carried out by the tsar, relying on the Boyar Duma. Direct management of the construction and training of the armed forces was concentrated in the orders (Streletsky, Oruzheyny, Bronny, Pushkarsky, Yamsky, etc.). Since 1535, the highest body of military administration was the Rank Order - the founder of the Military Ministry created in the future. He was in charge of all the military men of the state, kept records of the local army, distributed it among the regiments, carried out inspections and collection of troops,, at the direction of the tsar, appointed the chief commander and commander of the regiments, and brought to them the plan of military action.

With education in the 17th century. The regiments of the “new system” also saw changes in the system of higher military administration. A military-territorial system appeared, and with it the corresponding governing bodies - ranks.

Beginning of the 18th century in Russia was marked by large-scale reforms. The completion of the transformation of the standing army into a regular army required the creation of a unified centralized military command system. 12 boards were created, including the Military and Admiralty boards. The Military Collegium dealt with all military affairs of the state, determined the staffing of regiments, kept records of command personnel and nominated officer ranks for assignment. Naval affairs were managed by the Admiralty Board. It was these military command and control bodies that became the prototype of the War Ministry. The closest ally of Peter I, Field Marshal General A.D., was appointed the first president of the Military Collegium. Menshikov. The Admiralty Collegium was headed by another associate of the Tsar - Admiral General F.M. Apraksin.

Thanks to the activity of Peter I and constant monitoring of the work of the boards in the early years, they were quite effective. But after his death, the collegiums began to turn into bureaucratic authorities, often slowing down the adoption of necessary military-administrative decisions. The presidents of the colleges gradually lost power, and new governing bodies (councils, committees, etc.) began to emerge at the court.

Insufficient efficiency in resolving issues of managing the armed forces led to the creation, with the accession to the throne of Catherine II in 1762, of a special military commission with the aim of revising all existing troop levels, transforming military institutions and improving the organizational foundations of the Russian army. In 1763, at the proposal of this commission, the General Staff was established, the leadership of which was headed by the vice-president of the Military Collegium, Chief General Count Z.G. Chernyshev. According to the Regulations of 1772, presented to the Empress by Major General F.V. Baur, the General Staff was entrusted with the tasks of preparing data for the combat activities of troops, studying the terrain, organizing the movement and deployment of troops, drawing up topographic maps for military needs, and a military-historical journal of military operations. In 1774, the General Staff was renamed the Department of the General Staff, and in 1796, by decree of Paul I, it was abolished. Instead, the Retinue of His Imperial Majesty is created in the quartermaster department, subordinate directly to the tsar.

Russia entered the 19th century as one of the most powerful and influential states in Europe. IN to a large extent This was facilitated by a well-functioning military organization. At the same time, the numerical growth of the Russian armed forces and the increasing complexity of the organization of troops required more flexible and efficient management of them. During the reform of the public administration system on September 8 (20), 1802, 8 ministries were created in Russia, including the Ministry of Military Ground Forces (since 1808 - the Ministry of War). It united under its leadership all branches of military administration. The first minister of the military ground forces of Russia was an infantry general who reported personally to Emperor Alexander I.

Sergei Kuzmich Vyazmitinov was not only a military leader, but also a political figure on a national scale. After resigning, he was a member of the State Council, Minister of Police, governor of St. Petersburg, and then headed the Committee of Ministers.

The Military Collegium continued to be the executive body of the War Ministry. In 1812, it was finally abolished, and a Council, general and chancellery, and 7 departments (inspectorate, artillery, engineering, provisions, medical, commissar, audit) were established under the ministry. The Military Scientific Committee and the Military Topographical Depot were also created within the ministry.

In 1802, along with the Ministry of Military Ground Forces, the Ministry of Naval Forces was established (since 1815 - the Naval Ministry).

The creation of the Military and Naval Ministries was the most important milestone event in the history of reforming the country's central military command system. The most trained, experienced people who had proven themselves in military service were appointed to key positions in the Military and Naval Ministries. They made a significant contribution to the creation of the state's advanced military organization at that time, which proved its strength during the Patriotic War of 1812. The defeat of Napoleonic army predetermined Russia's leading role in Europe for half a century.

In December 1815, the administration of the military department was divided into two parts. All issues of troop control came under the jurisdiction of the chief of the newly created General Staff, and the Minister of War, who headed the War Ministry, supervised economic activities and, unlike the chief of the General Staff, did not have the right to directly report to the emperor. The “bifurcation” of the central military command system caused considerable confusion and made it difficult to resolve many issues regarding the leadership of the armed forces. The main headquarters of His Imperial Majesty as such in its previous form was abolished only in 1832 (the name was retained), and soon became part of the War Ministry and received new functions and organizational structure. The unity of the highest military administration was restored, and it was concentrated in the hands of the Minister of War (in 1832 he became the cavalry general and adjutant general the Count, who had been its manager since 1827).

Largely thanks to the efforts of A.I. Chernyshev, flint weapons were replaced by strike weapons in the army, artillery pieces were improved, and mountain artillery was created. Work was carried out on a military-statistical description of the provinces, and 8 cadet corps were founded. While still in military service, cavalry general and adjutant general Count A.I. Chernyshev is appointed chairman of the State Council.

By the middle of the 19th century. The constantly increasing extreme centralization of military command, strict regulation of the activities of its lower levels, and the numerical growth of the administrative apparatus significantly complicated the system of military command and control, which no longer met the requirements of the time. The problems and shortcomings that existed in the Russian army were revealed with particular severity during the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853-1856. The defeat in the Crimean War put forward the modernization of the army as a priority task. The initiator and organizer of urgently needed reforms in the military field was the Ministry of War, headed by.

One of the most important links in the reforms was the introduction of the military district system in Russia. In 1864, according to the “Regulations on Military Districts,” the entire territory of the country was divided into 15 military districts. Military district directorates were military ministries in miniature, combining military administrative leadership and military command.

The process of reorganization of the central military administration lasted from 1862 to 1868. On January 1, 1869, it was completed with the release of the “Regulations on the War Ministry.” In accordance with it, the rights of the Minister of War were significantly expanded. The importance of the Military Council increased. Its five main committees resolved issues of the structure of the army, its internal administration, equipment, weapons, officer training, and legislative acts. Departments of the War Ministry were transformed into main directorates (there were 7 of them) with greater administrative rights being granted to their heads.

In 1863, the Department of the General Staff (as it began to be called in 1832) was transformed into the Main Directorate of the General Staff, which turned into a body that covered all the main issues of leading the armed forces in peace and war. In 1865, the Main Directorate of the General Staff and the Inspectorate Department were merged into the General Staff, which became one of the departments of the War Ministry. At the General Staff there were the Military Scientific Committee, the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, the editorial offices of the newspaper “Russian Invalid” and the magazine “Military Collection”. The staff of the War Ministry was reduced by a thousand people, and the volume of incoming and outgoing documents was halved.

On January 1, 1874, the Law on Universal Military Service was approved in Russia, which made it possible to create a massive modern army and have trained reserves.

Victory of the Russian army over Turkey in the war of 1877-1878. confirmed the correctness of the course of reforms carried out in the army under the leadership of D.A. Milyutina. In 1898 he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal.

Increased attention to the Russian armed forces during the reign of Alexander II led to a qualitative improvement in the military command and control system, a significant increase in the level of management activities of leading personnel, and the professionalism of commanders and chiefs of all levels.

However, at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. the military command system began to gradually lag behind the requirements of modern warfare, acquiring a cumbersome staff with many, including unusual functions. After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which revealed the shortcomings of the military administrative apparatus, in which society saw “the root of all our troubles and failures,” in 1905-1912. military reforms were carried out, largely preparing the army and navy for world war and restoring their reputation.

To combine the activities of the land and naval departments and organize interaction between them and other ministries, the State Defense Council (SDC) was created in June 1905. It included the ministers of war and navy, the chiefs of the General Staff and the Main Naval Staff, inspectors general of all branches of the military (weapons) and a number of commanders of military districts. Under the supervision of the CDF, a program was developed to restore the combat capability of the armed forces.

To renew and rejuvenate the senior command staff under the Council, a Higher Certification Commission was created in 1906, which mandatory considered all candidates for appointment to leadership positions from brigade commander and above.

The introduction of the positions of general inspectors of military branches (weapons) into the SDS in mid-1905 did not bring practical benefit to the army. They were either great princes or their associates. They interfered in the decisions of commanders of all levels, often disregarding their opinions and without coordinating their actions with the War Ministry.

In the same year, the Main Directorate of the General Staff was removed from the War Ministry. The position of Chief of the General Staff was re-established, reporting directly to Emperor Nicholas II. The military department was once again dismembered. The minister and his staff were involved in administrative and economic issues, and the Main Directorate of the General Staff was in charge of preparing the country for war in a strategic sense. A plurality of power was created, further disorganizing the army, which was already upset after the lost war. The need for radical measures to reform the military organization of the state became obvious again.

Due to acute disagreements with the tsar on issues of further military development and the subsequent resignation of its leader in 1908, the Council of State Defense lost its significance and was abolished a year later. After this, the power of the Minister of War increased significantly. He began to lead the Higher Attestation Commission and the inspector generals. At the end of 1908, the Main Directorate of the General Staff was also returned to the Ministry of War; the Chief of the General Staff became subordinate to the minister and became his closest assistant on military operational issues. Thus, the unity of the central military command was again restored.

Under the direct leadership of the War Ministry, a new organizational structure of the troops was introduced, a certain degree of technical modernization of the army was carried out, a new branch of the military was created - aviation, and some reduction in defense spending was achieved. At the same time, underestimation of the role of the domestic defense industry led to the fact that quite significant supplies of weapons, military equipment and ammunition were carried out to the army from abroad. This was one of the reasons for Russia's unpreparedness for the First World War.

With the outbreak of the First World War, leadership of the active army passed to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his headquarters; the War Ministry was responsible for meeting the needs and requirements of the front, from food supplies to the formation of new units and formations.

The reorganization of military command and control bodies was actively carried out during the First World War. In 1916, the Air Force Directorate was formed in the War Ministry, and in 1917, the Foreign Supply Directorate. Since 1915, a Special Conference on Defense was created to control the supply of the army and navy and coordinate the efforts of various departments.

The failures of the Russian army on the fronts of the First World War and the revolutionary events that were brewing in the country led to the fact that in three years, from July 1915 to October 1917, six leaders were replaced at the helm of the military department.

Military Department of the Soviet State

As a result of the October Revolution, by the end of 1917 the old Russian army ceased to exist. The creation of a new army was the first and most important task for the Bolsheviks who came to power. This was required by the external and internal political situation in the country. Volunteer Red Guard detachments were unable to maintain Soviet power and stop international intervention. As the first months of the Civil War showed, the “universal arming of the people” did not produce positive results. In connection with the abolition of the old links of the central military command, it was necessary to create a completely new system of command and control of the army and navy. Under these conditions, there was an acute shortage of command personnel, and the lack of experience in military development in the country's leadership was reflected.

The management of the newly created armed forces was established gradually, often spontaneously, and was distinguished by its multi-stage nature, and the names and functions of the governing bodies often changed. At the end of November 1917, the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs was formed, headed by the Collegium (its predecessor was the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs, then the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) for Military and Naval Affairs). Already in February 1918, it was divided into two people's commissariats - for military and naval affairs. By this time, the previously existing Military and Naval Ministries were disbanded.

The general management of the country's defense and the Armed Forces of the Republic since November 1918 was carried out by the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense (since 1923 - the Council of Labor and Defense), created by analogy with the State Defense Council of 1905-1909, which through the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) united the activities of two people's commissariats: for military and maritime affairs, developed and implemented plans for the country's defense, supervised the construction of the army and navy and military operations through the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the RVS of the fronts and armies.

Frequent changes of senior military leaders were characteristic of the period of formation of the military command and control bodies of the new army. The field headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Forces of the Republic developed strategic plans, collected and processed intelligence information, and provided command and control of the troops. After the abolition of the General Staff of the old Russian Army in May 1918, the All-Russian General Staff was created, which was engaged in the organization, mobilization, recruitment and replenishment of the army, and the training of command personnel.

The structure of command and control of the armed forces during this period was cumbersome and slow. Many bodies duplicated each other, and the number of staff reached 11 thousand employees and 9 thousand service personnel, while in the War Ministry of the Imperial Army in 1914 only about 3.5 thousand people worked.

At the same time, the new military administration bodies played a significant role in the victory of Soviet power and the strengthening of the workers' and peasants' state.

After the end of the Civil War and the formation of the USSR, the separate People's Commissariats were united in July 1923 into the all-Union People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. The People's Commissar was also the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In November, the first Regulations on the People's Commissariat were approved, defining its functions, tasks and organizational structure.

He became the first people's commissar for military affairs in the Soviet government. From 1918 to 1925 he was at the head of the military department. Despite the lack of military education, possessing high organizational skills, he quickly restored order to the troops and laid the foundation for military reforms, which were continued under his successor.

During the military reforms of the 1920s. The central administrative apparatus of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) was subjected to repeated reorganization. The centralization of management led to the merger in 1921 of the All-Russian General Staff and the Field Headquarters into the Headquarters of the Red Army. He was the executive body of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, and through him to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. The number of departments and directorates within the headquarters was reduced by half, their work was streamlined and their functions were clarified.

Head of the commission for the preparation and implementation of military reform M.V. Frunze emphasized that “this operational headquarters should become not only the brain of the Red Army, it should become the military brain for our entire Soviet state.”

Under the direct supervision and with the personal participation of People's Commissar M.V. Frunze created military scientific societies, the magazines “Military Science and Revolution”, “Red Army”, “War and Revolution”, the style and methods of work of the central apparatus changed, the personnel leapfrog stopped, the system of reporting of lower military command bodies to superiors, the first steps have been taken towards the technical re-equipment of the army.

However, starting from the second half of the 1920s, a wave of repression hit the command staff of the army and navy. The search for class enemies, hidden saboteurs, Japanese-German spies and saboteurs, Trotskyite-Zinovievite traitors caused irreparable harm to the entire system of the highest military command of the USSR.

The further development of the military control system was carried out on the eve of a new world war, in the context of the construction of a mass army and the introduction of universal conscription.

The Council of Labor and Defense, which had existed since the Civil War, was abolished, and instead of it, the Committee on Military and Naval Affairs was formed under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - a collegial body that united and coordinated activities to strengthen the country's defense and build the armed forces.

In 1934, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) of the USSR, under which a Military Council of an advisory nature was created. Since 1938, the Main Military Council of the Red Army began to operate, to which in 1940 the role and functions of the Military Council were transferred. He considered the main issues of the construction and organization of the Ground Forces and the Air Force, the organization and training of personnel, and the development of new types of weapons and equipment. In 1937, an independent People's Commissariat of the Navy was created.

Of great importance was the transformation in 1935 of the Headquarters of the Red Army into the General Staff as part of the People's Commissariat of Defense, which increased the efficiency of the entire central apparatus. Under the People's Commissariat of Defense, inspections of infantry, cavalry, artillery, air force, armored forces, signal troops and engineering troops were formed. New bodies were created: the Directorate of Military-Technical Supply, the Directorate of the Chief of Supply of the Red Army (Main Quartermaster Directorate).

As the military branches deployed and the tasks they solved became more complex, their departments were enlarged and reorganized into main ones, and departments for military development of the Red Army and airborne troops were formed. To carry out activities related to the preparation of pre-conscription and conscription contingents, carrying out regular conscription, registration and training of those liable for military service in the reserve, the NPO of the USSR had local military administration bodies (military commissariats) subordinate to the district military councils in the union and autonomous republics, regions, cities and districts. The authorized NGOs of the USSR continued to remain under the Council of People's Commissars of the union republics.

The measures taken contributed to improving the management of the Armed Forces. Under the leadership of the People's Commissar of Defense, significant work was carried out on the construction of the Armed Forces, their technical re-equipment, personnel training, training and education of troops. However, continuous personnel changes in the conditions of repression of the command and control personnel caused significant damage, primarily to the top and senior military leadership.

The most significant issues of restructuring the military leadership bodies were resolved during the Great Patriotic War and at a very high cost. “War is the most severe test of the ability to command troops,” the marshal emphasized in his memoirs. This test had to be passed.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the military leadership system urgently adapted to new conditions. By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command was created, from July 10 - the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and from August 8 - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC), which was subordinate to the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR. Chairman of the State Defense Committee, People's Commissar of Defense (from July 19, 1941) and Supreme Commander-in-Chief USSR Armed Forces (since August 8, 1941) became.

The General Staff became the main working body of the Headquarters for strategic planning and management of the army and navy. The General Staff was entrusted with the tasks of collecting and analyzing data on the situation on the fronts, preparing conclusions and proposals to the Supreme Command Headquarters, developing plans for campaigns and strategic operations, organizing strategic interaction between the armed forces and fronts, communicating to the troops decisions, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and monitoring them implementation, management of military intelligence, organization of operational transportation of troops, control over the formation and dispatch of reserves to the front.

Officers * representatives of the General Staff were sent to the troops to assist the headquarters of formations and formations (up to the division inclusive) and provide the center with objective information. To generalize combat experience, a department was created (from 1944 - management) for the use of war experience.

Other working bodies of the Headquarters were the People's Commissariats (Defense and Navy).

NPO departments solved problems of an organizational and administrative nature, dealing with issues of development, construction and training of the Armed Forces, their support, manning, equipping with the necessary technical means, and preparation for carrying out combat missions. The People's Commissariat of the Navy led the fleet, subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters and coordinating work with the General Staff of the Red Army.

At the Supreme Command Headquarters in May 1942, local headquarters were created to organize and manage the partisan struggle. To coordinate the actions of the fronts, main commands of strategic directions are created (Northwestern, Western, North Caucasian and Southwestern, abolished in 1942). For logistics support, the Red Army Logistics Directorate was created. The structure of command and control of the military branches was developed and improved, and the role and importance of headquarters in achieving continuous command and control of troops increased many times over.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, the military leadership system was strictly centralized. Supreme military and civilian power were concentrated in the hands of a single body, and a viable structure for managing the Armed Forces was formed from the Commander-in-Chief to Headquarters and from it to the General Staff, People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy. The troops had a system that had been well-established over the years: commander - headquarters at all levels (up to and including the battalion). In many ways, the perfection of the established organization, the talent of military leaders, the dedication and heroism of the command corps contributed to the victory of the Soviet people over the enemy.

After the end of the war, all emergency military administration bodies were abolished: State Committee Defense, Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces of the USSR, created as a result of the merger in February 1946 of the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy (since March - the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR), became the unified body for the management of the army, aviation and navy. The People's Commissariat also included the General Staff, which became its leading governing body.

In February 1950, the USSR Ministry of the Armed Forces was again divided into the USSR Military Ministry and the USSR Naval Ministry. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was transformed into the General Staff of the Soviet Army (SA), and then the Naval General Staff was created on its model. However, the Soviet government abandoned such decentralization of the highest military command already in March 1953, creating a unified Ministry of Defense of the USSR. The General Staff of the Soviet Army in September 1955 was transformed into the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, which included the Naval General Staff.

At this time, the military control system of the Soviet state was finally formed and included the following main elements. The highest leadership of the country's defense and the Armed Forces was carried out by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the highest bodies of state power - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The direct leadership of the USSR Armed Forces (except for the Border and Internal Troops) was carried out by the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by the Minister of Defense. The branches of the Armed Forces were subordinate to the commanders-in-chief, who were deputy ministers of defense.

The leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR was carried out by the Ministry of Defense through the General Staff, the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, the Logistics Headquarters, the Civil Defense Headquarters, and the main and central departments of the ministry.

The leadership of party political work was carried out by the CPSU Central Committee through the Main Political Directorate of the SA and the Navy, which worked as a department of the Party Central Committee.

In the post-war period, the highest body of military command played a leading role in equipping the Armed Forces with nuclear missile weapons, introducing modern types of conventional weapons, creating and developing new types of armed forces and branches of the military. Fundamental changes have occurred in the structure of the combat strength, armament and deployment of the Armed Forces and their groupings in various directions, and the organizational structure of their constituent formations and formations. The combat potential of the allied armies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the level of their interaction with Soviet groups of forces and border military districts were significantly increased. Ultimately, a military-strategic balance (parity) was achieved both in strategic nuclear forces and in conventional weapons, between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Department and NATO. Behind all this was the intense daily work of the leaders and ordinary employees of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

At different times, the Ministry of Defense was led by talented, bright personalities who, with their example, responsible attitude to business, and brilliant organizational skills, raised not only the work of the military department itself, but also the country’s defense capability as a whole to a new level.

During this period, profound structural changes were carried out in the Armed Forces and other troops, their partial transfer to being staffed only by military personnel serving under contract, with the creation of a training system for trained reservists, which made it possible in 2008 to reduce the conscription period to one year .
The elimination of framed units and formations and the formation of permanent readiness units on a contract basis were carried out.

Much attention was paid to the formation of a unified system for training military personnel and staffing the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as the reorganization of the military-industrial complex, ensuring the production of the required quantity of modern weapons and military equipment for the defense needs of Russia and its allies.

In accordance with the tasks of ensuring military security, the operational functions of the Armed Forces and other law enforcement agencies were revised in order to eliminate their duplication and ensure more effective coordination of their activities.

Has been installed one system military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation in order to allow law enforcement agencies to make full use of the country’s military infrastructure and avoid dispersal of forces.

The Ministry of Defense received the exclusive right to order military equipment and weapons, including for other security forces, as well as leadership functions in relation to the logistics support system of the security bloc.

A new silo-based and mobile-based intercontinental missile, Topol-M, was put into service.

On February 15, 2007, he was appointed Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. His name is associated with the launch of a radical reform of the Russian Armed Forces, giving them a “new look.” The catalyst that accelerated the decision to reform was the military conflict with Georgia in August 2008. The experience of the participation of the Russian Armed Forces in the conflict revealed a lot of problems associated with both shortcomings in the command and control system and outdated weapons, equipment and communications equipment. The official start of the reform was announced on October 14, 2008. The changes affected all main elements of the Armed Forces.

Thus, instead of six military districts, four military districts and four joint strategic commands were formed, under whose subordination the main groupings of all branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces were transferred.

The central military command and control bodies were reorganized and reduced, with a significant reduction in the role of the commands of the branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces. The size of the Armed Forces has been significantly reduced, including the number of officer positions.

The military education system has been reformed, consisting of the consolidation and transformation of 65 military educational institutions into ten systemic military universities. Military educational and scientific centers have been created that implement educational programs at various levels, profiles and specialties.

The Ground Forces were transferred to a brigade basis with the abolition of the divisional and regimental level and the transformation of all formations into permanent readiness forces.

The Air Force and Air Defense were reorganized with the abolition of armies, corps, divisions and air regiments and the transition to a system of air bases and aerospace defense brigades.

All support and maintenance systems for the Russian Armed Forces have been transferred to outsourcing (service by civilian organizations).

A rearmament program has been launched, providing for equipping the Armed Forces with the latest types of weapons and military equipment, including military production.

Currently, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is a federal executive body that carries out the functions of developing and implementing state policy, legal regulation in the field of defense, as well as other functions established by federal constitutional laws, federal laws, acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of Russia in this area. The activities of the Ministry of Defense are managed by the President of the Russian Federation.

The Ministry of Defense carries out the tasks of developing and implementing state policy in the field of defense; legal regulation in the field of defense; legal regulation of the activities of the Armed Forces and federal executive bodies subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense; coordination of the activities of federal executive authorities and executive authorities of constituent entities of the Russian Federation on defense issues, coordination of the activities of troops, military formations and bodies for performing tasks in the field of defense, as well as coordination of the construction of troops and military formations; coordination and control of the activities of executive authorities subordinate to the Ministry of Defense; organizing the use of the Armed Forces in accordance with federal constitutional laws, federal laws and international treaties of the Russian Federation; maintaining the necessary readiness of the Armed Forces; implementation of measures to build the Armed Forces; ensuring social protection of military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service and members of their families; development and implementation of state policy in the field of international military and military-technical cooperation.

The Russian Ministry of Defense is the governing body of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. It consists of the General Staff, main and central directorates and a number of other divisions.

The Russian Ministry of Defense includes the main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy), commands of the branches of the Armed Forces ( Missile Forces strategic purposes, Aerospace Defense Forces, Airborne Forces), Armed Forces Logistics Directorate, as well as other control bodies.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the main body of operational control of the RF Armed Forces, coordinating the activities and organizing the interaction of the RF Armed Forces and other troops in carrying out tasks in the field of defense. The General Staff comprehensively analyzes and evaluates the emerging military-political situation, determines trends in the development of means of warfare, methods of their use, organizes the training of the Armed Forces and carries out the necessary measures to ensure their high combat readiness to repel any aggression, and exercises control during the conduct of military operations.

The main structural divisions of the General Staff include: the Main Operations Directorate, the Main Intelligence Directorate, and the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate.

The main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces, the commands of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carry out the development and implementation of plans for the construction and use of branches (branches) of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, plan and carry out operational and mobilization training of their troops (forces), their technical equipment, personnel training, provide command and control of troops (forces) in daily activities, develop a system of basing and infrastructure.

The main and central directorates of the Russian Ministry of Defense are designed to manage certain areas of work or individual services on the scale of the Armed Forces. These departments report directly to the Minister of Defense or his deputies and closely interact with the General Staff.

Over its 210-year history, the Ministry of Defense has repeatedly changed its name, but its purpose has always remained unchanged - ensuring the territorial integrity and independence of the country, reliable protection of state interests.

Material prepared by the Research Institute (military history) of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

IMINOV VLADISLAV TAIROVICH, retired lieutenant general, candidate historical sciences, Professor.

At the turn of the 20th—21st centuries, the interest of the Russian public in the activities of the highest political, state and military bodies for the strategic management of the armed struggle of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War increased noticeably. And this is no coincidence, since the country and army management system created in that exceptionally difficult period for the USSR was at a fairly high level, was harmonious and well-balanced both vertically and horizontally, and most importantly - effective, capable of successfully and promptly solving problems incredible complexity. It was one of the significant factors that ensured the crushing defeat of the aggressor and played an important role in achieving the overall victory over Nazi Germany and its allies.

Such outstanding commanders as Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky gave a high assessment of the activities of the strategic leadership bodies and the system as a whole during the war, especially in its second half, in their memoirs. , I.S. Konev, other prominent Soviet military leaders, as well as a number of foreign political and military figures, including those representing the opposing side. However, the very victorious outcome of a war unprecedented in the history of mankind for the USSR, despite the mistakes and miscalculations that took place during its conduct, more than eloquently testifies to the superiority of the Soviet system of strategic leadership created during the war years over the German one, to the highest organizational and creative capabilities of those involved. in its composition of bodies, maturity, professionalism, responsibility and extraordinary abilities of the people who headed these bodies, and their “ordinary” employees.

At the same time, starting from the second half of the 1980s, and even now, one often reads and hears something exactly the opposite: in particular, the reasoning of some domestic “researchers-new readers” of the history of the past war that everything is as if in the course of its conduct it was “not so”, events in the state and on the Soviet-German front developed almost spontaneously, and the country, the peoples inhabiting it, defeated the formidable and insidious enemy not thanks to, but in spite of their leadership, due to a random coincidence of circumstances . Attempts were made, which, by the way, continue to this day, to prove that the Armed Forces of the USSR both did not know how to fight, and did not learn during almost four years of war hard times, “paved the road to Berlin with corpses”, that their Supreme High Command, and first of all the General headquarters as its “think tank”, almost until the end of the war, was not up to the task assigned to it, inferior in many respects to similar bodies of the strategic leadership of Germany, was responsible for large losses of Red Army troops, etc.

In fairness, it must be noted at the same time that, of course, the blame for the fact that the war began exactly this way and not otherwise lies largely with the system of leadership bodies, primarily such as the General Staff, which was unable to predict in advance the nature of the war. and the scope of the impending war, and in this regard it is necessary to take into account that not immediately their organizational structure and activities began to fully correspond to the scale of the unfolding armed struggle, the forms and methods of conducting military operations, especially at its beginning. The most appropriate and effective methods, techniques and style of work of the highest military administrative bodies were developed, developed and improved gradually, as experience was gained during the war, primarily in its first period.

And the point here, to a large extent, was that with the attack of Nazi Germany, the general system of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces that had developed in the USSR by the summer of 1941, acceptable mainly for peacetime, turned out to be of little use in war. It turned out, first of all, that the country did not have a single government body vested with emergency powers that could direct the war as a whole, and there was no Main Command of the Armed Forces. Moreover, there was not even an approved Regulation on their management in wartime. All this required an immediate reorganization of the structure and redistribution of the functions of the existing military-political and military strategic leadership bodies in the direction of its maximum centralization.

In order to concentrate all power in the country in one authorized body, on June 30, 1941, by a joint decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed. I.V. Stalin became its chairman. All decisions of the State Defense Committee as an emergency supreme body of power had the force of wartime law and were subject to strict implementation by all other government and public structures, citizens of the USSR. In terms of the conduct of military operations, the State Defense Committee, based on general political goals, determined the military-political tasks of the Armed Forces, outlined the forces and means necessary to achieve them, established the number and terms of conscription of those liable for military service, the volume of production of weapons, military equipment and military equipment , allocated resources for new formations of military branches, timing of their deliveries, etc.

On the second day of the war, June 23, 1941, by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Headquarters of the Main Command was formed. On July 10, 1941, in connection with the creation of three main commands of strategic directions - North-Western, Western and South-Western - by decree of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Main Command was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, headed again by I.V. Stalin. On July 19, 1941, he was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8 - Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On the same day, the Headquarters was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The Supreme Command Headquarters was the highest body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces. The range of tasks it solved was extremely wide: it planned and carried out measures to develop the army and navy and improve their organizational structure; determined the plans for military campaigns and operations, set tasks for the fronts and naval forces, and created appropriate groups to solve them; organized interaction between fronts and individual armies; supervised the creation of strategic reserves, logistical support for troops (forces), the partisan movement, etc. At the final stage of the war, Headquarters coordinated the actions of the Red Army troops with the Allied troops.

The main working body of the Supreme Command Headquarters for the leadership of the Armed Forces was the General Staff of the Red Army. Along with the Headquarters and the General Staff, other military command and control bodies also played an important role in their leadership. Thus, the preparation of strategic reserves and reinforcements for the active army was carried out by the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Red Army Troops (Glavuprform), created in July 1941. The implementation of tasks related to the development of artillery, aviation, armored, engineering troops, communications troops, and air defense was in charge of the relevant commanders and chiefs, their main and central headquarters. There was no special body for the leadership of the Ground Forces either in the pre-war years or during the war. The People's Commissariat of the Navy supervised the development of fleets and flotillas.

To centralize the work of rear services, in August 1941, the position of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army was established, subordinate to Headquarters (under the Chief of Logistics, the Main Logistics Directorate was created). Since May 1942, general management of the partisan forces has been carried out by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. It should be especially emphasized that all these military command and control bodies organized their work in accordance with the instructions of the General Staff.

One of the links in the general system of leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War was the intermediate authorities, which functioned initially as the main commands of strategic directions, and from the spring of 1942 - as an institution of representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters at the fronts. Objectively, the creation of these units was caused by the desire to bring leadership closer to the troops, increase the efficiency of their control and ensure coordination of the actions of groups of fronts that were solving one strategic problem. It is characteristic that the institution of representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, in contrast to the high commands of the directions, was preserved until the end of 1944. Most of the largest operations of 1945 were carried out under the direct leadership of Headquarters.

Usually, representatives of the Headquarters were sent to where, according to the Supreme Commander's plan, the main tasks were solved. In the operations of 1943 and 1944, representatives of the Headquarters also exercised direct leadership of the fronts, which contributed to the successful implementation of its directives, as well as orders of the General Staff, helped the command of the fronts (armies) make rational operational decisions, and organized interaction between formations on the spot. A.M. Vasilevsky, N.N. Voronov, G.K. Zhukov, A.A. Novikov, S.K. Timoshenko and others worked many times as representatives of the Headquarters.

Before the war, the competence of the General Staff, which was the main working body of the People's Commissariat of Defense, included the solution of both operational and basic administrative tasks relating to the composition, strength, structure, mobilization of the Armed Forces, their training, logistics, etc. By the middle In 1941, it consisted of 8 departments (operational, reconnaissance, organizational, mobilization, manning and service of troops, military communications, logistics and supply, military topographical) and 4 departments (fortified areas, military history, personnel and general).

During the war, the structure of the General Staff was repeatedly reorganized, and its functions changed. The main goal of these events was to free the General Staff from solving tasks unusual for it and to concentrate efforts on the operational management of associations with a clearly expressed specialization of each directorate and department. It must be said that it was not immediately possible for the General Staff to overcome the prejudiced attitude and some distrust of itself on the part of the country's top military-political leadership that took place in the pre-war period. It took some time and enormous effort from the entire staff of the General Staff before it was able to advance to what by definition belonged to the upper rung of the hierarchical ladder, to a leading role in the system of providing leadership to the Armed Forces, to turn into a competent, efficient and highly effective body, with whose proposals the Headquarters was forced was to be considered.

To a large extent, the improvement of the activities of the General Staff of the Red Army was facilitated by GKO Resolution No. 330 of January 28, 1941, which, along with other issues, determined the organizational structure and tasks of the General Staff in wartime, as well as the place and role of its chief in the overall system of senior military leadership. He, in particular, was given the right to sign, together with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, orders and directives of the Headquarters or give orders at his direction. As Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and a member of Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff was authorized to unite and coordinate the activities of all structures of the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, and to give a final conclusion on the compliance with the decisions of the Supreme High Command of the operational and organizational measures they planned.

In order to free the General Staff from administrative tasks not related to operational activities, organizational and mobilization areas, management of manning and service of troops, military communications, logistics and supply were removed from its composition. The General Staff retained operational, reconnaissance, military topographical, operational logistics and construction of fortified control areas, as well as departments: encryption, military history, personnel and general. In addition, on February 11, 1942, for closer communication with the troops, a group of officers was formed at the General Staff as a department - its representatives at headquarters from the front to the division inclusive (in June 1943, this group was reorganized into a corps of officers - representatives of the General Staff with subordination to the head of the operational department). The structure of the directorates themselves also underwent changes, primarily the operational one, the leading body of the General Staff. Instead of the departments that were previously in charge of the corresponding military districts, directions were created for each front (group of fronts) consisting of a chief, his deputy and 5-10 officer-operators. Along with this, special departments continued to function in the department (aviation, air defense, communications) and, in addition, new ones were created - operational transportation, organizational accounting and reserves.

All of the above and other changes were then reflected in the “Regulations on the General Staff” approved on August 10, 1941 by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which also determined the main directions for further improving the forms, methods and style of its work. The main requirements for the activities of the General Staff were: high professionalism of personnel, planning, efficiency, accurate calculations and comprehensive validity of the proposed decisions and measures.

The organizational restructuring and specification of the functional responsibilities of the General Staff allowed it to focus on resolving mainly those issues that were directly related to the management of military operations. “As a result of the reorganization,” Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov noted in his memoirs, “the General Staff became a more efficient, operational body and was able to carry out the tasks assigned to it much more effectively.”

The tasks of the General Staff were varied, complex and responsible. He was entrusted with: collecting, processing and assessing information about the situation at the fronts and in the rear; on the basis of this, developing proposals for the Supreme Command Headquarters regarding plans for military campaigns and operations of groups of fronts (often front-line operations), planning them in accordance with the decisions made by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief; developing orders, directives from Headquarters and other operational documents, communicating them to the troops and monitoring their implementation, as well as the development of operations on the fronts; creation of groupings of forces and means for conducting operations, organization of interaction between associations and formations of military branches; organizing operational-strategic transportation, managing the activities of all types of intelligence, analyzing its data and informing members of Headquarters, headquarters and troops; solving air defense problems of important administrative and political centers and industrial regions of the country; organization and arrangement of the operational rear of the army; management of the construction of fortified areas, the work of the military topographic service and the supply of maps to the active army; organization of a encryption service and provision of covert command and control of troops (forces). The scope of activity of the General Staff also included: operational training of command, headquarters, services and logistics agencies; development of regulations, manuals, guidelines for staff service; publication of theater descriptions; collection and synthesis of materials on the study of war experience and its implementation in combat practice, etc.

One of the important tasks of the General Staff in the final stages of the war was also the preparation of proposals, reports and materials on military issues discussed at government meetings and international conferences of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Through its structures communication was carried out with the headquarters armed forces allies in order to coordinate efforts for the final defeat of the opposing enemy - Nazi Germany.

During the war years, the General Staff acquired vast experience in operating in various conditions. As it accumulated under the influence of developments on the fronts and changes in the nature of the armed struggle, the qualifications of employees increased, the order, style and methods of work of both the General Staff as a whole and its individual structural units were improved. A significant role in this was played by Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the General Staff during the war (July 1941 - May 1942); Colonel General, from January 18, 1943, Army General, from February 16, 1943, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky (May 1942 - February 1945); General of the Army A.I. Antonov (since February 1945), other senior officials. The results of this process increasingly had a positive impact on the course of the armed struggle.

In total, during the Great Patriotic War, the Armed Forces of the USSR conducted, as is known, eight campaigns, of which two - the summer-autumn 1941 and 1942 - were defensive and six offensive, depending on what type of military action was the main one in this military campaign . At the same time, during defensive campaigns, Soviet troops also carried out offensive operations in certain directions, just as defense was used as part of most offensive campaigns.

Gradually, during the war, a certain, fairly harmonious and effective procedure for planning military campaigns was developed.

The General Staff, based on the military-political goals and tasks of the armed struggle, which at each period of time were determined by politics (political leadership), and in accordance with the emerging strategic situation on the entire Soviet-German front, 2-3 months before the start of the campaign, developed proposals and made preliminary calculations for the Supreme Command Headquarters regarding its general strategic plan, as well as the logistics of troops, the preparation of the required number of strategic reserves and their use, and on many other issues. The prepared proposals with the necessary justifications were reported by the Chief of the General Staff at meetings at Headquarters with the participation of members of the State Defense Committee. At the same time, only plans for initial (initial) operations were developed in detail. The subsequent ones were outlined in general terms, but they, as a rule, were provided in advance with human and material resources, a certain part of which arrived during the preparation of the campaign, and a large part - during it. Such operations were planned already during military operations, depending on the results of the initial operations. This was largely due to the fact that during military campaigns the situation usually changed quickly, the front line moved in one direction or another, the grouping of forces changed, new tasks arose that were not provided for in the plan, and the methods of conducting military operations also changed. All this forced the General Staff to make serious adjustments to the plans and plans of the campaigns, to create additional groupings of forces and means to conduct new operations. This is why most campaigns in the last war were divided into periods.

Defensive campaigns occupied a special place during the armed struggle. In them, the conduct of strategic defense by the Armed Forces of the USSR was not planned in advance, since the transition to it in both cases was forced. Under these conditions, the prevailing circumstances allowed the Headquarters to determine only the general goal and method of action of the troops: in stubborn defensive battles, combined with carrying out private offensive operations in a number of directions and launching counterattacks, to wear down, bleed the enemy, stop his advance and create conditions for launching a counteroffensive. To achieve this goal, it was almost impossible to outline any definite time and territory limits, since the strategic initiative was in the hands of the German command, and the course and results of defensive actions were influenced by a large number of factors that were difficult to take into account.

Nevertheless, what has been said does not mean at all that the armed struggle in defensive campaigns was carried out spontaneously, without the directing and coordinating influence of the Supreme High Command on its course. In order to stop and ultimately bleed the powerful strike forces of the Wehrmacht, the Headquarters and the General Staff had to, during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, revise many theoretical positions and views, in particular on forms of warfare, develop and put into practice new ones. Thus, based on an analysis of defensive battles in the initial period of the war, the General Staff came to the conclusion that in conditions of the large spatial scope of the armed struggle, its dynamism and intensity, the use of a huge number of troops and the latest military equipment, a sharp increase in losses and, as a result, a weakening of combat and numerical strength associations and connections of efforts of one front to solve problems in one or another strategic direction are not enough and that defensive operations in each of them must be carried out by forces and means of several (groups of) interacting fronts with the widespread involvement of long-range aviation, and in the coastal direction, naval forces.

With the beginning of this kind of operations (somewhere from mid-July 1941), the scope of the Wehrmacht offensive began to gradually decrease, and the pressure of its groups weakened, and the German command was forced to make certain adjustments to the initially developed plans. All this made it possible for Soviet troops to delay the enemy’s advance and inflict significant losses on him, thereby preparing the necessary conditions for launching a counteroffensive. However, to create such conditions, the Headquarters and the General Staff had to carry out several defensive operations, successive in depth, in the summer and autumn of 1941 in each strategic direction. Their simultaneous organization, as well as the management of the Armed Forces in the context of fierce battles, accompanied in most cases by a deep withdrawal of Soviet troops, required from the General Staff a colossal effort of strength, intelligence and will, the greatest efficiency and coherence in work. And we must admit that in the end he generally coped with these problems that had no analogues in the past.

The nature of the planning of military operations in offensive campaigns was influenced by the various military-political goals pursued in them, the specific strategic situation developing on the Soviet-German front, the different balance of forces and means in certain periods of the war, and other factors. The campaigns associated with the struggle to seize the strategic initiative (winter 1941/42 and 1942/43) began with a counteroffensive in decisive directions (Moscow - in early December 1941 and Stalingrad - in November 1942). Subsequently, as the results of the counteroffensive were revealed, the General Staff, in accordance with the decisions of the Headquarters, planned and organized new offensive operations, but on a wider front and to a considerable depth (general offensive). At the same time, it was not possible to avoid major miscalculations, which is most significant for the second stage of the winter campaign of 1941/42.

In the future, with the increase in the economic capabilities of the country, the combat power of the Armed Forces, and the accumulation of experience, the planning of offensive campaigns by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff becomes more and more skillful. It already clearly reveals elements of deep anticipation of the development of the situation, a persistent desire to impose one’s will on the enemy where it is beneficial to the Soviet side, not to give the enemy a respite after the defeats inflicted on him, and to concentrate the main efforts on solving the main tasks by delivering several simultaneous and sequential strikes.

All this took place already during the preparation and conduct of the winter campaign of 1942/43, the most important military-political events of which were the defeat German troops and their allies at Stalingrad, in the Upper and Middle Don, in the North Caucasus, breaking the blockade of Leningrad and others, but a particularly brightly creative approach to solving the urgent problems of armed struggle was demonstrated when planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. This campaign, generally offensive, began with a deliberate, comprehensively prepared defensive operation of two fronts in the Kursk ledge area, not forced, as was previously the case, during which Soviet troops repelled a powerful enemy offensive in the shortest possible time according to the “Citadel” plan, and then, going on a counter-offensive, which was also foreseen in advance by the plan of the Supreme High Command, they completed its defeat in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. Subsequently, the Red Army launched a general strategic offensive on the front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea.

In the campaigns of 1944 and 1945, the General Staff, drawing on the experience gained, demonstrated the highest level of skill in solving the problems of planning a strategic offensive through the sequential (along the front and in depth) and simultaneous conduct of a number of operations of groups of fronts, connected by a unity of concept and covering most of the or even the entire Soviet-German front. At the same time, the operational part of the campaign plans was worked out on maps. Other planning documents of the General Staff reflected all issues related to providing the fronts with reserves, weapons, transport, and materiel.

Before the start of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff created four strategic strike groups (in South Karelia and on the Karelian Isthmus, in Belarus, the western regions of Ukraine and Moldova), which alternately, without significant temporary pauses, went on the offensive at given targets. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in directions, forcing the enemy to urgently transfer available forces and means from one section of the Soviet-German front to another.

In the same campaign, the General Staff and the Supreme Command Headquarters showed that they were capable of successfully planning and carrying out not only successive operations along the front, but also in depth. Thus, during the offensive in the Balkans, Soviet troops for four months to a depth of 1100 km sequentially, one after another, practically without pauses, carried out the Iasi-Chisinau, Belgrade and Budapest (ended on February 13, 1945) offensive operations of groups of fronts and the Debrecen frontal operation . Moreover, the planning and preparation of each subsequent of these operations was carried out during the previous one. With this method of conducting an offensive, the enemy did not have time to fully restore its defensive front in the strategic direction.

In the 1945 campaign in Europe, the General Staff, fulfilling the task set by the Supreme Command Headquarters for the Red Army to complete the defeat of the armed forces of Nazi Germany, planned a strategic offensive through simultaneous operations, which made it possible to pin down almost all enemy forces in combat operations, depriving them of the opportunity to maneuver them along the Soviet- German front. This was facilitated by both the increased economic power of the USSR by the end of the war, the reduction in the length of the front line, and the significant overall superiority of the Soviet troops, as a result of which it became possible to create several powerful strike groups and almost simultaneously launch an offensive from the Baltic Sea to the Danube with the main attack on the Warsaw- Berlin direction.

In preparation for this campaign, its initial operations were planned in detail and in full, while further tasks of the troops were determined, as before, only in general terms, and the planning of subsequent operations itself was carried out during the strategic offensive, based on the specific situation.

The plan for the initial stage of the campaign was communicated, insofar as it concerned them, to the front commanders, who prepared their proposals for the participation of subordinate troops in solving the assigned tasks and presented them to the General Staff, where these considerations were considered, linked together and brought into line with the overall plan of the campaign. .

Based on the decisions made by the Headquarters, the General Staff, together with the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the headquarters of the military branches, and the Logistics Headquarters of the Red Army, developed operational directives and logistics directives for each front separately, as well as various instructions related to the preparation of operations. In accordance with them, plans for front-line operations were developed at the fronts, which were then approved by Headquarters.

In general, it must be said that during the war years, the General Staff gradually developed a well-defined, quite effective, repeatedly tested and proven in practice system of planning operations, characterized by a more detailed study of all related issues than in campaigns. In this area of ​​activity, the General Staff and Headquarters have accumulated truly unique experience.

An important area of ​​activity of the General Staff was to provide direct leadership of armed forces during military operations, which was expressed primarily in the practical organization at a high professional level of the implementation of decisions made by Headquarters, maintaining a favorable balance of forces in decisive sectors of the Soviet-German front, and timely orientation of front commanders and fleets for further actions, flexible response to all changes in the situation, in the creation and purposeful, rational use of strategic reserves and much more.

The General Staff successfully resolved such problems as achieving close interaction between troop groups, formations and units of military branches; conducting effective reconnaissance, improving the command and control system at all levels, carrying out operational camouflage measures, etc. Constantly in his field of attention were also issues of improving the organizational structure of troops, organizing the operational training of command and staff to perform tasks in a specific situation on the theater of operations.

All this contributed to the achievement of superiority of the Red Army troops over the Wehrmacht. The events of the Great Patriotic War indicate that the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff during its conduct more than once demonstrated brilliant examples of skillful, flexible planning and leadership of armed struggle, especially during offensive operations, against a strong and sophisticated enemy.